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US states have many policy options to promote short-term and long-term development 
of local economies and workforces. During the 1990s and 2000s, Alabama voters 
rejected a number of policy proposals designed with long-term, balanced development 
in mind, maintaining by default their state‘s capital-subsidy framework for economic 
growth. These outcomes were surprising; many observers expected the bills to pass 
because they were progressive and had strong business support. Using a power 
framework and methodology developed by Gaventa (1980) and others, this mixed-
methods study explores the way power was used to shape two vote outcomes. Through 
consideration of the historical, structural, and cultural makeup of the state, and 
mindful of theories about ―the end of Southern exceptionalism‖ (Shafer & Johnston, 
2006), the study develops hypotheses about the continued role of regressive 
institutions in shaping Alabamians‘ ideas about development. Content analysis of 
public debate suggests that ―jobs and development‖ arguments for the proposals were 
less resonant with voters than expected. Subsequent regression analysis of county-
level voting confirms that race still plays an important role in predicting voters‘ 
response to progressive development policies. This research is important because it 
focuses on the causes and durability of spatial inequality at the subnational level, a 
scale that has been neglected by social science but is a key site for public policy 
interventions (Lobao, Hooks, & Tickameyer, 2008). It also provides a lens for the 
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study of economically ―uneven‖ regions negotiating post-industrial change and a new 
knowledge-based global economy.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
During the last 30 years or so, US states have become increasingly involved in the task 
of economic development and, with the help of researchers, have sought to apply 
policies that will make them more competitive destinations for investment and skilled 
workers. While the history of development in the US created a persistently uneven 
distribution of resources among the states and regions, broad social forces like the 
growing domestic mobility of labor and more informed and responsive policymaking 
appear to have diminished history‘s ability to determine state vitality. At the same 
time, patterns of spatial inequality have proven durable such that certain areas seem 
―locked‖ into poverty and marginalization. If knowledge of ―what works‖ at the state 
policy level has increased, why have these places remained so underdeveloped?   
 
These questions and the social scale at which they are directed are timely. Most 
sociological research on both durable spatial inequality and on development has 
focused on the national or the city/local level, leaving the subnational scale a ―missing 
middle‖ (Lobao, Hooks, & Tickameyer, 2008). Yet understanding inequality at this 
scale is particularly important for a few reasons. Trends in governance such as 
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devolution and decentralization have increased the policy role of states, counties, and 
regions relative to the federal government (Warner, 2003). The national level is 
becoming less and less salient as an economic ―clearinghouse‖ as subnational 
governments and firms establish relationships with intra- and international 
counterparts (Bonnanno and Constance, 2003). Political cultures and ideologies are 
becoming markedly variant across subnational space, implying that the states will 
continue to act as policy ―laboratories‖ with potentially significant impacts on the life 
chances of different socio-economic groups within the same nation (Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004). At the same time, the nation-state as a global 
entity that sets macro-economic policies and contains a bounded workforce (Peterson, 
1981) has certainly not disappeared, meaning that external forces exert the same 
pressures across subnational space.   
 
Understanding why inequality and poverty tend to persist at certain subnational sites, 
and the extent to which governments at this level have the capacity to address these 
issues, should be a key goal for sociologists who hope to make a progressive policy 
impact with their research. A major consideration is power: how much power to make 
significant economic changes do state governments have, in the context of the above-
mentioned global pressures? What role does subnational civil society play in limiting 
or enabling this potential sphere of power? What determines the relative power of 
groups within civil society? Does the democratic process ensure that this distribution 
of power remains relatively even? These concerns are important because there appears 
to be some correlation between state political characteristics and socio-economic 
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status. States that fare worst overall on most human and economic development 
indices tend to be politically conservative (Gelman, Schor, & Bafumi, 2005), despite 
the fact that low-income voters in the US are more likely to favor liberal ideologies 
(Bartels, 2006; Stonecash, 2000). How, then, are conservative policy frameworks 
maintained, especially where progressive policies would seem most needed? 
 
Overview of the Study 
 
The Southeastern United States is a region of much persistent inequality, especially 
race-based inequality (Hattery and Smith, 2007). Low levels of taxation, minimal 
support for organized labor, and high proportions of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups such as African Americans are historical legacies in the region. The Southeast 
continues to have a reputation for racial division, anti-statism, and traditionalism, in 
part due to empirical evidence (Duncan, 1999; Botsch, 1982; Black & Black, 2002) 
and in part due to stereotype. Most scholars would agree that the region has a durably 
conservative politics that helps maintain limited government and the primacy of the 
market (Glaser, 1996; Felson & Kindell, 2007). At the same time, the region is 
challenging many of the old expectations. While a healthy regional economy 
stemming from low regulation has been the case for decades (Cobb, 1993), more 
recently major efforts by state governments—such as investments in education and 
new infrastructures, and support for new types of entrepreneurs—have made places 
like North Carolina and Tennessee into hubs of innovation (Lohr, 2010). Such 
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investments have a broad constituency: they are good for elites, good for state 
government, and good for struggling workers. 
 
How have these changes been possible in a region expected to maintain the status 
quo? Some, like Browder & Stanberry (2007), point to African American 
empowerment and ―practical‖ biracial politics during the New South decades of the 
70s, 80s, and 90s. Others, like Cotter, Schaffer, & Breaux (2006), point to converging 
cultural attitudes between the South and non-South. Polling by the Pew Research 
Center (2004) has shown that ―the South remains a more conservative region on racial 
issues, but the differences between the South and rest of the country are narrowing.‖ 
Perhaps most controversially, Shafer & Johnston (2006) believe that the growing 
importance of economic development and job creation during this period has wiped 
out traditionalist politics.  Using voting data, they have shown that while conservatism 
remains strong in the Southeast, its political base is now wealthy rather than White. 
This suggests that people began to vote for their economic interests even if that meant 
granting more power to progressive agendas.   
 
On the basis of this evidence, Shafer & Johnston conclude that the ―Southern 
exceptionalism‖ outlined by V.O. Key, where politics always comes back to race in 
the end, is more of an enduring myth than a reality. In either case, many scholars agree 
that traditionalist policy preferences (like racial discrimination) have been replaced by 
more pragmatic or ―instrumentalist‖ behavior. By extension, the choices by many 
Southern states to implement balanced development strategies based on public 
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investment and long-term planning is neither surprising nor unexpected but evidence 
of democracy at work. Therefore, this debate about the South is not just a matter of 
regional politics but of power in the American political structure. If policy preferences 
are now based on economic self-interest, even in an area of significant and persistent 
poverty, the implications for working-class alliances and equal access to power are 
remarkable.    
 
Yet just as blanket statements about the Old South are inaccurate, so may be blanket 
statements about the New South. This study accepts, to a large degree, the decline of 
race as the fulcrum of policymaking in the region, but maintains that the ―end of 
Southern exceptionalism‖ theory overly simplifies a large and variegated region. The 
role of traditional rationalities in socio-economic policymaking has not disappeared in 
all parts of the region or the policy area; it may be harder to identify because of 
changing rhetoric and alliances, but it persists nonetheless under certain circumstances 
in the South. One problem in identifying this role is the reliance of most such studies 
on opinion polling and analyses of national elections or Congressional responsiveness. 
At these levels factors such as partisanship and ideology may distort political 
preferences; analysis of local policymaking is a better place to look for evidence of 
pragmatism and pluralist decision-making, or its absence. 
 
This study aims to do exactly that. It is motivated by the recent experience of one 
state, Alabama, where voters in the 1990s and 2000s were plainly faced with the 
choice between a new type of pragmatic, balanced development and the status quo of 
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low regulation and minimal public investment. An unlikely alliance between state 
managers and powerful but moderate business groups resulted in a handful of policy 
proposals designed to increase the state‘s human capital resources from the bottom up 
and to address its highly regressive tax system. In all cases, voters rejected these 
proposals, choosing instead to support familiar ―top-down‖ or ―trickle-down‖ 
development policies. In the short term, these choices have benefited elites and the 
middle class, but in the long term and for other interest groups, instability and 
disadvantage remain structured into society. This has implications for the state‘s 
competitiveness in a knowledge-based 21
st
 century economy.   
 
How did Alabama come to make these choices? Was it merely democracy at work, 
with progressive development failing in the ―marketplace of ideas‖? This seems 
unlikely in a place where 35 counties are classified by the US Economic Research 
Service as low education counties and 22 counties are classified as persistent poverty 
(including 10 of the 11 African American-majority counties). It seems more likely that 
power skewed development policymaking in a way perhaps unique to Alabama. 
Whether and how race played a role in this process is not yet established, but it‘s 
evident that race and power are connected even if indirectly, through class. To claim 
that race plays only a minor role in contemporary Southern policymaking 
misperceives the strength of that indirect connection; as many social scientists have 
noted, ―ideas about race and economics are interwoven in ways that may be 
impossible to separate‖ (Carter, 2007; also Kruse, 2005). This misperception is a type 
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of power itself because it implies that the political process is fundamentally sound and 
does not need further scrutiny.  
 
This study explores political power in contemporary Alabama and how its 
configuration shaped recent development policy choices. The study‘s goal is to use 
this case not only to explore the complexity of the ―New South‖ and how historical 
legacy can shape the way contemporary locales interface with the global economy. 
The broader goal is to explore the nature of power in the American political system, in 
the heart of a region that has been described as ―America on steroids‖ (Carter, 2007). 
Using a sequential mixed methods approach (as described in Creswell, 2003), the 
distinctiveness of Alabama‘s development policy framework is established by 
comparing the state to six others within its region on preparedness for the ―New 
Economy.‖ A second stage compares three theories of power and their potential to 
explain recent policymaking in Alabama. The historical distribution of power is 
compared with today‘s arrangements and the mechanisms by which inequality may 
have persisted despite major political, economic, and cultural upheaval are considered. 
The third stage explores the public debate over balanced development policies, and 
subsequent voting, to empirically test whether such mechanisms were actually at work 
during the recent period of socio-economic policymaking. 
 
Significance of the Study 
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This study is significant because it looks at events that surprised the nation (New York 
Times, 1999; USA Today, 2003; Lattin, 2004) through a new and broader theoretical 
lens. Compelled by the unexpected rejection of these policy proposals noted above, a 
small handful of academic studies explored the vote outcomes using theories about 
racial threat (Roch & Rushton, 2006), the conservative role of religion (Bobbitt, 
2007), and the conflict between traditionalists and modernizers (Webster & Webster, 
2006). While each is critical in helping us understand how cultural and historical 
context contributed to Alabama voters‘ unique choices, none draws conclusions that 
go beyond its particular theory or the particular state. This is unfortunate because what 
happened in Alabama during that 15-year period has implications for our entire 
subnational policy process. Policymaking is, fundamentally, about patterns of 
power—who has it, how they get or keep it, and how it helps them prevail. What can 
be learned about power in Alabama may be broadly applicable. Because voters‘ 
responses to these balanced development policy proposals unexpectedly (and 
decisively) preserved inequality, because there are relatively few competing power 
blocs in Alabama, and because evidence of similar processes can be drawn from more 
than one event, the naked workings of power are much easier to observe than they 
might be in another state. Yet the actual policymaking process does not differ too 
much from state to state; the same types of institutions and federal laws apply, and the 
same groups—state and civil society—are involved.   
 
As the study of the relations between state and society and the social forces that affect 
policy outcomes, political sociology is well-equipped to grapple with these questions. 
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Three major theoretical frameworks—state-centered, pluralist, and class-based—are 
generally used to understand relations of power in society, each drawing different 
conclusions about power‘s distribution. A primary task is to determine which of these 
frameworks provides the best conceptual tools for understanding enduring inequalities 
in power and resources.  Armed with such tools, researchers can more accurately 
pinpoint the barriers to change and dismiss flawed conclusions—and misguided policy 
recommendations—that might be reached otherwise.  
 
Following Weberian models of social action, state-centered theories see the state as an 
autonomous actor with its own considerable interests—such as social stability and 
revenue production—and organizational capacities, making it a formidable power 
center (Orloff & Skocpol, 1984; Skocpol, 1992). Policy directions are determined by 
―the structure of the state as well as the policy-making activities of bureaucrats (who 
are seen as relatively autonomous from the pressures of social forces)‖ (Huber, Ragin, 
& Stephens, 1993: 5); power can be constrained by groups within civil society, which 
either compete or cooperate with the state in pursuit of particular interests. In terms of 
inequality, ideas such as regime theory (Stone, 1993) suggest that subnational 
governments can create coalitions and prioritize interests within civil society to 
achieve socio-economic goals, whether they are growth or redistribution. Inequality 
might persist where it did not fundamentally conflict with government goals or where 
power to address it was limited by civil society. 
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Conversely, society-centered theories expect power to reside in civil society, where 
maneuverings to gain relative influence over the state are the source of social change. 
In this way the state is an instrument that makes policies favorable to whichever 
groups have the most power. Society-centered theories differ in proposing that 
power‘s availability is either structured by economic relationships, or is free to all 
political agents. Marxian class-based theories suggest that power is finite in society 
and consistently accrues to the capitalist or elite class, which can shape policy 
directions to its liking both through direct monetary and ideological influence over 
governments and voters and through its structural position underpinning the markets 
that the capitalist state relies upon (i.e., Poulantzas, 1973). Inequality persists because 
these policy directions follow the logics of capital accumulation and profit, 
systematically disadvantaging non-elites and maintaining their powerlessness. States 
have limited ability to intervene in this system, but the dominant class can use the state 
to ameliorate uneven development where it threatens the smooth functioning of market 
processes.   
   
Pluralist theories also have Weberian roots, taking an individualist perspective on 
social action that also appears in neoclassical economic and political theories. 
Pluralism sees power as infinite in society and freely available to all agents, rejecting a 
determinist view of power‘s role in policymaking and suggesting instead that policy 
directions are negotiated by demand, as in a market. Policies are durable based on 
their popular support in civil society; in a democracy policymakers either respond to 
changing preferences or are voted out of office. Inequality persists because of 
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individual choices within commonly agreed-upon policy frameworks.  Subnational 
governments can intervene by aligning policies to the demands of a majority; if a 
majority prefers to tolerate inequality, unsatisfied minority groups have the mobility in 
a federalized system to relocate in more favorable places. 
 
Depending on the theoretical perspective used, the power to maintain or change how 
resources are distributed in society can be found in the state and its institutions, in the 
economic elite (e.g., the business sector), or in voters. Evidence supporting one power 
framework over the others can be found empirically and not just in the realm of 
theory, though. Evidence of political pluralism is the easiest to find because it is overt 
or ―one-dimensional,‖ focusing on observable behavior in a system that is assumed to 
be fair and open. Expressed preferences are taken at face value, and whoever prevails 
in a conflict situation is said to have more power (see Polsby, 1963). The other two 
frameworks do not make such assumptions and expect power to work in sometimes 
covert and indirect ways. One way this might work is by excluding certain choices and 
participants from the policy process altogether, making conflict unnecessary. Through 
the ―mobilization of bias,‖ the political system allows powerful groups to suppress 
dissent through intimidation or other means that which can be indirectly observed 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). But even the absence of conflict and the absence of 
intimidation does not necessarily indicate consensus, if power can actually shape 
preferences in support of certain agendas. Evidence of this ―third dimension‖ is hard 
to find empirically, but it is essential in a rigorous study of power and it can be done, 
as Gaventa (1980) has shown most convincingly.   
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In its analysis of Alabama‘s development choices during the 1990s and 2000s, this 
study falls short of but emulates Gaventa‘s rigor by considering not just the particular 
vote outcomes, but the historical development and contemporary maintenance of 
power relationships. If there is a pattern or causality to be discovered, it has broader 
applicability than the experience of one state. At a time when all states are facing the 
same global pressures and have the same policy tools at their disposal, some have 
chosen to use their engagement with the world economy to reduce inequality and 
underdevelopment and some have not. This study will identify some of the state-level 
factors that are predictive of these choices. 
 
Description of the Chapters  
 
Chapter 1 has introduced the research question— why might some places most likely 
to benefit from balanced development repeatedly reject this approach in favor of the 
status quo? The conceptual framework, power, that will be used to answer this 
question as well as the different theories that are generally used to understand power 
have also been introduced. This chapter has also identified the empirical case that will 
be used as a way to approach the research question and ultimately, to shed light on the 
concept of power. 
 
Before exploring state-level predictor variables for Alabama‘s development policy 
choices, the study must define and establish the dependent variable. Chapter 2 uses the 
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literature on state-level development policy to establish two ideal-type models—―first-
‖ and ―second-wave‖ development aimed at driving down costs for investors, and 
―third-wave‖ or balanced development aimed at public investment and capacity-
building—and the policies that tend to be associated with each. To accurately 
characterize a development approach as ―balanced,‖ it should have a net positive 
effect for the state‘s economy and people across a range of indicators like educational 
attainment and income. Despite strong growth and low unemployment during the 
1990s and 2000s, Alabama‘s approach to development appears somewhat unbalanced 
and may not be preparing it for long-term economic vitality. This conclusion is drawn 
through the triangulation of three types of secondary evidence and the comparison of 
the state to its regional neighbors, which have more similar economic, social, and 
political histories. Standard development indicators, rankings from three independent 
systems that classify states on their preparedness for the knowledge-based economy, 
and the presence or absence of key balanced development policies (suggested by the 
literature) are generally correlated across the states, and all suggest that Alabama‘s 
development approach is closer to the outdated capital subsidy model.   
 
Having classified Alabama‘s development approach as one more friendly to the 
interests of corporate investors than workers, the study next looks at why voters might 
go against their economic self-interest and reject progressive economic policies. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on power, comparing and contrasting three theoretical 
approaches—class-based, pluralist, and state-centered—that would give different 
explanations for these outcomes. Following Gaventa‘s (1980) methodology for 
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collecting data on power, interview and secondary data focus on the historically-
established relationship between different power blocs in Alabama and its potential 
effects on contemporary policymaking. Assuming a null hypothesis of pluralism, 
which is methodologically the easiest to support, the data are analyzed through a series 
of stepwise tests. There is adequate evidence to support pluralist theory and its 
assumptions of fairness in the political system. At the same time, for the more rigorous 
requirements of class-based theory there is also (partial) evidence; there is clearly a 
structured or ―self-perpetuating‖ aspect to economic inequality in the state yet 
significant conflicts of interest within the business sector disorganize class power. 
Little evidence of a state-centered system of power exists; in fact, the weakness of the 
state seems to enable the business community, especially the more conservative 
sectors. On the evidence from Alabama, Chapter 3 concludes that a structural-
institutional theory, which sees power in society as class-based but filtered through 
institutional contexts, best explains the relations between state and society. 
 
Chapter 4 begins by considering the role that institutions can play in a society‘s 
political system—not only do they provide rules and expectations but they can 
organize the way people see the world. The literature points to several institutions and 
ideologies that may be important in ―southern culture;‖ with these possibilities in 
mind, interview data were collected from diverse groups in Alabama to get a sense of 
what residents think the local society is defined by. The evidence suggests a central 
role for ―conservative‖ ideologies—anti-statism, traditionalism, religion, 
racialization—as well as the notorious state constitution, which has proven difficult to 
 15 
modernize and in many ways, serves as an institutional frame for conservative values. 
Chapter 4 then analyzes the public discourse surrounding the two major balanced 
development proposals of the 1990s and 2000s, coding the rhetoric in reference to 
these value categories. It appears that opponents of balanced development policies 
drew heavily upon conservative principles and economic self-interest to motivate 
voters, while supporters focused on statewide economic development and pragmatic 
reasons to pass the bills. The chapter‘s analysis suggests that conservative ideologies 
parallel the value system set out by the state‘s key political institution, so they are 
more familiar to voters and give conservative interests an advantage over progressive 
interests.   
 
Understanding the ways that powerful actors frame policy issues is more useful if it‘s 
clear how and why these frames resonate with their audience. In Chapter 5, statistical 
analysis is used to explore whether ―No‖ voters acted out of self-interest or for 
ideological reasons, by establishing relationships between opposition and county-level 
demographic characteristics. Regression analyses of each vote outcome, especially 
when looked at comparatively, reveal a complex interplay between race, religion, and 
self-interest. Self-interest was clearly an important predictor; voters in counties with 
fewer school-aged children (and thus less of a stake in state education investment) 
were more likely to oppose both measures. However, a much stronger predictor was 
race; counties with more Whites were the strongest opponents of both progressive 
proposals, even after controlling for other factors like income—which complicates the 
self-interest explanation. One possible explanation is the role of religion among 
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Whites. Alabama is a highly religious state, with Evangelical Protestantism (i.e., 
Baptism) the largest single denomination. White voters in counties with a higher 
proportion of religious adherents were more likely to support the measures, while 
White voters in counties with a higher proportion of Evangelical Protestant adherents 
were more likely to oppose the measures. While individual voting could not be 
tracked, aggregate voting data suggests that an Evangelical voting ―context‖ is 
qualitatively different from a merely religious context, provoking a more conservative 
set of development policy preferences. This dominant religious ideology is reinforced 
by a generally conservative political and cultural context in Alabama. 
 
The study‘s findings suggest that institutional, structural, and cultural variables at the 
state level determine the relative power of capital, state government, and the public to 
set political agendas, achieve goals, and facilitate or ward off change. The recent 
literature on social policy formation, although generally focused on national level 
policymaking, provides theoretical support for these findings in pointing to at least 
some interaction effect between class power and political institutions. Hacker & 
Pierson (2002) have explored this interaction and conclude that ―the ability of 
particular economic actors to exert influence [depends] heavily on institutional 
variables‖ (304) and that such variables are subject to policy feedback processes 
potentially reinforcing certain political processes, preferences, and strategies. Jenkins, 
Leicht, & Wendt (2006) also conclude that state policy is a ―joint effect of class forces 
and political institutions‖ (1124), with effects that may be additive, mediating, or 
magnifying, with path dependence playing a potentially significant role in all cases. In 
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Alabama, the third possibility—that ―political legacies (earlier policies and the class 
mobilization /institutional complexes behind them) aid class mobilization by 
magnifying their effects on subsequent policy outcomes‖ (1128)—seems likely.  
 
However, this magnification of class power does not play out smoothly; socio-
economic policymaking reveals a significant bifurcation in the way business can 
leverage its economic advantages into political and social advantages. In struggles to 
reform policy areas bearing on development, the more ―moderate‖ or pragmatic 
sectors of capital has been less successful at recruiting voters to its position than the 
conservative sector, despite the public benefits of the former position and the past 
willingness of disadvantaged groups to take a clear position against inequality (e.g., 
the Civil Rights era). The interaction between institutional and class effects may be 
conditioned by a third factor which has been suggested by Alabama voters‘ 
conservatism: cultural norms or values. In identifying this additional factor, this study 
makes an important contribution to the understanding of subnational social policy 
formation. The conditional causality suggested by this study complicates the one-size-
fits-all ―end of Southern exceptionalism‖ theory, and helps explain why social 
inequality and uneven development continue to threaten places where no price is too 
high to pay for job creation.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT MODELS AND THE US SOUTH 
 
Introduction 
 
For decades, the U.S. Southeast favored industrial recruitment as the dominant 
economic development policy of state and local governments (Tomaskovic-Devey & 
Roscigno, 1997). This ―particularly southern and conservative pattern of economic 
development‖ has included ―the encouragement of low-wage job growth…and very 
low levels of protective legislation for workers, transfer payments to the poor, and 
controls over business activity‖ (Roscigno & Tomaskovic-Devey, 1994: 603). For 
many years, these conditions attracted economic flows seeking low-cost, low-
regulation environments, but their ―footloose‖ nature meant that local benefits like 
jobs and tax revenue were often short-lived. With comparatively little investment in 
human capital and public goods, many of the region‘s people were deprived of the 
long-term opportunities and empowerment that come with increased education and 
skills. Educational attainment as well as wages have remained persistently low, and 
poverty persistently high, in many areas of the Southeast (Lichter, Parisi, Taquino, & 
Beaulieu, 2008; Swanson, 2005).   
 
More recently, though, the region has experienced considerable growth, in terms of 
both human and capital flows. Unlike other former centers of manufacturing, like the 
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Rust Belt, the Southeast became a new regional base for heavy manufacturing and 
high-tech industry during the past twenty years or so. These changes are notable 
because they occurred as global economic restructuring was shifting much of the 
world‘s industrial development into the Global South. The reputation for business 
friendliness and low costs probably continued to attract external investors to this part 
of the U.S., but the most successful states in the region have also embraced the ―New 
Economy,‖ a ―global, entrepreneurial, and knowledge-based economy in which the 
keys to success lie in the extent to which knowledge, technology, and innovation are 
embedded in products and services‖ (Atkinson & Andes, 2008: 3).   
 
New Economy strategies like greater investment in education and training, support for 
local entrepreneurs, or the upgrading of communication and travel infrastructures all 
result from proactive state policymaking (ibid.). Such strategies require more 
commitment to public goods and central planning than has historically been the case in 
the tax-averse Southeast. States that pursue this approach must balance existing 
preferences with a new set of values: openness, innovation, expansion of 
opportunities—as well as the dismantling of traditional social structures that prevent 
economic dynamism. Western societies have repeatedly faced these choices in times 
of major economic transition, and it is clear that overcoming these political barriers 
opens up a much broader range of opportunities for state and civil society. 
 
Despite aggregate growth across the region, such forward-looking changes have not 
been made uniformly throughout the Southeast. Although global economic change 
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exerts the same pressure everywhere, places respond to it differently based on local 
circumstances. Compared to neighbors like Georgia and North Carolina, which have 
chosen to nurture higher education and high-tech R&D alongside the traditional 
manufacturing base (Bennof, 2002; American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, 1997), states like Alabama and Tennessee are known for their continued 
emphasis on capital subsidy and incentive programs (Delinski, 2011). This approach 
has also been successful in some important ways: by making themselves attractive to 
heavy manufacturing, these states were able to upgrade many middle-class jobs and 
increase their tax bases over the past twenty years or so while keeping unemployment 
low (Arit, Erdimir, & Seaton, 2008). For historically poor states, increasing the tax 
base—no matter how—may be an essential first step before any investments in the 
knowledge economy can be made. However, it stands to reason that an ongoing focus 
on capital subsidy will eventually become a less balanced model for development, 
since keeping the costs of production low may reduce investment in certain public 
goods that are required to compete over the long-term.    
 
Most research on state-level economic development focuses on the straightforward 
economic outcomes of different strategies and policies. Even those studies that 
consider a broader range of outcomes such as equity, opportunity, social mobility, and 
stability tend to focus on states as individual units. For example, major reports from 
the National Governors‘ Association and National Conference of State Legislatures 
refrain from regional and comparative analysis, highlighting best practices instead—
probably for political reasons, or because there are so many state-level variables at 
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play. Looking at state-level economic development strategies in isolation—from 
geographic region, from historical experience, from demographic makeup—is a 
necessary project from a descriptive standpoint, but it does not help with inference. It 
is important to understand why certain places have chosen certain strategies. To what 
extent does path dependence shape the choices that are made by policymakers and 
voters? Are states constrained in their development policy choices by history or other 
factors? Or do local choices result from purely local calculations?   
 
These distinctions matter because of an ongoing theoretical debate about subnational 
governance (with important real-world implications). As Green (2003) has explained, 
the ―structuralist‖ perspective expects that external conditions (for example, national 
trade policy or increasingly mobile capital flows) constrain state governments‘ ability 
to shape local economies. This forces places to adopt what marginal measures they 
can to gain a competitive edge, resulting in a development approach that can be 
reactive and competitive rather than proactive and redistributionist. On the other hand, 
the ―regime‖ perspective expects state government to have a fairly broad capacity to 
shape local economic conditions. This power can result in a competitive or a 
redistributionist approach depending on local circumstances; in other words internal 
conditions shape the choices of local governments too. Knowing which theory better 
describes reality can help policymakers and voters understand their own power and the 
range of choices that are available to them.   
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Considering these theories on a national scale is difficult because there are so many 
U.S. states and such diversity of history and experience. Focusing on a small group of 
historically, geographically, and culturally similar states such as those in the Southeast 
region may be a bite-sized way to approach this issue. This chapter will explore 
Alabama‘s policy choices and development outcomes in the context of the Southeast 
regional experience. After giving an overview of the history of Southern economic 
development policymaking to establish the states‘ similar experiences, the first part of 
this chapter‘s data analysis will compare the group on different indicators of 
development—income, educational attainment, and so on—to see whether there has 
been much difference over time; i.e., did today’s high-performing states “start out” 
with more economic advantages? Static position over time suggests that states can‘t 
change the hand they have been dealt.   
 
Then, after reviewing the literature to better understand the differences between the 
two development ―models,‖ the states‘ development approaches will be categorized 
between those that have established the conditions for balanced development, and 
those that are still focusing on capital subsidy and aggregate growth. Does a balanced 
development approach actually correlate with better development outcomes? Finally, 
the chapter will explore any major differences in policy adoption during this period 
that may have contributed to the different outcomes. Are certain policy choices 
correlated with better outcomes? If so, this would suggest that state governments do 
have considerable agency in development, and are not just at the mercy of external and 
historical conditions. The triangulation of three different kinds of data should be 
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enough to draw some suggestive conclusions about the power that state governments 
have to be proactive, rather than just reactive, about economic development.  
 
Secondary data for this study were collected from a variety of sources, most of which 
were government-produced or government-sponsored (including foundations, 
university-affiliated researchers, and in some cases by non-profit ―watchdog‖ 
organizations).
1
 The data are organized into comparative tables and visually inspected 
for similarities and differences both within and between tables; e.g., between states 
and between efforts and outcomes. Because of some conflicting information due to the 
different sources, different weighting of index components, and ad hoc availability of 
state policy information, some generalization is unavoidable and noted. As such, the 
conclusions this chapter reaches about patterns and correlation may be different than 
the conclusions another study might reach using the same data. 
 
Variables for comparison will be limited as much as possible—in particular, the 
number of state cases in the group. The Census-defined region contains states that may 
be geographically South but did not share the 20
th
-century experiences of the ―Deep 
South‖ typified by Alabama—namely, the residuals of a plantation economy (such as 
                                               
1
 In a paper prepared for the US Economic Development Administration, Poole, 
Erickcek, Iannone, McCrea, & Salem (1999) explain that  
“economic development data are derived from two basic sources: primary and 
secondary…one common type of secondary data used for evaluation reports is 
government-generated data. Such data are collected by an organization other than the 
entity being evaluated (or the evaluating entity).  In practice, secondary data tends to 
be quantitative in nature and is typically collected under scientifically rigorous 
conditions for general socioeconomic analysis purposes” (50).   
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peripheral economic status, Civil Rights-era strife resulting in statewide enforcement 
of the Voting Rights Act, and a significant number of counties with high minority 
populations). Some states within the prototypical Southern region have had 
significantly different in-migration patterns or demographics (such as Florida or 
Texas) or are on the cusp of another influential sub-region (Kentucky). This chapter 
will confine its comparison to 7 states: Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, 
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The time period of comparison will also 
be limited to the post-NAFTA period of 1990-2010 because this watershed policy had 
a tremendous effect on state economic fortunes and strategies. Finally, the breadth of 
state policies to be compared will be limited only to those expected to directly, and 
most markedly, affect economic development profiles.  
      
A Brief History of Economic Development Policy in the South 
 
The Southern US has always played a unique and disproportionate role in the shaping 
of the nation‘s economic and ideological trajectory. Here, elements of the national 
culture seem ―distilled‖ into their most concentrated form; global forces facing the 
nation seem to have a concentrated effect. Although the South often seems very 
―different‖ from the rest of the country, its translation of these factors into policy 
creates templates that other regions often follow, willingly or not—perhaps an apt 
metaphor for the relationship between the US and the rest of the world.   
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Economic development policy in the US South underwent a qualitative change during 
the 1950s and 60s with the shift in the region‘s relationship to the federal government; 
where national investment in the region once aimed to address poverty and inequality 
through social welfare programs, the new strategy funneled defense dollars in to 
subsidize a new industrial foundation for the Southern economy (Schulman, 1991). 
The decoupling of federal money from social prescriptions and spending regulations 
was well-received by state leaders, who in turn provided reliable Congressional 
support for defense policies. They believed that the region‘s race- and class-based 
antagonisms would be ameliorated by growth, not federal intervention. And indeed, 
huge expansions in the nation‘s defense and aerospace budget during the 1970s 
following a period of rapid southern industrialization left the region well-positioned to 
gain a large share of significant new capital sources.   
 
Furthermore, defense-related economic growth seemed to have long-term benefits that 
would outlive the Cold War, because it spurred capital upgrades suitable for newer, 
more flexible sectors like high-tech manufacturing and service while curtailing those 
older, geography-dependent sectors like agriculture and resource extraction. By the 
70s, the South was starting to set the nation‘s economic pace in many ways, with its 
aggressive recruitment of corporations and research centers, its preference for fiscal 
federalism, and its maintenance of low business tax rates and low wages for less-
skilled workers (ibid.); this ―first wave‖ development strategy, reliant upon the 
attraction of external investment capital would create a dynamic of regional 
competition that probably prepared the nation for future economic globalization 
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(Drabenstott, 2006). This economic model of externally-driven investment disbursed 
in a top-down fashion remains important in Southern development strategies because 
it was so successful and because it dovetailed with existing preferences vis-à-vis social 
organization. 
 
After the initial defense boom, the pro-growth economic model continued to increase 
the South‘s share of manufacturing employment during the 70s and early 80s. Auto 
and aircraft makers, electronics, and electrical machinery all migrated to the region, in 
part because of the infrastructure that the defense industry had created. However, a 
major component of the South‘s appeal to business during this period was anti-
unionism. The region‘s policy toward its relatively unskilled, low-wage workforce 
was codified in right-to-work laws, which existed in 21 states by the mid-1980s (the 
eleven southern states plus some western and mid-western states) (Eisinger, 1988: 
165). As Schulman (1994) explains, Southern cultural and economic history can 
partially account for this structural and ideological theme in the region‘s economic 
development trajectory, but exogenous factors were important too: Defense 
Department regulations unfavorable to labor, increased mechanization in high-tech 
sectors, and Cold War tensions all diminished labor‘s potential power in these 
industrializing economies. Fewer cost-inducing regulations for employers and the 
assurance of a cooperative labor force made these states comparatively attractive 
during this period. Tax incentives also continued to attracted business to the South: 
while state governments in all regions began to offer these prizes in the form of low 
corporate tax rates, low property taxes, and generous debt financing plans, abatements 
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(apparently the most valued form of incentive among businesses) had been a Southern 
innovation and were most consistently applied throughout this region‘s localities. 
Regional consistency was important because individual state policies often had low 
visibility for industrial recipients during this period (Eisinger, 1988: 145). 
 
The favorable business climate, along with the continued legacy of federal defense 
investment, recreated the region as a pioneer in technology research and development 
during the late 1980s with areas such as the Research Triangle in North Carolina, the 
Microelectronics Research Center in Georgia, and NASA‘s Space Flight Center in 
Alabama. Such projects were the foundation of the new ―Sunbelt‖ economy which 
cast the South as the nation‘s fastest-growing region. These successes helped shape 
new national understandings of the state‘s role in fostering economic development, 
making the South an ideological proving ground for the theories of devolution and 
decentralization which became popular during this time. Federal regulation and 
planning were believed to inhibit the free movement of capital, but state and local 
governments became essential actors in facilitating partnerships and developing 
policies that would encourage private investment. Deregulation and devolution were 
seen as effective ways to drive down the costs of doing business, and as Drabenstott 
(2005) remarks, ―this ‗New Federalism‘ was a critical turning point in economic 
development and led development practitioners to engage more private sector players 
in development strategies‖ (125).   
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With the broader establishment of market-led development and the acceleration of 
direct foreign investment by American firms, the South‘s advantage in recruitment 
dissipated just as it was becoming more important for states to demonstrate their 
attractiveness. At the same time, the wealth that was pouring into the South was not 
spreading evenly between communities and locales; problems of urban blight and rural 
decay were becoming increasingly visible. This phenomenon was, of course, not 
confined to the region, but existing race-based inequalities and lower levels of human 
capital attainment among minority groups were particularly marked here, especially 
because of the region‘s greater racial diversity (Squires, 1994). One of the responses to 
this changing environment was an extension and intensification of the ideological 
themes that had spurred deregulation and decentralization. In keeping with an 
increasingly accepted neoliberalist public discourse, development agencies, public 
officials, and business leaders proposed that competitiveness and efficiency would not 
only encourage external investment and firm retention, but would also generate 
aggregate wealth that would ―trickle down‖ to underperforming and distressed areas, 
without needlessly throwing money at them (ibid.).  
 
As Squires explains, the 80s and 90s were a period of ―growing disenchantment with 
the potential of liberal reforms…[opening] the door to neoconservative contentions 
that little could be done in the policy area, particularly in terms of government 
intervention, to mitigate these problems‖ (1994: 16). In federal and state development 
programs throughout the nation, aggregate growth and support for the most 
competitive locales and industries were seen as primary goals, which would facilitate 
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the secondary goal of ameliorating the condition of poorer communities (Warner, 
2007). The Schumpeterian concept of ―creative destruction‖ and natural economic 
―lifecycles‖ provided a moral explanation for policies that directed resources toward 
thriving locales and withheld aid from uncompetitive ones (Squires, 1994).   
 
Development strategies focused on broad access to opportunity were seen as less 
efficient and perhaps wasteful. For example, despite clear evidence that unionization 
rates are tied to greater class- and race-based equality in a locale (Reich, 1981) federal 
and state policies generally continued to adhere to business demands for easily hired 
and fired labor pools, particularly in the right-to-work states. Although these states 
experienced slower income growth rates throughout the early 80s, they continued to 
add jobs and external capital investments more quickly (Eisinger, 1988), confirming 
the expectations of supply-side and neoliberal ideology. However, the employment 
growth was becoming increasingly concentrated in the tails of the distribution, with a 
wage polarization between new jobs easily created through recruitment of low-wage 
industries and new jobs less easily created through workforce development and 
recruitment of or upgrading to high-tech and professional industries (Bluestone & 
Harrison, 1988). Growth in the form of minimum-wage, service-sector, and migrant-
filled positions was most common: between 1979 and 1987 the U.S. economy lost 1.9 
million manufacturing jobs and gained 13.9 million in the service sector (Squires, 
1994: 101)—jobs which have a less significant and lasting effect on local qualitative 
development processes. The Midwest and South were most affected, the Northeast 
region least. While the global structural changes that contributed to these 
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reconfigurations cannot be attributed merely to weak labor policy preferences in these 
regions, the widespread implementation of these policies as an ―unavoidable‖ factor in 
maintaining American and regional competitiveness certainly eroded the social norm 
of employers providing secure jobs with a livable wage.  
 
Since the South had been so successful in achieving growth goals with the capital 
subsidy strategy that it had pioneered, and since there seemed to be little evidence or 
taste for bottom-up strategies, the region continued to pursue external investment 
toward the end of the century. As Eisinger remarks, ―states in which incentives had 
originally appeared…continued to trust in their effectiveness‖ (1988: 62; also Cobb, 
1993)—after all, capital mobility had clearly benefited the region—and saw that they 
offered a relatively quick and easy route to continued regional competitiveness. To a 
large extent, the research of Saiz (2001) and others suggests that many of the southern 
states continued throughout much of the 90s to see the cheap cost of doing business as 
their comparative advantage. 
 
Development Outcomes in Comparison and Over Time 
 
For historical reasons, the Southeast began the late twentieth century with relatively 
fewer economic and human resources than most of the rest of the US, and the South 
continues to exhibit some regional distinctiveness in terms of its development 
paradigm. As mentioned above, the region tends to be a less regulatory environment in 
general, with lower taxes and less stringent labor and environmental protections. It 
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continues to allocate relatively more financial resources to capital subsidy strategies 
such as tax abatement, and to use them more frequently than any other region (Poole 
et al., 1999). Yet evidence suggests that within the South, most states have been able 
to make remarkable gains in development over the past 20 years or so. Key indicators 
such as educational attainment and earnings have increased approaching the national 
average. Of the 13 Census-region Southern states with educational attainment lower 
than the national average in 1990, four (Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, and Florida) 
were within three percentage points of the national average in 2006 (US Census 
Bureau, 1990, 2006). Of the 12 states with median earnings lower than the national 
average in 1990, four (Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee) were 
within $5000 of the national average in 2006 (US Census Bureau, 1990, 2006).   
 
Did today’s high-performing Southeastern states (for example, Georgia and North 
Carolina) “start out” with more economic advantages in the recent past, a time 
period in which subnational governments gained more policy responsibility? As 
suggested above, static position over time suggests that states can‘t much change the 
hand they have been dealt and justifies a structuralist theory of development. In this 
section, the group of seven states is compared over time on some major indicators of 
human and economic well-being: educational attainment, income, employment status, 
poverty, and GDP. Indicators come from Census data over a thirty-year period and are 
indexed, where applicable, to current figures. The measure of educational attainment 
used is ―Bachelor‘s Degree or more‖ because the vast majority of Americans now 
have high school diplomas whereas completing a 4-year college education is still out 
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of reach for most people in most states. Yet achieving this credential (or higher) was 
associated with at least $21,000 more in yearly earnings in 2009 (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2009). Median household income is used for the most accurate picture of the 
income range within a state. Percent in poverty, gross state product, and employment 
status (the unemployment rate) apply to each state at the start of the year in question. 
All state-level figures are compared to the US average.   
 
Table 1: State Development Indicators Over Time 
a: Percent of resident population earning Bachelor‘s Degree or more; b: Given in 2009 dollars; c: Percent in labor 
force that are unemployed; d: Percent of resident population in poverty; e: Given in billions of 2008 dollars  
Sources: US Census 2010 Statistical Abstract  
*Mean of 50 states 
 
 
Indicator Year US AL TN MS GA LA NC SC 
Educational 
Attainment
a
 
1980 16.2 12.2 12.6 12.3 14.6 13.9 13.2 13.4 
1990 20.3 15.7 16.0 14.7 19.3 16.1 17.4 16.6 
2000 24.4 19.0 19.6 16.9 24.3 18.7 22.5 20.4 
2007 27.5 21.4 21.8 18.9 27.1 20.4 25.6 23.5 
Median 
Household 
Income
b
  
1984 44,074 34,037 32,998 30,340 39,294 37,259 40,445 39,933 
1990 47,637 37,159 35,942 32,101 43,847 35,644 41,887 45,715 
2000 52,301 44,122 42,468 42,721 52,190 38,261 47,726 46,795 
2009 49,777 39,980 40,517 35,078 43,340 45,433 41,906 41,101 
Unemploy-
ment Rate
c 
1980 7.1 6.9 6.3 6.3 5.3 6.9 5.2 5.4 
1990 5.6 6.3 5.2 7.9 5.1 5.6 3.5 4.7 
2000 4.0 4.1 3.9 5.9 3.6 4.6 3.4 3.7 
2010 9.7 11.1 10.7 11.0 10.4 7.4 11.1 12.5 
Poverty
d
  1980 13.0 21.2 19.6 24.3 13.9 26.3 15.0 16.8 
1990 13.5 19.2 16.9 25.7 15.8 23.6 13.0 16.2 
2000 12.2 15.6 13.5 18.2 12.6 20.0 13.1 14.4 
2007 13.0 16.9 15.9 20.6 14.3 18.6 14.3 15.0 
Gross State 
Product
e 
         
1990 132.6
*
 83.2 110.5 44.9 164.8 108.0 162.6 76.0 
2000 195 114.5 174.8 64.2 290.8 131.5 273.7 112.5 
2008 230.5 137.1 210.2 71.7 329.4 144.8 329.4 127.1 
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Figures 1a-e: Comparative State Development Indicators Over Time 
          
 
 
       
 
 
                                        
 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1a show that residents of these Southeastern states all had lower 
educational attainment than the US average in 1980 through 1990. However, by 2007, 
the most recent year for which data are available, Georgia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina made significant gains in educational attainment and surpassed the other 
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states, coming close to the US average. Mississippi and Louisiana have the lowest 
attainment; Alabama follows them at third from the bottom. Only about 20% of 
residents 25 and older in these three states have finished college.   
 
In terms of income, residents in all of these states have maintained lower per-capita 
incomes than the US average throughout the entire 30-year period (Georgia came very 
close to the national average in 2000 but has since lost those gains). Within the group, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia started out with the highest incomes in 
1984 and retained that advantage by 1990 (with a remarkable jump in median income 
for South Carolina during this 6-year period). Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi 
started out with the lowest incomes; by 2000, Alabama had climbed to the middle of 
the pack. Most of the states had experienced significant jumps in income between 
1990 and 2000 (Mississippi‘s income increase by a remarkable $10,620 during this 
period, although it was not enough to bring the state out of last place). Alabama‘s 
gains were probably also related to its strategic investment in recruiting the auto 
industry, beginning with Mercedes in 1993. However, by 2009 (the most recent year 
for which data were available), many of the states‘ gains had eroded. Nationally, 
median income dropped by $2,524; most of the states in this group lost a good deal 
more than that. Compared to the other states, Alabama‘s losses were not as great, as 
measured by percentage of 2000 median income. But the state‘s residents ended up 
with the second-lowest incomes of the entire group (behind Mississippi). Louisiana 
was the only state with increased median income—a result of increased federal and 
philanthropic aid spurred by Hurricane Katrina.  
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The employment picture over time shows that the Southeastern states generally 
maintained slightly lower unemployment levels than the US average until the present; 
by 2010 this relationship had reversed and Southern unemployment was higher. Most 
of the states have similar levels of unemployment in 2010 except for the slightly 
higher level in South Carolina and the lower level in Louisiana (again, likely an 
indirect effect of Hurricane Katrina). Again, Mississippi has persistently fared worse 
than its regional neighbors and Alabama has generally remained third from the 
bottom. In terms of poverty, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama began and ended the 
thirty-year period with a greater percentage of residents in poverty; interestingly 
though, Alabama reduced this percentage by the greatest margin save Louisiana. 
Georgia‘s poverty increased slightly. 
 
Finally, GSP data shows that the seven states remained in the same positions relative 
to each other between 1990 and 2010 (indexed 1980 data by state was not available). 
Here again, Alabama is in the lower-middle of the group with Mississippi at the 
bottom and Georgia and North Carolina at the top. The latter two states‘ GSPs 
exceeded the mean for all fifty US states from 1990 through 2008, and the chart shows 
steep increases for these two. Although Alabama‘s recruitment efforts should have 
been paying off in increased GSP during this period, the slope is fairly flat and fails to 
match the mean rate of increase nationally. Overall, the states‘ relative positions 
stayed much the same between 1980 and 2010, but during the intervening period, there 
was a good deal of flux with significant variety in state trends, especially for the 
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middle-achieving group of Alabama, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana. While 
this evidence is far from conclusive, it suggests that state governments do have some 
power to shape their internal conditions despite similar external pressures. 
 
Comparative Economic Development Strategies 
 
These raw figures create a general picture of the standard of living in each state and 
ideally its trendline, but they do not help us understand what states have actually done 
to modify or improve standards of living. Are certain policy approaches correlated 
with better outcomes? This chapter has suggested that balanced development is a more 
proactive, more forward-looking strategy, but has not explained what is actually meant 
by ―balanced development.‖ The following section will review the literature to better 
understand the differences between balanced and uneven development in terms of 
inputs and expected outcomes; then, the states will be categorized based on which 
approach they seem to have adopted. Does a balanced development approach actually 
correlate with better development outcomes?   
 
The power of the growth imperative to shape political behavior should be central to a 
discussion of the development choices made by any US state. Molotch‘s seminal 
exploration of the growth imperative led him to conclude that it was ―the political and 
economic essence of virtually any given locality in the present American context,‖ and 
therefore ―the most important constraint upon available options for local initiative in 
social and economic reform‖ (1976: 310). Because capital is mobile in a federal 
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system, ―localities [must] compete with each other to gain the preconditions for 
growth:‖ a process which is ―the significant dynamic of local political economy and is 
critical to the allocation of public resources and the ordering of local issue agendas‖ 
(ibid.: 311). For much of US history, subsidizing capital was the quickest route to 
attracting or maintaining investment. Under pressure from existing firms, or from a 
general fear of capital flight or deterrence, state governments have tried to keep labor 
and overhead costs low in a variety of ways. Some of these ways have directly 
benefited the public, such as investments in transportation. Many have depleted public 
goods in some manner: preventing organization by workers, relaxing anti-pollution 
requirements, or abating corporate taxes, for example.    
 
But voters in the South or elsewhere could be expected to applaud these choices: they 
have often created jobs quickly (or rather, as Molotch reminds, moved jobs in from 
somewhere else). Especially in manufacturing, attracting external investment has 
historically been the fastest way to build up a locale‘s tax base. In states with high 
levels of unemployment, even low-paying jobs with few benefits have been welcomed 
at the expense of other public goods. For such areas, where human capital may be low 
and the local economy not very dynamic, there have not appeared to be many other 
options for gaining a competitive foothold. Even where job creation was minimal or 
short-lived, external investment had the potential to be ―sticky‖ (Markusen, 1996), 
bringing some new industry or workers that would stay and perhaps attract further 
upgrades from an existing agricultural, extractive, or textile base.   
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However, the global and national economic circumstances that made traditional capital 
subsidy a smart move have drastically changed over the past 3 to 4 decades. As 
mentioned above, any competitive advantage gained by states that aggressively 
pursued this policy was lost as soon as it became an established practice. By 1985, 
most states had industrial development programs that subsidized capital to one extent 
or another (Rork, 2005). Secondly, and more fundamentally, production and trade 
have become increasingly organized on a transnational basis (Wallerstein, 1991; 
Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991). Thus ―the primary capitalist dynamic [has become] 
located at the transnational as opposed to the national level‖ (McGrew, 1996: 483). 
Improved transportation and rising global education levels began to make it more 
profitable for American firms to bypass the states completely and send their 
manufacturing operations overseas. An international division of labor meant that 
production in the US could never be as cheap as that in newly industrializing (or 
―peripheral‖) countries where wages, living standards, and other capital constraints 
were lower. With the old model of competition within national boundaries no longer 
applicable, US states had to have innovative responses to avoid losing their places in 
the economic world-system.   
 
Their responses to this changing game have generally sorted into two ideal-types since 
the Reagan era, both innovative in different ways. One response has upgraded the 
capital subsidy approach so as to attract emergent types of locational investment (such 
as shipping/warehousing, entertainment, or reverse outsourcing). This approach—
labeled ―second-wave‖ (Eisinger, 1988), ―incentive-based‖ (Bradshaw & Blakely, 
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1999), or ―neoclassical‖ development (Atkinson & Andes, 2008; see Table 2 below)—
views an unfettered market as the key component of growth (Madrick, 2007). The 
approach has been lucrative for US states with reputations for friendliness to business; 
building on what they were already good at, some have been able to attract less-visible 
industries that slipped under the national radar as growth sources or were deemed lost 
to perpetually cheaper foreign sites. Places devastated by the loss of major industries 
that in many cases shaped entire economic and cultural identities have been able to 
take advantage of that heritage and reconfigure to new conditions. As noted by Bartik 
(2004), leaders in these places saw that ―(1), because corporations are becoming more 
footloose, they are becoming more responsive to incentives, and (2), increased local 
employment rates yield social benefits‖ (Besser, Recker, & Parker, 2009). In order to 
retain as much local benefit as possible, these places refined and customized the old 
incentives: for example, by offering services such as sector-specific workforce training 
that would also be a boon for the local population, by structuring credits such that 
firms would profit more the longer they remained in the state, or by encouraging the 
spread of supplier industries.   
 
As a result, such places were able to create a unique niche in the global economy, 
attracting industries that required the conditions of highly developed countries, like 
skilled workforces, reliable infrastructures, and transparent political environments, 
without the onerous labor obligations often found in such places. The automobile and 
aerospace industries are two good examples: the top links in these global supply 
chains (development, engineering, ownership) might be found in parts of western 
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Europe or North America where capital is too costly. States embracing the new capital 
subsidy approach saw that they would be ideal candidates to occupy the middle links 
on the chain. Their workforces already had the required late-20
th
 century skills: 
service, logistics, machine-based manufacturing. Where necessary, skill upgrading 
could often be done on-the-job—a key benefit helping to keep costs low for firms and 
state governments.  Workers have benefited because these types of jobs generally 
don‘t require costly investments in higher- or continuing-education programs. They 
have been able to immediately use their increased buying power (which has a 
potentially quick effect on the local economy), or save more. Researchers have found 
quantifiable positive outcomes for places in which such businesses locate: in a recent 
Iowa study, Besser et al. (2009) confirm that ―towns with a new employer from the 
outside experienced a greater reduction in the poverty rate and a larger increase in 
median household income compared with all other towns [in the state sample]‖ (313).      
 
Because this type of development approach builds on existing economic 
circumstances and relationships, because it is usually financed with existing public 
resources rather than increased taxation, and because it has immediate and visible 
effects for at least some workers, it has met with little resistance. Furthermore, it has 
almost always been politically advantageous: as Eisinger (1988) has shown, political 
leaders receive greater support for giving the impression of aggressive action than for 
net economic outcomes. Long-term outcomes are hard to track and span terms in 
office; recruitment ―coups‖ (however modest) usually receive positive press and 
contribute to state managers‘ prestige.    
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However, this development model has notable drawbacks, some of which have been 
well-documented and others of which are not yet fully understood. Although there is 
no consensus about long-term effects, many have suggested that capital subsidy, even 
the more targeted ―second wave‖ model, is not a particularly stable approach to 
economic development (Walthall,  Thuston, Presley, Harrell, Deravi, & Clark, 2002; 
Peters & Fisher, 2004). Clearly, it relies upon ―trickle-down‖ or supply-side growth, 
assuming that growth is created by supporting (e.g., through low taxation) those at the 
top of income and power structures who then pass benefits downward. While in 
depressed areas investors are certainly needed, the nature of capital is to hunt out 
profit which may be found in continually changing locations. The capital subsidy 
model discussed here has tended to focus on repeated influxes of this ―footloose‖ 
investment rather than focusing on rapidly converting it into more stable economic 
anchors. Rork (2005) even suggests that this is a systemic problem, in that low-tax 
recruitment plans encourage the immigration of labor-intensive firms that do less 
capital upgrading and are thus more mobile. The labor-intensive industrial structure 
distorts labor choice away from skilled labor toward unskilled labor and ―may have 
the impact of reinforcing, rather than correcting, pre-existing labor market distortions‖ 
(39).   
 
Notably, it also assumes that aggregate growth is itself the greatest public good—thus 
direct support to those at the bottom is inefficient and non-multiplying, and a poor use 
of scarce resources. This neglects the importance of human capital in sustaining not 
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only a stable economy but as an end good in itself. An American place that has built 
its economic base on low production costs not only faces global competition but 
almost guarantees a lesser quality of life for workers (via the ―race-to-the-bottom‖ 
effect). For example, in the last 10 years, an increasing higher education wage gap in 
the US has created in situation in which those with a college education earn on 
average 45% more than those without (Bernstein & Mishel, 2007); some sources cite a 
gap of 83% for full-time workers in 2010 (Leonhardt, 2011). Less-educated workers 
also tend to have less health coverage and are more likely to earn the minimum wage, 
of which the real value has fallen steeply since the 1980s (ibid.). They are 
geographically concentrated as well: not surprisingly, the South has the lowest levels 
of educational attainment (Stoops, 2004). A spatial concentration of individual skill 
and wealth deficiencies adds to the disadvantages because talented workers leave, or 
don‘t come at all. This situation suggests that locales that don‘t invest directly in 
people are doing their workforce a serious disservice (Lobao & Hooks, 2003). 
 
There may even be a direct trade-off between the capital subsidy model and poorer 
education outcomes: Figlio & Blonigen (1999), for example, found that although 
recruited firms pay higher wages, incentives to attract these firms result in decreased 
public education expenditures by states. A 2003 joint NEA/Institute for Taxation and 
Economic Policy study reports that in 32 states, corporate subsidies divert funding 
from schools via tax abatements (National Education Association, 2003). With a less-
educated workforce, there are fewer resources for locally-led development and often, a 
lack of the amenities that attract educated newcomers. While knowledge can also be 
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―imported‖ with external investment especially from high-tech firms, researchers have 
also found that only states above a certain human capital threshold have the capacity 
to take advantage of knowledge spillover (Ford, Rork, & Elmslie, 2008). 
 
Table 2: Economic Development Doctrines and State Economic Development Policies 
 Capital Subsidy Paradigm 
(“1st” and “2nd wave”) 
Balanced Development Paradigm  
(“3rd wave”) 
Underlying 
Principles 
Conventional 
 
Neo-Classical 
Business Climate 
Neo-Keynesian 
Populist 
Innovation-Led 
 
Source of 
Growth 
Capital 
investment; 
exogenous 
Capital 
investment; 
exogenous 
Worker incomes; 
endogenous 
Innovation and 
organizational 
learning; endogenous 
Principal 
Economic 
Development 
Means 
Drive down costs 
through firm-
specific 
subsidies 
Drive down costs 
through lower 
taxes 
and reduced 
regulations 
Drive up wages and 
benefits, and foster 
more progressive 
taxes and public 
spending 
Spur firm innovation 
through targeted 
support (e.g., 
research, financing, 
skills, etc.) and 
incentives for firms to 
produce these 
themselves 
Object of Policy Recruitment of 
out-of-state firms 
Recruitment of 
out-of-state firms 
Small business and 
socially-conscious 
business 
High-growth 
entrepreneurs and 
existing firms 
Quality of Life Minor 
importance 
Not important High importance Moderately important 
to attract and retain 
knowledge workers 
Goal Growth Growth Equitability Local capacity 
Sources: Atkinson and Andes 2008 Bradshaw and Blakely 2002, Madrick 2007 
 
The other response to the changing global economy sees the state‘s role quite 
differently—as the creator of an environment for locally-led growth. This balanced 
investment approach—labeled ―third-wave,‖ ―innovation-led,‖ etc., (see Table 2 
above)—acknowledges that economic development cannot just be left to markets, but 
must include governments (Madrick, 2007). Through investment in public goods, this 
approach adds value to people and places, with high-quality job creation as an ―end‖ 
but also as a ―means to an end‖ (rising incomes and improved qualities of life). 
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Policies in this vein use business incentives, but only as one tool out of many. They 
acknowledge that most job gains are ―homegrown‖ (Kolko, 2010); as such, they seek 
to increase access to education and up-skilling; more skills leads to better incomes, 
more entrepreneurialism, and more empowerment—not only in the sense of local 
equity but in the ability to set economic conditions rather than respond to them. Places 
with broadly educated workforces (say, Silicon Valley or the Research Triangle) seem 
to have greater capacities for innovation and creating new types of value (Goetz & 
Freshwater, 2001). Moreover, quality education along with infrastructural, 
environmental, and cultural offerings are amenities that attract highly-skilled workers 
and their families from other states and countries (Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2001).  
 
Often, such places have taken a regional approach to development where cooperation, 
not zero-sum competition, leads to benefits for a wide range of spaces and groups. In 
part, this means building local entrepreneurialism as an economic anchor; local 
entrepreneurs may be more stable because they are deeply tied into their communities, 
they often make use of immobile resources (such as local culture or geography), and 
they diversify the local economy; moreover their presence is associated with improved 
quality of life (Besser et al., 2009). Businesses that are encouraged to cooperate and 
build networks regionally (even across state lines) can capitalize on a clustering effect: 
they might mutually use each other‘s services, or become broadly recognized as a 
source for certain types of goods and services (Held, 1996). Successful places have 
also enabled cooperation between public and private sector actors like nonprofits, 
community colleges, and businesses, ―[moving] economic development policy beyond 
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the sole province of the private sector‖ (Blakely & Bradshaw, 2002: p. 46). These 
networks help anchor existing firms in the area and give them an incentive—and a 
means—to invest in the local workforce, including less-skilled workers (Lowe, 2007).   
 
In a knowledge-based economy, the ability to innovate and change is an important 
quality for all institutions (private, nonprofit, and government) (Atkinson & Andes, 
2008). Innovation and cooperation imply modification of entrenched power structures 
where necessary: in order to invest in a ―bottom-up‖ type of development that sees all 
people as potential growth engines (not just big employers), established power centers 
must be willing to cede some of their economic and political advantages. This allows 
for more broadly spread knowledge and power, and frees up space to build new 
institutions that Bradshaw & Blakely (1999) see as the ―‗soft infrastructure‘ for 
economic revitalization.‖ And indeed many elites have been willing to cede significant 
resources, anticipating further benefit to themselves in a more dynamic state economy 
(Webster & Webster, 2004). In turn, the balanced approach has generally required a 
larger state presence—for example, in managing more costly education programs, 
playing a more micro-strategic role (i.e., through various programs, councils, or 
authorities), or enforcing equity goals—but these tactics also keep a fair amount of 
revenue inside the state while growing public goods, from which both elites and non-
elites, workers and employers, gain. 
 
As noted, the two development paths outlined above are ideal-types; every state uses a 
mix of incentive, entrepreneurial, and human capital programs in the quest for growth 
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and development. However, certain states have clearly emphasized one approach over 
the other throughout the past few decades. Both paths have led to quantitative growth: 
many states prominently within the capital-subsidy paradigm, such as those in the 
―Southern auto corridor,‖ saw tremendous growth and reduced unemployment during 
the last decade or two. Kolko, Neumark, & Mejia (2011) have found that states with 
lower taxes and less regulation, as well as lower transfer payments (like welfare and 
social security) had faster economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s, especially in 
manufacturing employment (although factors out of states‘ control, like mild weather 
and low population density, had the strongest effect on growth). States prominently 
within the balanced development paradigm, such as Massachusetts, Maryland, 
California, and Washington, have also seen dynamic growth in the form of R&D 
expansions, leadership in the ―green sector,‖ and sustained influxes of knowledge 
workers (State New Economy Index, 2008).   
 
Qualitatively, though, growth under these two paradigms has differed. Various 
measurements (the State New Economy Index, the Development Report Card for the 
States, etc.) conclude that the states investing in ―better economies‖ top the states 
investing in ―bigger economies.‖ In part, this is because of sustainability: states that 
have made preparations for long-term economic health can face economic downturns 
with less vulnerability and respond to changing global economic patterns rapidly. 
Indeed, recent evidence shows that the current recession has hit states with low 
income levels or manufacturing-dependent economies hardest (Wolgemuth, 2009). It 
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is also because of equity: long-term economic health is predicated on the state‘s ability 
to balance the need for public goods with the demands of private actors.    
 
Index Rankings 
 
Along with the traditional business climate rankings, a recent spate of economic 
development ―report cards‖ is available and increasingly useful to researchers, 
policymakers, and firms. These evaluations recognize that aggregate growth indicators 
like gross state product or tax rates are no longer enough to predict the long-term 
economic vitality of states. The new ranking systems acknowledge that new global 
conditions—growing participation by low-wage workers in other parts of the world, 
the increased relevance of new media and communications technologies, the trend 
toward localization and local self-sufficiency, looming resource shortages, and 
increasing intra- and international inequality—require a different type of state 
competitiveness as well as a different set of measurements (Hall, 2009). These ranking 
systems are a useful form of secondary data because they identify states that have 
brought more balance to their development approaches.   
 
Because they take into account dozens of factors and sub-indices, state ranking 
systems can be very complex, making it hard to understand how figures have been 
derived (although prior peer review ensures that methodologies are standard). Also, 
the inclusion and weighting of factors may differ according to the ideology of the 
researchers or their funding source. Research by Kolko et al. (2011) and others has 
 49 
explored inter-reliability and found good correlation within groups of business climate 
rankings and within groups of development rankings, but less between them. For a 
simple comparative overview, triangulating between a few indices can give a sense of 
broad similarities and differences between states (Hall, 2009). It is still important to be 
aware of the difference between rankings and scores; rankings are interval variables 
that may exaggerate differences in scores. Where possible, it also helps to report sub-
index scores or rankings since these can skew overall rankings.   
 
One prominent development ranking system is the 2008 State New Economy Index 
(SNEI), produced by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
2
. It 
establishes a core set of needs for 21
st
-century state economies: that they be 
knowledge-based, globalized, entrepreneurial, IT-driven, and innovation-based. 
Correspondingly, states are measured and ranked in the categories of ―Knowledge 
Jobs,‖ ―Globalization,‖ ―Economic Dynamism,‖ ―Digital Economy,‖ and ―Innovation 
Capacity‖ (Atkinson & Andes, 2008). Each category is an index of multiple 
measurements such as the percentage of jobs in information technology occupations, 
the number of entrepreneurs starting new businesses, the number of people online, or 
the growth in renewable energy use. Both the National Conference of State 
Legislatures and the National Governors‘ Association endorse this type of assessment 
as a ―new way to measure employment environments beyond the number of jobs 
gained and lost‖ (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2008) and as a guide to 
best practices (NGA Center for Best Practices, 2006).   
                                               
2 The 2008 report is funded by the Kauffman Foundation. 
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The SNEI emphasizes human capital, new businesses, and technology as the key 
inputs for positive development outcomes. Alternatively, the Economic Freedom 
Index for North America (EFINA) which is produced by the Fraser Institute
3
, focuses 
on taxes, costs, and regulation—more of a classic business climate index. On the 
premise that ―[not] only is economic freedom important for the level of prosperity, 
growth in economic freedom spurs economic growth,‖ the EFINA ranks US states and 
Canadian provinces in three areas: ―Size of Government,‖ ―Takings and 
Discriminatory Taxation,‖ and ―Labor Market Freedom (Ashby, Karabegovic, 
McMahon, & Bueno, 2010).‖ Measurements include government spending, 
redistribution, tax revenue collected, yearly earnings of minimum-wage workers, 
union density, and so on, generally measured as a percentage of GSP. Generally, 
places with smaller governments, lower taxes, and fewer worker protections are more 
highly ranked on this index. This index is included because there is some evidence that 
business climate indices such as the EFINA are better are predicting economic growth 
than development indices (Kolko et al., 2011). Although this chapter‘s goal is to 
explore balanced development and not merely growth, the inclusion of this index will 
be useful because it identifies states with a strong focus on capital subsidy.  
 
                                               
3 Canadian independent non-profit research organization; envisions ―a free and prosperous world where 
individuals benefit from greater choice, competitive markets, and personal responsibility;‖funders 
unidentified. This index was chosen because Kolko et al. (2011) found it to be the most reliable of the 
business climate indices.. 
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The 2007 State Development Report Card (SDRC), produced by the Corporation for 
Enterprise Development
4
, is a third index that measures states on the basis of current 
resources and future capacity. Under the principle that states should move beyond 
traditional economic development activities and ―invest in their real economic 
strengths: skilled workforces, entrepreneurs, high standards of living, technology 
development, existing businesses, world class infrastructure and excellent public 
services,‖ the SDRC ranks states in 3 categories: ―Performance‖ (the climate for a 
wage earner, including employment, income and benefits, and quality of life 
measures), ―Business Vitality‖ (the climate for business, including establishment of 
new business, industrial diversity and business closings), and ―Development Capacity‖ 
(the way current resources are used with an eye to the future, looking at education 
systems, physical infrastructure, and financial, natural and technological resources) 
(Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2007); overall rankings for each state are 
not given. The SDRC is supported and endorsed by a wide range of government and 
civil society groups, including major corporations—which is further evidence that 
balanced development is good for capital and labor.   
 
Table 3 reports the three indices‘ rankings of the Southeastern states both overall and 
in different component categories. The SNEI, the most future-focused of the three, 
finds that overall, North Carolina and Georgia compare favorably to the rest of the 50 
states, whereas Mississippi and Alabama fare very poorly. Alabama ranks 47
th
 overall, 
                                               
4 CFED is funded by a variety of institutional funders, including the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the 
Ford Foundation, Bank of America, United Way, AARP, Morgan Stanley, and others. 
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Table 3: Comparative State Rankings 
State AL TN MS GA LA NC SC 
2008 State New Economy Index Rankings*        
Knowledge Jobs 40 42 50 29 44 26 36 
Globalization  27 17 49 15 18 11 5 
Economic Dynamism 50 32 37 4 29 23 47 
Digital Economy 49 37 50 25 42 27 40 
Innovation Capacity 25 37 46 26 44 23 29 
Overall 47 38 50 21 41 24 34 
2010 Economic Freedom Index**        
Size of Government 37 16 55 10 20 8 54 
Takings and Discriminatory Taxation 9 4 42 19 16 12 31 
Labor Market Freedom 4 1 6 7 3 10 2 
Overall 13 2 33 9 8 9 21 
2007 State Development Report Card        
Performance 34 45 49 33 50 41 35 
Business Vitality 3 12 34 26 31 20 14 
Development Capacity 49 34 47 28 50 22 40 
* In 2010, Alabama was ranked 47th overall (44th in Knowledge Jobs, 27th in Globalization, 49th in Economic 
Dynamism, 48th in Digital Economy, 27th in Innovation Capacity). Tennessee was 40th overall; Mississippi was 49th 
overall; Georgia was 19th overall, Louisiana was 42nd overall; North Carolina was 28th overall; and South Carolina 
was 38th overall. 
** Rank is out of 60: includes 10 Canadian provinces, which are all ranked at the bottom for ―economic freedom.‖ 
 
and is in the bottom quintile in three of the five component categories: Knowledge 
Jobs, Digital Economy, and Economic Dynamism. Within each category, there are 
about five subcategories; Alabama ranks in the bottom quintile in the Knowledge Jobs 
subcategories of workforce education, in-migration of US knowledge workers, and 
manufacturing value-added. This type of information is not reflected in aggregate 
development indicators like unemployment; while Alabama compares favorably to 
national and regional employment averages, the jobs available in the state are of 
poorer quality than the norm—which is bad for workers and for the state‘s future 
competitiveness. Although the state has a reputation for advanced manufacturing (e.g., 
automobiles and aerospace), its workforce is less educated than the norm, it produces 
less valuable goods than the norm, and it fails to attract highly skilled newcomers who 
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might help upgrade the industrial mix. This suggests that Alabama is not pursuing 
balanced development.   
 
In the Digital Economy category, Alabama ranks 49
th
 out of the 50 states due to low 
investment in technology in schools, e-government, online agriculture, and broadband 
telecommunications. The SNEI report notes that over the past decade information 
technology (IT) has been the principal driver of increased economic growth and 
productivity (citing Atkinson & McKay, 2007) and suggests that ―digital technology is 
doing as much to foster state economic growth in the early 21st century as mechanical 
and electrical technologies did in the early and mid-20th century‖ (36). Without an 
adequate IT infrastructure, states will fall behind more and more rapidly unless they 
make major investments soon. Most of the Southeastern states (except for Georgia and 
North Carolina) rank in the bottom 50% on this measure, but Alabama and Mississippi 
finish last in the country.   
 
States that rank high on Economic Dynamism are the most entrepreneurial, with a 
high rate of business startup (and failure) and fast-growing firms. The category 
measures all entrepreneurial activity, so the findings may be somewhat distorted by 
states with many new gas stations or many failing businesses. Still, it is striking that 
Alabama ranks 50
th
 out of 50 states in this category, with especially low levels of job 
churning, entrepreneurial activity, and inventor patents. Furthermore, without a 
dynamic economy, fewer in- and out-migration occurs and the workforce probably 
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Figures 2a-c: Comparative State Rankings 
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stays fairly homogenous, curbing dynamism even more. South Carolina also fares 
poorly in this category, while the other states fall in the middle except for Georgia, 
which is in the national top five.   
 
The Southeastern states rank well in the Globalization category, perhaps because of 
their strong export focus and their success in recruiting international firms like the 
Asian auto manufacturers.  Alabama‘s investments in these areas leads it to be ranked 
near the median of the 50
 
states. The state is also ranked at the median in Innovation 
Capacity, outperforming most of the Southeastern group. The category assesses 
whether states have the right conditions for technological innovation, which helps 
people use capital more productively (44); measurements focus on investment in R&D 
and movement toward a ―green‖ economy. While Alabama ranks in the bottom 
quintile in subcategories measuring the proportion of scientists and engineers in the 
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workforce, patents issued relative to the size of the workforce, and venture capital, it 
ranks in the top quintile in non-industry investment in R&D and alternative energy 
use. These results may be somewhat skewed due to large federal aerospace facilities in 
the one case, but the state also has a wide-ranging university system that supports a 
nationally-recognized medical industry. In the other case, the results are surprising 
enough to warrant a further look through other sources; Alabama is not known for 
alternative energy use.    
 
The EFINA provides a different assessment of Alabama‘s economic climate, focusing 
directly on the conditions for business. The index shares its perspective with the 
capital subsidy model of development: ―The prosperity of an economy depends on 
having an economic climate that consistently encourages productive employment as 
well as innovation and entrepreneurship; economic freedom is the key ingredient in 
providing such a climate‖ (50). Furthermore, ―the theory of economic freedom is no 
different at the sub-national and all-government level than it is at the global level‖ (4). 
While some of the EFINA‘s theoretical foundations may give pause, its predictive 
power comes highly recommended by the National Bureau of Economic Research via 
Kolko et al., (2011), so it‘s worth taking a look at its findings.   
 
The index compares Alabama favorably to the rest of the country, and to its neighbors. 
As a percentage of GSP, Alabama‘s government is bigger than Tennessee‘s, 
Georgia‘s, Louisiana‘s and North Carolina‘s—a cause for lower ranking. The results 
don‘t intuitively make sense; Alabama‘s government is certainly smaller than North 
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Carolina‘s, for example. Because the measure considers spending on medical care and 
social security a measure of government size, it may be that governments with more 
low-income and/or more retirees are considered bigger. Alabama is highly ranked on 
takings and discriminatory taxation; after all, it has the lowest rate of taxation in the 
nation and probably Canada too. Only Tennessee receives higher marks in this area. In 
terms of labor market freedom, Alabama ranks highly compared to the rest of the 
country, as does the rest of the Southeastern group. The EFINA report states that labor 
market freedom is key to growth: low minimum wages are preferable because they 
don‘t restrict the ability of employees and employers ―to negotiate contracts to their 
liking‖ (8)5; minimal government employment is preferable to avoid ―a governmental 
quasi-monopoly in provision of services‖ (9) or regulatory activity that restricts the 
freedom of citizens, and so on.   
 
How do these findings compare with those of the SNEI? That ranking system found 
the worst developmental outcomes in Mississippi and Alabama, and the best in North 
Carolina and Georgia; here Mississippi is again the laggard but Tennessee and 
Louisiana are on top (with Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama not far behind). 
Very different theories about inputs and outcomes explain this difference; the SNEI 
hews closer to the balanced development model and the EFINA to the capital subsidy 
model. The conditions for aggregate growth are most essential in the latter; the 
conditions for equitable development are not specifically considered. The EFINA‘s 
                                               
5Other data suggest that growth in both small business jobs and total jobs is faster in states with higher 
minimum wages (Fiscal Policy Institute, 2006). 
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endorsement of Alabama is further evidence that the state focuses on capital subsidy, 
not balanced development. 
 
These results can be corroborated with the SDRC ranking system, which focuses more 
closely on individual states. The SDRC‘s assessment of Alabama concludes that ―the 
state is an excellent place to conduct business, and an average place to live and work 
[but] is not making the necessary investments to create a foundation for future growth‖ 
(2007: Appendix A, p. 1). Low unemployment (in 2007) and few layoffs, net 
migration, high rates of homeownership and affordable housing, and a ―charitable 
outlook‖ (3rd nationally in charitable contributions) contribute to an overall good 
quality of life. A diverse industrial base, high rates of manufacturing investment and 
private lending to small businesses, and strength in federally-funded R&D contribute 
to a stable economy. On the other hand, the SDRC finds a high poverty rate, uneven 
distribution of income, and poor set of health outcomes (for example, the state is 46
th
 
in infant mortality), which eat into overall quality of life. The friendly business climate 
contributes to high rates of greenhouse gas emissions (despite low overall energy use, 
which explains the state‘s high ranking in SNEI‘s ―movement toward a green 
economy‖ subcategory), and little alternative energy use or recycling.   
 
In the SDRC ranking system, Alabama ranks in the bottom 50% of states in the 
Performance category, which assesses the climate for wage earners, but compares 
favorably to its six neighbors. Moreover, it compares favorably to its neighbors and 
the rest of the country in the Business Vitality category, ranking in the top 5 states 
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nationally for business climate—a finding that correlates with the EFINA. Alabama‘s 
biggest handicap is its Development Capacity, which measures the steps that states 
have taken to plan for the future health of their economies: it ranks 49
th—a finding 
that correlates with the SNEI. Most marked are its low levels of human capital (ranked 
49
th
; along with low levels of high school completion and college attainment, the state 
is ranked 48
th
 in basic educational skills), low personal and venture capital investment, 
and minimal investment in transportation infrastructure (ranked 50
th
) and broadband 
access. The SDRC notes, ―with failing marks in Human Resources and Infrastructure 
Resources, the state‘s most fundamental ‗inputs‘ are in jeopardy;‖ without greater 
investment in its development capacity, the state‘s current economic vitality will 
certainly decline. This is further evidence that Alabama‘s development strategy is 
unbalanced.   
 
Taking the three indices as a whole, the highest-achieving states, North Carolina and 
Georgia, perform at the US median or better on almost all measures of balanced 
development, from business climate to human capital to innovation capacity and so 
on. The high performers were already doing better than the rest of the group in 1980, 
so they did start out the comparison period with advantages. Louisiana started out with 
comparatively few advantages but has seen recent improvement through 
circumstances out of state control (Hurricane Katrina). Mississippi also started out 
from a disadvantaged position and has been unable to move itself out of that position. 
Over the last 30 years, steps taken by South Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama have 
significantly improved socio-economic conditions, which suggests that state-level 
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actions do matter. Alabama has made positive interventions in the past decade that 
have positioned it well in global markets and raised per-capita income and job 
availability. Although its business profile appears geared toward traditional rather than 
fast-growing or high-tech industry, its partnerships with the federal government and 
the resulting investment in R&D suggest a capacity for innovation. However, the state 
may find itself unable to capitalize on these strengths because its preparation for the 
future is especially poor both within national and regional contexts. Even with its 
advantages, Alabama has acted more like Mississippi in this regard.   
 
Policy Adoption 
 
A goal of this chapter is to understand what tools states have available to create the 
best environment for workers and businesses; previous sections have concluded that a 
balanced development approach is better than one focused on conditions for business. 
Judging from the above analysis, Alabama has done the right things in terms of 
business climate, yet the climate for workers is only average, and the climate for 
future development (given the likely economic conditions of the 21
st
 century) is in 
very poor shape. To promote balanced development, most research recommends four 
key areas for state investment: human capital, business development, innovation, and 
infrastructure (OECD, 2001, 2004; Business Roundtable, 2005; National Governors‘ 
Association, 2006; Dede, Korte, Nelson, Valdez, & Ward, 2005; Bradshaw & Blakely, 
1999).   
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Strengthening human capital and people‘s ability to work can be achieved through 
education, workforce training, and a supportive labor environment. Although 
attracting quality workers is important, ―policies that increase the quantity and quality 
of the [existing] labor supply can grow the economy‖ since 60% to 70% stay in the 
same state over their working careers (Bartik, 2009: 16). State efforts to invest in 
human capital can be assessed in part by comparing their primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary education policies. Universal preschool ―has over twice the projected 
annual impact on jobs of business subsidies‖ (ibid.: 15); does the state require and 
fund it? It is more difficult to quantify investments in K-12 and higher education, but 
per-pupil expenditures should not be below the national average. Grants and other 
financial supports should be available so that all students have access to higher 
education. The ―second-chance‖ skills development system—workforce 
training/retraining and work supports like childcare subsidies and unemployment 
aid—needs to be adequate as well, particularly in places with historically 
disadvantaged populations (Bartik & Hollenbeck, 2000: 7; Kochan & Schulman, 
2007). State workforce training can be hard to quantify because of the variety of 
agencies and programs involved, so this factor is not used for comparison.  
 
To address local business development, policies need to focus on business attraction, 
retention, and entrepreneurship. As explained above, most US states already have 
attraction and retention policies in place—these are the incentives and tax abatements 
that make up the bulk of development policy in the capital subsidy model. Corporate 
income taxes are one such ―policy.‖ However, small businesses are equally important 
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because they employ half of US workers and are often the quickest route to the middle 
class for disadvantaged groups (US Small Business Administration, 2011). Balanced 
economic development requires public investment in small-scale, homegrown 
employment as well as attraction of corporate employers. Entrepreneurship (and 
expansion of existing businesses) can be supported by providing access to capital and 
to entrepreneurship training (which, according to Bartik 2009, has the most rigorous 
evidence of effectiveness of any economic development policy). Clawback provisions 
that reclaim subsidies from companies failing to deliver promised jobs, wages, or 
other investments make for smarter recruitment practices (NEA, 2003). 
 
Innovation can be supported through investments in R&D and linkages between 
higher education and firms. States can support innovation through ―public investments 
that not only support a state‘s knowledge infrastructure but also provide key inputs for 
targeted firms and/or industries‖ (SNEI, 2008: 56). This may mean granting tax credits 
for R&D or creating institutional connections between universities and high-tech firms 
(NGA, 2006). While greater state funding for higher education institutions is 
important, targeting that funding to also create knowledge-based industry clusters and 
jobs in the state is probably even more effective.   
 
Infrastructure support means investment in energy efficient, 21
st
-century transportation 
and communications systems like mass transit and broadband. New Economy 
infrastructure can be supported by investing in new transportation and communication 
systems that make working and learning easier, faster, and less resource-intensive 
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(Khan & LeRoy, 2003). Policies that support mass transit and broadband access are 
fundamental; so are policies that aim to establish a ―green infrastructure‖ (such as 
renewable energy use) which will undoubtedly become more important as traditional 
resources become more scarce and expensive. Infrastructure investments are 
especially important in bringing rural areas into the economy; rural areas can make 
significant contributions to state GSPs but often need special support and capacity-
building (NGA, 2006).  
 
To compare state policy adoption in these key areas, state legislative records and 
policy databases covering the period 1990-2010 are used, focusing on policies that are 
mandated and funded by state governments, not the federal government. This method 
of comparison is similar to that used by the National Governors‘ Association, which 
frequently highlights state best practices in various development areas. The method 
used here makes side-by-side comparisons based on available policy information, 
which may obscure other more important policy differences between states. All data is 
most recent available. 
 
Table 4: Key State Policies/Interventions for Balanced Development 
Policy Area Policy/Intervention 
Human Capital 
Universal pre-K 
Per pupil K-12 spending 
College aid 
Work supports (childcare, unemployment aid) 
Business Development 
Low tax/labor costs 
Entrepreneurship programs 
Small business support 
Innovation 
Tax credits for R&D 
R&D spending 
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Infrastructure  
Broadband access 
Public transit funding 
Incentives for renewable energy use 
 
 
 
Table 5: Comparative Adoption of Sample New Economy Policies 
Invest-
ment 
Area 
Policy AL TN MS GA LA NC SC 
Human 
Capital 
Universal Pre-K
a 6% 23%  
 
No state- 
funded 
program 
53%  
 
32% 
 
25%  
 
42%  
 
Per-pupil K-12 
Spending
b 
$8,870 $7,897 $8,075 $9,650 $10,533 $8,587 $9,277 
College Aid
c
 $33.20; up 
to $360/ 
year 
available for 
all in-state 
students 
 
$264.56; 
merit 
awards up 
to 
$3800/year 
$20.52 
 
$4.27; full 
public 
tuition for 
all students 
with 3.0 HS 
GPA 
 
$8.69; merit 
awards up 
to $1200/ 
year  
 
$486.55 $331.64; 
full public 
tuition for 
all math and 
science 
majors with 
3.0 HS GPA 
Child Care 
Subsidies
d
 
127%  163% 199% 151% 181% 208% 146% 
 
Business 
Costs 
Corporate  
Tax Rates
e 
4.5% 6.5% 5.0% 6.0% 8.0% 6.9% 5.0% 
Clawback 
Provisions
g 
   X  X X 
Health Care 
Subsidies for Small 
Businesses
h 
 X  X  X  
Entrepreneurship 
Programs
i
  
 X  X X X  
Innovation R&D Tax Credit
j
 
   X X X X X 
Infra-
structure 
Percent of  
Households with 
Broadband Access
k 
37.4% 41.6% 33.2% 53.9% 42.9% 47.1% 39.1% 
State Public  
Transit Funding
l 
$0 $38,310 $ 1,600 $6,025 $0 $ 75,866 $6,400 
Rebates/Tax Credit 
for Renewables
m 
   X X X X 
a: Percent enrolled (State Preschool Yearbook, 2009); b: US average is $8,701 (US Census Bureau, 2009); c: Need-
based aid offered per undergrad and/or merit aid program (CollegeScholarships.org, 2010); d: Eligibility as % of 
poverty level (National Women‘s Law Center, 2010); e: Alabama is one of the few states allowing for the deduction 
of federal income tax, which lowers its actual rate of 6.5% to a net effective rate of 4.5% (Economic Development 
Partnership of Alabama, 2009); g: (Good Jobs First, 2010); h: (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010); i: 
Codified and/or funded (Markley, et al., 2008); j. (NGA Center for Best Practices, 2004); k: (NGA Center for Best 
Practices, 2008), (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010); l: Figures X 1000 (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, 2008); m: (Database of State Initiatives for Renewables and Efficiency, 2010)
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Investment in human capital is critical for balanced development. In terms of 
education, states can take measures to improve both access and quality from the pre-K 
through post-secondary levels. All but one state in the region (Mississippi) offers and 
funds universal pre-K; Georgia and South Carolina are ranked highest with roughly 
50% of children enrolled. Alabama has a pre-K program but only 6% of children are 
enrolled in it—a significant divergence from the pattern established by 5 of the other 
states. Per-pupil expenditures can be a useful means of assessing the way that states 
prioritize education, but can also be unreliable because they do not show local effort. 
Public education in the US is significantly funded by local property taxes on top of 
state efforts. Despite fiscal equalization programs (which Alabama was court-ordered 
to implement in 1995), significant local variation exists due to district-to-district and 
municipality-to-municipality taxation differences, as well as other funding sources 
such as local education foundations and grants (personal communication, PARCA 
6/16/10). Looking only at overall per-pupil expenditures, the state outlays are 
surprising given the patterns of educational attainment seen in Table 1. Only Louisiana 
spends more than the US average of $10,499, and Alabama spends more than many of 
its neighbors on K-12 education.   
 
How can this investment be explained given the state‘s poor education outcomes? Is 
Alabama using its education budget poorly or inefficiently? This could be the case, or 
(since K-12 and higher education are funded from the same earmarked revenue 
source), K-12 could have been winning a bigger piece of the ―pie‖ in recent years. 
This, of course, is great for enhancing elementary and secondary education but less so 
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for increasing college-going among Alabama students. Other evidence suggests that 
the lack of in-migration in Alabama in the last decade (as compared to say, Tennessee 
or North Carolina) has meant that there is no lag in per-pupil spending as in other 
states that have had to respond to rapid growth in the student population (personal 
communication, PARCA 8/18/11). This could mean that ―native‖ Alabama pupils are 
benefiting from a relative lack of dynamism in the state‘s economy. Still other 
evidence shows that Alabama did increase its investment in K-12 education through 
supplemental reading and math programs during the middle of the 2000s, in part 
because of the auto-industry-led growth in the tax base and in part because of a jump 
in private donations (e.g., corporate foundations) to these supplemental programs 
(personal communication, PARCA 8/18/11). It remains to be seen whether these 
spending gains will continue if employment gains do not.   
 
Enabling access to and quality of higher education is also essential; most US states 
offer some combination of need-based and merit-based awards alongside federal aid. 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee offer the most need-based aid while 
Georgia gives the most merit aid with full public tuition paid for all students with 3.0 
high school GPAs. A common means of enabling higher education access is through 
dedicated lottery proceeds; all of the Southeastern states but Alabama and Mississippi 
have created lotteries between 1990 and 2010. Lack of adequate aid is one of the 
reasons Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana score low on a national index of 
preparation, participation, affordability, completion, and benefits (National Center on 
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Public Policy and Higher Education, 2008); for example, students in Alabama can 
expect only $360 a year in aid from the state.   
 
A balanced development strategy invests in workers of all abilities so they can be 
productive over the long term, even if this requires considerable public support up 
front. Work supports help keep low-income people in jobs because they often face 
considerable structural obstacles; this is important because ―earned income is the 
single most important contributing factor to a household‘s ability to save money, 
access affordable credit and build assets‖ (Corporation for Enterprise Development, 
2007). Some of the major supports states can provide are childcare subsidies, 
unemployment benefits, or Earned Income Tax Credit; for visual ease, only one type 
of support (childcare subsidies) is displayed in Table 4. The most generous childcare 
and unemployment supports are provided by North Carolina; Alabama is the least 
generous in both. Except for Tennessee, Alabama‘s taxes are the least progressive 
judging from the tax balance (rate paid by top 1% versus bottom 20%).   
 
According to the rankings above, Alabama‘s business climate is the chief strength in 
its economic development profile. Its corporate tax rates are lowest in the region (and 
in the nation) (PARCA, 2009). States can support small business development and 
entrepreneurship in a number of other ways, though. Twenty-three states have explicit 
microenterprise policies that enable training, education, and other services targeted to 
very small businesses (a category which often includes innovators or the economically 
disadvantaged). Among the 7 states, Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee, and North 
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Carolina have either codified microenterprise support in state policy or budgeted 
stable sources of funding. Another way to help small business is to provide health care 
subsidies to owners or employees. Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina do so; the 
other states do not. These factors and others measured by Goetz (2008) contribute to 
the highly ranked entrepreneurial climate of Tennessee, Louisiana, and North 
Carolina; on the other hand Alabama‘s climate is ranked 49th in the nation.   
 
Innovation capacity is another key component of a balanced development profile. 
Clearly, indirect policy measures such as providing quality education and risk-
enabling business climates are essential to encourage innovation; in terms of direct 
measures state should pursue ―targeted investment in knowledge infrastructures‖ 
(SNEI, 2008: 56). One way to measure this effort is to assess state support for research 
and development. The data show that Alabama and Tennessee do not provide tax 
credits for R&D; the two also have the lowest state R&D expenditures per capita. As 
noted above, Alabama‘s high R&D score in the SNEI is probably due to federal 
expenditures for the NASA space center, which distorts actual state-level efforts.   
 
Infrastructures that facilitate 21
st
 century economic activity are a necessity. 
Knowledge economies require up-to-date communications networks like broadband 
internet access as well as increased worker mobility through mass transit systems. The 
latter is also an important element of green infrastructure; states preparing for a green 
economy will save a lot of money as fuel becomes more expensive. Except for 
Missisippi, Alabama has the lowest rate of residential broadband Internet access—
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only 37% of households in the state have broadband. In rural and low-income areas 
(such as the Black Belt region) this is particularly important because students cannot 
take advantage of educational technology and may not be close to a local library or 
school. However, Alabama recently followed the lead of Tennessee and the Carolinas 
in creating a statewide broadband initiative to map access and increase both supply 
and demand for broadband.   
 
Alabama and Louisiana are the only states in the group that do not put forth any public 
transit funding. Of the others, even the smaller efforts are significant, ranging from 
$1.6 million in Mississippi to $76 million in North Carolina. Only North Carolina has 
a renewable energy portfolio standard (as do 35 other states) which requires utilities to 
use renewable energy for a portion of their electricity sales (Database of State 
Initiatives on Renewables and Efficiency, 2010), so Alabama does not deviate from 
the norm here. However, it does not offer tax credits or rebates for renewables as 
North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana do. Its high ranking on alternative 
energy use in the SNEI should be reinterpreted as a possible function of enforced 
energy savings due to public sector cutbacks (like school and government office 
closings).     
 
The Relationship Between Development Efforts and Outcomes 
 
This chapter compared development outcomes and efforts among seven regionally 
similar states.  The goal was to look for correlation between positive development 
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indicators, a balanced development profile, and certain key policy adoptions. The 
absence of such correlation might be evidence that states do not have much control 
over local economic vitality—in other words, external conditions such as national 
trade policy, foreign ownership, or increasingly mobile capital flows constrain state 
governments‘ ability to shape local economies. In response, states might adopt more 
of a reactive or competitive development approach, or might adopt policies for 
balanced development without seeing much benefit. The evidence presented here 
suggests that there are limitations to this structuralist perspective; states do appear to 
have some power to shape development in a way that is far-sighted, proactive, and 
able to balance the interests of both capital and labor (e.g., moderate business costs 
and high quality of life).   
 
The states that perform best, Georgia and North Carolina, have adopted this model for 
development. What policy characteristics do these states share? In terms of human 
capital, both offer universal pre-kindergarten and significant aid to students pursuing 
higher education. Both practice smart recruitment using clawback provisions and are 
strongly supportive of entrepreneurs, offering health care subsidies for small 
businesses and committing to microenterprise programs. To support innovation, both 
offer tax credits for research and development although neither leads in state funding 
for R&D. The two have the highest percentages of broadband access of the group, and 
both provide significant funding for public transportation and tax credits for renewable 
energy use, although only North Carolina has renewable portfolio standards. By 
contrast, the lowest performing state, Mississippi, does not offer universal pre-K nor 
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much college aid although it does have strong work supports. It has a moderate tax 
balance and low corporate tax rates, but offers little support for small business and 
entrepreneurship. Broadband access is low as is public transit funding, and few 
incentives for renewable energy use are provided.   
 
Thus, based on data from these seven states alone, investments in the following areas 
have been important to balanced development: universal pre-K, access to higher 
education on the basis of need and/or merit, programs and climates that support 
entrepreneurs, use of tax credits to promote innovation (namely R&D and renewable 
energy use), widespread broadband access, and well-funded public transit systems. 
Taken as a whole, this is a policy approach that invests in human capital from early 
childhood on. It offers at least some work supports to help people move through 
difficult periods and ultimately stay in the labor force. It values small business as an 
important economic driver, devoting resources to encourage and maintain an 
entrepreneurial climate—but it also devotes resources to encourage high-tech 
innovation in the form of R&D support. And, it invests in the key infrastructures 
(communications, mass transit, and green energy) of the 21
st
 century economy. How 
are such public investments financed in this approach? Tax rates are moderate, but 
high enough to generate adequate revenue because of the sizable tax base. This 
strategy creates an environment to help local people and businesses succeed—the 
hallmarks of a balanced development approach.   
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Clearly, other inputs are necessary for balanced development, and many may be more 
important than those considered here—for example, the amount of local social capital, 
the way that public-private partnerships are used (Lowe, 2007), the simplicity of the 
tax structure (Kolko et al., 2011), the amenities available (Green, 2003), and so on. It 
is also true that the high-performing states have had better economies for years, 
suggesting that some aspects of development are path dependent or tied to past events 
out of anyone‘s control today. But, as Figures 1a-e show, there has been a great deal of 
―switching places‖ among the rest of the group over the past thirty years, and the types 
of policy efforts states have made are likely an important independent variable here. 
Therefore, it‘s probably notable that Alabama‘s pre-K effort has not been sufficient, 
nor the aid it provides for college-bound students. The state-level support it provides 
to entrepreneurs climate and R&D are unfavorable
6
. Nor is broadband access 
sufficient; only in Mississippi do fewer households have access to this key 
infrastructural element. The state does not invest in public transit and does not 
encourage renewable energy use.   
 
Alabama has fewer taxable resources than some of its neighbors, but it is not longer 
one of the very poorest states in the nation or region. Its per-capita income is just 
about equal to the high-performing states, but it raises less tax revenue than any state 
in the region. Unlike perhaps Mississippi, it can afford to make some of the critical 
public-goods investments described above.  And, judging from the experience of its 
                                               
6 In a more thorough ranking of entrepreneurial climate undertaken by Goetz (2008) (emphasizing the 
importance of a culturally supportive environment where risk-taking, scientific rationalism, and 
toleration of change are valued), Alabama ranks 49th.   
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high-performing neighbors, efforts to do so will likely result in long-term economic 
benefit. Yet over the past decade, as others have invested in balanced development, 
Alabama continues to adhere to a traditional model for growth, leaving its workers at a 
disadvantage for the future. Why hasn‘t the state reinvested its new wealth into more 
long-term resources for development, like expanded pre-K or entrepreneurship 
programs or a public transit system? Again, such investments in public goods do not 
have guaranteed or immediate benefits, but they are fairly standard development 
efforts among both the Southeast group and the country. What forces or factors have 
contributed to Alabama‘s non-standard approach to development? The ―regime 
theory‖ of development expects that local governments have significant control over 
local economies, yet internal conditions can still constrain the choices they make. The 
next chapter will take a closer look at internal conditions in Alabama, in particular the 
processes by which the state's economic development approach is crafted, and the 
relative influences of various actors and their interests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORIES OF POWER IN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concluded that Alabama had failed to implement a balanced 
economic development strategy even as its neighbors in the region were doing so, 
apparently preferring to rely on its traditional capital subsidy approach. While this 
approach brought jobs and raised per-capita income over the past two decades, it was 
not effective in improving the skills and opportunities available to the state‘s 
workforce. In fact, median household income actually fell 5% between 2000 and 2005, 
because the bulk of new job growth came in low-wage sectors; a regressive tax code 
left working people at further disadvantage (Sanders, 2009). Although the last few 
decades‘ growth has certainly improved quality of life in Alabama, the state continues 
to have a low development capacity, marked by a poorly educated population and a 
dearth of the public assets and amenities needed to compete in the 21
st
 century 
economy. The state‘s voters are aware of their circumstances: public opinion polls 
during the 2000s suggest that they would support greater human capital investments 
even if they were required to pay higher taxes. Consistently, about 60-70% of poll 
respondents across demographic categories say education should be state 
government‘s highest budget priority, and 60-65% of respondents across demographic 
 76 
categories would pay more in taxes to avoid cuts to education (Public Affairs Research 
Council of Alabama, 2002, 2010; Seroka, 2005). 
 
The case of Alabama‘s development choices in relation to those of its regional 
neighbors raises important questions about subnational responses to global macro-
economic change. Why have some states responded with more short-sighted 
approaches than others? If a balanced development strategy prioritizing human capital 
and new infrastructures has become the most sustainable development path, why 
would a state fail to implement this strategy? As the previous chapter shows, 
Alabama‘s wealth has grown in the past few decades and it can afford to invest in 
public goods now. It would seem that the internal conditions are right for this type of 
socio-economic upgrade, but what about leadership and voter preferences? Either 
policies for balanced development have never been seriously considered by 
policymakers, or they have been proposed and rejected by voters.   
 
Given the fact that most of Alabama‘s neighbors have created education lotteries to 
fund college scholarships, codified and/or funded microenterprise support programs, 
allotted tax credits for research and development and renewable energy use, and 
funded mass transit systems, it seems unlikely that the state has failed to even consider 
such policies that are mainstream even in the Southeast. In fact, proposals to direct 
more revenue to education and to adjust the tax system have been recommended and 
discussed at various times throughout the 1990s. For example, in 1999, Democratic 
Governor Don Siegelman sought significant educational reform via the proceeds from 
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a proposed state lottery modeled after Florida and Georgia‘s successful programs; in 
2003, Republican Governor Bob Riley proposed a sweeping reform of the tax code 
that would have lowered income taxes for the bottom 50% of the distribution, 
provided free college tuition for in-state students, and caused the wealthiest, least-
taxed groups to start contributing their share to the state‘s funds.     
 
It seems that voter preferences have prevented the state from implementing a more 
balanced approach to development. Amendment 1, the Riley proposal, was defeated 
by two-thirds of voters, with significantly more ―no‖ votes coming from many of 
those who would have benefited the most from the plan: poor and working class 
voters, rural voters, and the less educated (Seroka, 2003). The lottery was similarly 
defeated in 1999 despite being based on a sumptuary or elective tax, which 
Alabamians tend to prefer over property or income taxes (Johnson, 2003). On the 
other hand, proposals for industrial development bonding—which offer companies 
tax-free loans of public money and can affect state and local government‘s credit 
ratings (LeRoy & Hinckley, 2002)—and other types of business incentive have been 
repeatedly approved by lawmakers and voters, most recently in 2007. These outcomes 
suggest a cross-class rejection of development policies that center around public goods 
investment—which benefit all, but especially less advantaged groups who can‘t buy 
public goods on the market—and a concurrent embrace of policies that increase 
wealth without changing how it is currently distributed among the electorate.   
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How can voters‘ rejection of their own apparent interests be understood? Political 
sociology interprets behaviors and outcomes related to policy as functions of power. 
Where a particular policy framework is seen as preferable to those who have power, it 
has a high chance of being maintained or implemented, with fundamental changes 
likely to be made only where they suit the interests of the powerful. The analytical 
utility of this premise, however, will be limited by the different understandings of 
power that are used in political sociology. This rift has its roots in classical sociology, 
and often leads researchers to opposing interpretations of the same events. Those who 
conclude that power is distributed by the structure of society (the Marxian view) focus 
on groups that prevail systemically over the long term. Those who conclude that 
power is potentially available to any person or group (the Weberian view) consider 
outcomes to be historically specific and expecting power to continually change hands. 
These two views have been long debated by social scientists because of their radically 
different implications for structure and agency and the subsequent possibilities for 
social change. 
 
In the former perspective, economic choices are determined by production factors 
often external to the control of decision-makers like voters or policymakers (a concept 
that is echoed in the ―structuralist‖ theory of development). In a capitalist world 
economy, ―patterns of national economic incorporation into the world economy 
depend not only upon the investment decisions of international capital but also upon 
local class relations and the economic projects of local elites‖ (Tomaskovic-Devey & 
Roscigno, 1997: 571). With devolution and decentralization, the same has become true 
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for subnational states which are already nested within globally-dependent national 
economies. States must generate growth in order to remain afloat in the world 
economy; since elites are the source of growth, they are also the locus of power. This 
is especially true at the subnational level, where government cannot run deficits, 
manipulate interest rates, or regulate workforce mobility (Peterson, 1981). State 
governments are compelled to adhere to a minimal-tax and –redistribution paradigm in 
order to suit elite interests, even at the expense of other public goods. Expected 
challenges from less powerful worker-voters are minimized because growth creates 
jobs even at the expense of public goods (Molotch, 1976; Block, 1977), and because 
the dominant economic discourse prevents them from conceptualizing other 
possibilities. 
 
In the latter perspective, such structural analyses conceal agency and hamper 
understanding of the ways in which people‘s actions contribute to these circumstances 
of uneven development. To the classical liberal or Toquevillian observer, economic 
policy outcomes are determined through a process of policy proposals by elected 
officials, vigorous public debate, and popular approval or rejection by referenda—a 
model of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Although subnational growth 
regimes have historically been strong, social movements such as slow-growth, 
environmental justice, and good government have been able to challenge them at the 
local level (and in the US such places have become some of the more economically 
stable and vibrant; see DeLeon, 1992). Where growth regimes and uneven 
development have continued to dominate policy frameworks, evidence can be found 
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of complicity by labor and other non-elite groupings (Stone, 1989), who may 
understandably prioritize ―exchange values‖ over ―use values‖ just as capitalists do. 
Overall, economic policy decisions are made by the choices of voters and state 
managers in particular circumstances, not forced by abstract social forces untethered 
from time and space. 
 
Either theoretical perspective could be used to understand why Alabama has failed to 
adopt policies that would significantly increase investment in public goods; as Chapter 
2 has suggested, the Southeast states‘ recent development experiences can be 
interpreted through either structuralist or regime theories. The proposals mentioned 
above may have been defeated by the outsize influence of the business class, which 
would reject any effort to raise taxes or increase the resources of state government. Or 
they may simply have been instances of bad policymaking, rejected by legislators and 
voters who did not believe they were a good way to address economic development in 
Alabama. These different ways of understanding power have more than academic 
utility. When policy decisions are made under an assumption of potentially equal 
access to power, even decisions that appear to repeatedly favor certain groups are 
legitimate because they reflect local circumstances that can and likely will change 
over time given the shifting and pluralistic nature of American values and alliances. 
Conversely, when policy decisions are made under an assumption of a ―rigged game‖ 
that systematically favors certain groups, they cannot be judged as legitimate. US 
politics operates under the assumption of equal access, just as US society operates 
under the assumption of equal opportunity. Does taking a closer look at these 
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assumptions through a particular history of policymaking (e.g., that of development 
policy in Alabama) bear them out?   
 
Class-based Theories of Power 
 
Class-based power theories follow the ―production model‖ associated with Marxian 
sociological theory (Perrucci & Wysong, 2008). Marx himself believed that capitalism 
creates a fundamental distinction between the owners of the means of production and 
those who sell their labor to these owners. Owners‘ position in this relationship 
compels them to seek ever-rising profits, and every means of doing so directly 
opposes non-owners‘ interests. For example, increasing the productivity of labor and 
decreasing the costs of production either lower the value of a work hour, replace the 
worker with mechanization, or extract a greater share of commonly-held goods (Marx, 
1978[1891]). Thus owners‘ economic power comes at the expense of non-owners‘ 
economic power—a ―zero-sum‖ situation. Moreover, the nature of capitalism 
prescribes that this relationship will never be reversed: as long as workers must sell 
their labor on the market, they will be the economic ―losers.‖ Given the amount of 
economic diversification since Marx‘s time, the owner class might be expanded to 
include major property and stockholders, corporate ―persons,‖ and other types of 
investors; and the worker class to include voters or the public, since many people are 
now self-employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force (e.g., Perrucci & Wysong‘s 
―distributional model‖ of class).  
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Moreover still, this relationship need not be maintained with force, as with pre-
capitalist relations of inequality (i.e., lord and serf, master and slave). Instead, 
economic power can be translated into political and social power at a societal level, 
allowing capital to continually reproduce the conditions of its power through 
legitimate means. Most Marxian subtheories have addressed the ways, both 
instrumental and structural, in which coercion over and consent of the state and civil 
society are secured by capital (see Figure 1). How do these mechanisms work? 
Scholars concerned with the coercion aspect have explored such issues as whether or 
not the state shapes policy on capital‘s terms, the extent of direct influence by elites 
over policymaking, the interests of the state itself, and so on. Following Marx, class-
dominance theories have generally considered the state to be formally neutral, an 
arbiter of class interests lacking its own agenda beyond social stability. The 
instrumentalist school associated with Miliband (1969) and Mills (1956) suggested 
that elites were able to directly influence state policymaking in their favor by 
systematically staffing the state apparatus. This idea was subsequently criticized for 
emphasizing individual agency as the key means of reproducing inequality 
(Poulantzas, 1976; Block, 1987).   
 
However, the idea that the ―ruling class‖ could exploit its position to gain access to 
important decision-making sites in society clearly had some merit, and it has persisted 
despite falling out of favor for awhile. More recent work by Domhoff (2009) and by 
Perrucci & Wysong (2008) has expanded on this organizational approach by showing 
how deeply state and market elites are integrated—in particular, they point to the 
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unification of the corporate and governing classes through their connections to key 
organizations that channel resources in patterned ways. Because elites have wealth and 
position, they are able to influence policymakers through direct access, financial 
underwriting, and formal input in government decision-making processes. The 
theoretically neutral state is ―coerced‖ into shaping policy on capital‘s terms because 
the potentially countervailing force (the public) has relatively less access and 
organizational resources. Thus, to put it mildly, ―individuals and organizations with 
more economic power have a different set of opportunities for exercising political 
power than groups without economic power‖ (ibid: p. 20).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But theories presenting the state as a simple ―tool‖ of the more powerful economic 
class fail to explain how the legitimacy of the social order can be maintained under 
such circumstances (Block, 1987). And, it only offers a ―negative‖ understanding of 
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political behavior on the part of non-elites: the barriers to progressive action. It does 
not explain why non-elites whose economic interests are violated by conservative 
policies do support them, often vehemently. In response, some observers have 
suggested that since stability is tied to growth in a capitalist economy, political leaders 
are structurally obliged to create an environment that facilitates growth rather than 
equity (Poulantzas, 1976; Block, 1977; Hacker & Pierson, 2002). Voters accordingly 
interpret growth as a public interest—in fact, the critical item in the public interest. 
This is consistent with Marx‘s theory of capital: in his words, ―the indispensable 
condition for a tolerable situation of the worker is, therefore, the fastest possible 
growth of productive capital‖ because ―the more rapidly the worker increases the 
wealth of others, the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him‖ (Marx, 1978[1891]: 
126-27). Worker demands for a business-friendly climate that attracts investment and 
jobs do not counter elite preferences but reinforce them. This coercion is more than 
―convincing,‖ persuading, or filling a power vacuum; it can be exercised by one group 
without any planned or strategic action and yet compel another group‘s compliance.   
 
Structural coercion also appears to maintain the conditions of its operation: for 
example, social policies that provide a safety net for the free market‘s casualties (those 
rural areas seen as a ―bad investment‖ in growth, for example) create a stable 
environment that paradoxically allows for continued private capital accumulation 
(Poulantzas, 1978). These are powerful explanations for the federal passage of policies 
ensuring social security, minimum wages, or clean air, all of which encroach upon 
market freedoms and were predictably met with resistance by affected business 
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sectors. Theorists of corporate liberalism believe that the dominant class as a whole is 
far-sighted enough to originate such policies and press them upon the state (Domhoff, 
1979; Quadagno, 1984). In providing most workers with basic welfare guarantees as 
well as access to consumerism‘s benefits, economic elites blunt, pacify, or displace 
more fundamental economic demands while preserving sources of profit. This 
perspective requires a fair amount of unification and foresight on the part of capital, 
which may not be the case in reality.  
  
In response, ―relative autonomy‖ theorists propose that state actors implement welfare 
policies in order to transcend demands of capital that would threaten the legitimacy of 
accumulation (Block, 1987). From this perspective, states (as collections of 
institutions and organizations but not actors independent of class forces) have enough 
autonomy to implement policies with the long-term interests of capital in mind. How 
do state managers know what these interests are? Block says that they generally 
determine appropriate policy directions through a process of ―disciplining‖ by capital 
as a whole:  
…Capitalists, in their collective role as investors, have a veto over state 
policies in that their failure to invest at adequate levels can create major 
political problems for the state managers…There will be a tendency for state 
agencies to orient their various programs toward the goal of facilitating and 
encouraging private investment. In doing so, the state managers address the 
problem of investment from a broader perspective than that of the individual 
capitalist‖ (58-59). 
 
Through this framework, the state can address the other set of voter demands that are 
not consistent with growth—environmental regulations, wage increases, and so on—
enough to maintain social stability. Strict applications of Marxist theory predict that 
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these class conflicts themselves help rationalize capitalism by spurring business to 
develop further cost-saving technologies to make up for concessions to workers.   
 
Clearly, the coercive aspect of capitalism‘s self-preservation is tied up with its ability 
to produce consent. Like the former, the latter process happens both instrumentally 
and structurally. Gramsci understood hegemony as the ―intellectual and moral 
leadership of the popular classes by the dominant classes or power bloc‖ (Jessop, 
1977: p. 42). By tapping into popular culture, elites and the institutions they manage 
can articulate, across a diversity of subcultures, unifying ―principles‖ or ideologies, 
creating an imagined community with some basic shared beliefs and values (Hall, 
Held, Hubert, & Thomson, 1996: 412). The theoretical basis on which this idea rests 
was not without sociological precedent: Durkheim, (1986 [1912]) had also written 
about the ways in which societies both modern and pre-modern use symbols and 
rituals to define a collective identity. For Gramsci, Althusser, Benedict Anderson, and 
others, these ideologies and their transmission and reaffirmation function similarly, 
but with class-based interests at their source. Elites are culturally and politically 
positioned so as to cultivate and reinforce values supportive of capitalism. 
 
Like Durkheim, Gramsci believed that ongoing cultural work was required to maintain 
the binding effects of collective ideologies (1971 [1924]). Empirically, there is a 
wealth of evidence for these processes in the United States. Both corporate advertising 
and the political rhetoric supported by corporate backers seek to create cognitive 
connections between cherished ―American‖ values and experiences—freedom, 
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abundance, competition, individualism, or any other signifier of ―American culture‖—
and the country‘s free market, limited government framework. As Hall et al. (1996) 
note, ―the more deeply sedimented the layers of culture that they appeal to, the greater 
will be their persuasiveness‖ (419). Often, the express intent of each broadcast, 
speech, or branding is to connect a particular firm or political platform to these values, 
but their ubiquity creates a corresponding perception of society in general. Lukes 
(1974) calls this the ―third dimension‖ of power: the manipulation of symbols and 
values to ―make them appear objectively valid, natural, universalistic, and 
meritocratic‖ (19). This exercise of power occurs not only during times of conflict or 
in response to grievances, but constantly and invisibly—preventing grievances from 
arising in the first place.   
 
Not only have elite interests worked to associate ―American values‖ with freedom of 
private accumulation, but also to merge threatening or untraditional values with other 
types of economic organization—an accomplishment that would seem remarkable 
were it not so commonplace.  The anticommunist sentiment borne of war and 
nationalism in the mid-20
th
 century became a symbolic holding place for both 
economic and social ―otherness,‖ creating an extraordinarily powerful ideological 
alliance (Diamond, 1995). Leaders who capitalized on this alliance rose to prominence 
by cultivating social divisions that had not yet pervaded the national consciousness. 
They reframed society‘s groupings not in terms of class, but in terms of moral or 
ideological choices; class divisions did not disappear but were defined differently. 
Similar processes occurred in other western countries: Hall (1986), for example, has 
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shown how the Conservative Party in Britain was able to reshape the entire cultural 
understanding of British society by sidestepping class and creating political 
constructions of other central aspects of the national identity—family, race, ethnicity. 
 
The actions of conservative leaders to dismantle class-based politics were 
compounded by structural factors. As electorates began to perceive that one‘s 
economic position resulted from one‘s own actions, existing stratification between 
middle-income and low-income groups took on a new significance. Economic anger 
(over unemployment, or low wages, or high consumer prices, etc.) among the middle-
income group became displaced onto the lower-income group primarily through the 
work of identity politics, which helped voters equate poverty with people of color with 
irresponsibility (i.e., the ―welfare queen‖ myth). Both economic elites and the 
threatened public rejected the redistributive role of the state, a preference that now 
rises markedly where income falls just above the US mean and is more pronounced for 
whites across income (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2004). In post-class American politics, 
race became the central cleavage—not surprising, because racial divisions are largely 
based in the class system but appear to result from ―cultural differences‖ (Bobo, 
1991).   
 
Clearly, the replacement of class-based economic anger with identity-based economic 
anger was an economic coup for the ownership class and less of a victory for the 
public, as today‘s record income gap evinces (Saez & Piketty, 2008). This gap is taken 
as strong evidence among those who see identity politics as a means of securing 
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consent for an economic system that guarantees class-based inequality. While 
downplaying class divisions, identity politics often issues from economic insecurity; 
by referencing social differences, it foments opposition between non-elites while 
burying the vocabulary of class (for further discussion, see Ost, 2005 or Perrucci & 
Wysong, 2008).       
 
Other structural factors also help to maintain consent for a system of inequality. A 
broad variety of observers has shown that consent can be maintained without the 
active work of any particular person or group, through subtle reinforcements of the 
norms and expectations of the dominant system. For example, Althusser (1970) has 
shown that there are institutional (and more or less self-perpetuating) sites of 
ideological transmission—school, the church, the media—where voters and 
consumers are socialized and accustomed to mainstream cultural values. Other types 
of values (such as socialism or zero-growth) are simply not passed along at these 
formal cultural sites. Less formally, Bourdieu (1997)‘s ―field theory‖ points to the 
symbolic significance of common cultural tropes in reinforcing norms of domination 
(for example, the widespread linguistic use in the U.S. of sports metaphors, which 
valorize competition). Bourdieu has also explored the role of cultural capital in the 
transmission of dominant ideologies; the cultural behaviors of elites (such as 
conspicuous consumption) carry the most social value and are replicated in the mass 
pursuit of upward mobility. Thus reinforcement of norms (about hard work perhaps, or 
personal responsibility) can help reconcile, at a subconscious level, objective 
inequality and people‘s perceptions of an equal society. 
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The reinforcement of these norms can occur in even more indirect ways, through 
people‘s habituation to the time and space ―routines‖ of capitalism—such that 
…the real inculcation of voluntary acceptance of capitalism occurs not so 
much through the ideological indoctrination of the means of communication, 
as in the invisible diffusion of commodity fetishism through the market or the 
instinctual habits of submission induced by the work-routines of factories and 
offices-----in other words, directly within the ambit of the means of 
production themselves (Anderson, 1976: 27).     
  
Acculturation to a system based on inequality becomes an inertial force that does not 
even rely on the actions of a unified class to keep it going; the public sees this system 
as natural and cannot imagine possibilities ―outside‖ of it. This idea helps explain, for 
example, how the flourishing of open-source media formally independent from (and 
often antagonistic to) elite interests has not been able to create an alternative dialogue 
meaningful to the mass public. 
 
And empirically, the ownership class has not necessarily appeared unified enough to 
issue one consistent ideological message. Some sectors are orthodox about free 
markets or libertarian, some more liberal and sympathetic to the welfare state idea, 
some proponents of ―sustainable capitalism.‖ State leaders spend an enormous and 
highly visible amount of time and money maneuvering to translate these varying 
interests into public policy. Exaggerating the difference in elites‘ policy preferences 
has an interesting effect which may give the most compelling explanation of coercion 
and consent. First, it creates intense ―oppositions of principle‖ among voters who 
might not actually have much of substance to disagree on, leading to the 
―underutilization of the democratic state‖ by an indoctrinated public (ibid.: 28). But 
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more importantly, the democratic state‘s very existence creates an illusion of formal 
equality between individuals that abstracts their very real class differentiation, leading 
them to believe that they are fundamentally equal because they are legally so. Thus the 
resonance of the idea that disparity in a democratic society stems from personal 
failures, and attempts by a collective force (the state) to redress disparity are, in fact, 
undemocratic. Therefore, ―the existence of the [democratic] State thus constitutes the 
formal framework of all other ideological mechanisms of the ruling class‖ (ibid.). 
 
Pluralist Theories of Power  
 
While Marxian sociology is more concerned with the structures that shape social 
action, the Weberian perspective sees social action as a result of individuals acting in 
reference to group values and rationalities. Individuals may act in accordance with 
their own interests, but because these interests reference commonly-held values, 
converging behavior results. Since these values are not timeless but are dependent 
upon changing historical contexts (Weber, 1978 [1956]), action does not have a 
materially constant base, and nor does power. Thus, according to Weber, power can 
issue to various types of status—it is often tied to economic resources but not 
necessarily so (ibid.); it can be gained or lost despite status. Because peoples‘ interests 
are not defined in opposition, because power is not necessarily a finite resource, and 
because the motivations for action are situated in particular contexts, social outcomes 
can only be interpreted by considering their historical specificity.   
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This conceptual orientation is attractive because it acknowledges actors as more than 
passive reflections of structures and captures complexities that class-based theories 
cannot—specifics of culture, relationships, and historical experience, for example. 
Both pluralist and state-centered theories of power take this approach to understanding 
political behavior and outcomes, suggesting that they are based on particular 
configurations of circumstances and events that are generally patterned, but not 
structured to the extent that class theory predicts. However, these theories and their 
subtheories have varying usefulness for understanding durable relationships of power, 
as will be explored below.   
 
Classical pluralism, associated with Dahl (1961) and Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) 
is an approach that understands power as widely spread among multiple interest 
groups, and expects it to change hands without accruing to any one status indefinitely 
(―non-cumulative‖). Interests can be based in a variety of social preferences and 
positions—not only economic but cultural, occupational, spatial, and so on—and 
power can accrue differentially according to the shifting of these preferences over 
time. Power in pluralist systems is expressed through groups‘ potential capacity to 
influence the state, which as a neutral actor will mediate demands based on the level 
of support groups have among voters; the obvious analogy is a market regulating 
demand among consumers. Although some actors—such as industry or business 
groups—maintain more influential positions relative to citizen groups, no one group 
permanently dominates the political system (Vogel, 1989). Voting, lobbying, and 
expressing public opinion are democratic strategies used to transmit preferences to 
 93 
political parties (Key, 1961), which then build coalitions of interests; the state enacts 
legislation based on these expressions of political consensus (Hill & Hinton-Anderson, 
1995). The power of actors in a political process is thus transparent and traceable to 
self-professed interests and empirical outcomes (McFarland, 2007). Classical 
pluralists see the creation and preservation of the social safety net in the US as an 
indication of the power of labor and other non-elite groupings in the face of 
considerable opposition from capital.   
 
For a long time, classical pluralism was the dominant theory of power in American 
social science because it justified the liberal US political system while appearing to 
explaining it (Manley, 1983), but its insufficient treatment of durable power 
relationships and the maintenance of  inequality was acknowledged even by its chief 
theorists. This crisis spurred a number of subtheories, such as neo-pluralism 
(Connolly, 1969; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993), that still refuse to accept class as 
the basic fulcrum of power, but recognize the disproportionate influence of elites in 
the policy process (Held, 1996). Some, like Lowi (1964), suggested that policy areas 
might be controlled by different but bounded power ―oligarchies‖—for example, the 
disproportionate power of agricultural or pharmaceutical lobbies would be limited to 
the policy areas relevant to their industries. Lowi argued that as a consequence of 
these ―islands‖ of influence, decision makers underwent a process of bargaining with 
organized interest groups, ―thereby forming special interest policy-making coalition[s] 
specific to particular area[s] of public policy‖ (McFarland, 2007). Implied were 
multiple power centers but also confined pressure points that could be exploited by 
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narrow interest groups—a fractionalization of the political process into numerous 
dynamics of power and strategy.   
 
This theory, along with the recognition in the 70s-80s of rising popular political 
participation and direct involvement in legislative activity, led to the development of 
another subtheory, interest group pluralism (Clemens, 1997). Despite the apparent 
dominance of certain policy areas by elites, theorists recognized that citizens had 
considerable ability to shape outcomes through resources that elites might not have: 
powerful organizations based on popular support. Using these resources and mastering 
policy-making processes in a particular area, interest groups could develop repertoires 
of action—―historically specific constellations of power strategies‖ (Piven & Cloward, 
2000: 414)—that would be tailored to and could exploit the dynamics at work in that 
policy area. With more diffuse support and greater public visibility, citizens‘ lobbies 
would have as much ability to petition the state and secure desired outcomes as more 
economically powerful interests. Indeed, a number of extremely influential social 
movements have gained enough power to reshape society both culturally and through 
political process: for example, the environmental, consumer, and evangelical religious 
movements. These movements would seem to cut across class boundaries, which is 
evidence against a class-dominant society. Pluralist theories see such movements as 
evidence of a post-modern shift from political demands organized by material 
concerns to demands organized by post-material or ideal values (Hicks & Lechner, 
2005). This conclusion is in accordance with the Weberian expectation of changing 
value systems in society (for example, from ―value-rationality‖ to ―instrumental 
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rationality‖ during the rise of capitalism). Interpreted as such, this 20th century shift in 
political demands would be evidence that power centers frequently change over time 
(and space). 
 
This perspective also accounts for actors‘ pursuit of policies that appear to conflict 
with their material concerns. Economic conservatism among non-elites could be 
interpreted as a defensive but legitimate reaction on the part of middle-income voters, 
who don‘t want their earnings taxed away to support perceived ―undeserving‖ groups. 
This view has some merit because the lowest income groups tend to support a 
redistributive state (Bartels, 2004) and use government assistance, which puts their 
interests at odds from middle-income and elite groups that do not. The seemingly 
incongruous alliance between these latter two is not seen as a product of 
coercion/consent, therefore, but interest-driven and mutable—middle- and lower 
income groups might be allied against elites on a different issue such as gun control.   
 
State-Centered Theories of Power  
 
Class-dominance and pluralist theories are similar in that both are society-centered; 
that is, they expect power to reside in civil society, where maneuverings to gain 
influence over the state are the source of social change. They differ in how available 
they expect power to be: either limited by class position, or free to all. Neither 
perspective is particularly well-matched to empirical phenomena though, and scholars 
have sought more nuanced theories to deal with questions of power‘s location and 
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availability. During the 70s and 80s, ―a general awareness that, within all capitalist 
societies, the state had acquired a more directive role with respect to the economy and 
civil society‖ (Hall et al. 1996), as well as a renewed recognition of the extent to 
which policy outcomes are ―profoundly affected by government‖ (Skocpol & Amenta, 
1986), promoted the state as a possible mediator in the structure-agency debate. State-
centered theories understand the state as a source of change itself, rather than just a 
space for arbitrating society-based demands. Among the classical canon, Weberian 
models of social action were an appropriate starting point to understanding the role of 
the state; Weber‘s comparative-historical method had pointed to states in modern 
western capitalism as extremely powerful actors, particularly through their use of the 
bureaucratic organizational form which expanded their authority while legitimizing it 
(1978 [1956]). 
 
Weber had reasoned that states were sets of organizations with unique functions and 
missions, and consequently unique interests and capacities; states could be concerned 
with extracting resources, defending territory, and exerting coercive control (Skocpol 
& Amenta, 1986) or with promoting order and stability in the pursuit of continued 
political legitimacy and economic self-reproduction (Offe, 1984). These interests and 
actions might make them central causal actors in social and political situations 
(Skocpol, 1980). While in general state interests would be prized by civil society 
actors too, particular means of pursuing them might alienate different sectors, forcing 
the state to impose its will over opposition. For example, if stability requires a social 
safety net, state actors might resist the coercive effect of elite influence and instead 
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implement welfarist policies; where stability requires a reliable legal environment for 
capital accumulation, state actors might put down popular demands for redistribution 
(sometimes violently). What makes these circumstances different from the relative 
autonomy suggested by class-dominance theories? Block (1977) has suggested that 
―each social formation determines the particular ways in which state power will be 
exercised within that society and social formations will vary in the degree to which the 
exercise of state power is constrained‖ (229); for Block potential constraints come 
from class interests but the principle also applies to more pluralistic views such as 
those of Clemens & Cook (1997). Thus the specific arrangement of the state 
determines the extent of its autonomy from civil society demands and its capacity to 
prioritize its own interests in policymaking; ―strong‖ states have a greater causal role 
in social change than ―weak‖ states (Skocpol, 1980).    
 
Even with some isomorphism, the specific arrangement of most state institutions and 
processes is due to chance circumstances—geopolitics, dominant cultural themes, 
timing of industrialization, etc. (Abbott, 1994). In political sociology, this idea has 
been used to interpret differences in the shape of the western welfare state across 
space; in a well-known example, Skocpol & Orloff (1984) showed how differences in 
the sequence of state formation processes shaped divergent social policy outcomes in 
Britain and the US. Scholars of the state have also recognized that established state 
structures and processes are themselves crucial in shaping the political actions 
working through them (Katznelson, 1997). For example, highly transparent or 
accessible state agencies might encourage participatory policymaking, with 
 98 
implications for the distribution of power among civil society groups; some kinds of 
electoral rules or processes might favor incumbency while others might promote 
turnover within political offices. Institutional characteristics, therefore, also shape 
social action and create different types of constraints or opportunities; these are less 
durable than class-dominance theories would predict, but more durable than expected 
by pluralism. This is both a boon in dealing with the structure-agency problem in the 
social sciences: as Jessop points out, ―institutions are said to provide a bridge between 
macrophenomena and microphenomena or between macrosocial logics and 
microsocial foundations‖ (2001: 1216).   
 
Thus state-centered theorists generally agree that ―states may be sites of autonomous 
official initiatives, and their institutional structures may help to shape the political 
processes from which …policies emerge‖ (Skocpol & Amenta, 1986). State managers 
do not enact legislation in a vacuum, but based on different institutional pressures—
which develop through policy feedback and path dependence. The concept of path 
dependence, first applied to understand technological development but now broadly 
used in political sociology, encompasses a few key claims:  
Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar 
conditions, a wide range of social outcomes might be possible; large 
consequences may result from relatively ―small‖ or contingent events; 
particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to 
reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by 
critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life 
(Pierson, 2000: 251). 
 
Pierson suggests both a broad conception, where social outcomes depend on certain 
sequences of events but no lock-in to a particular path is implied, and a narrower 
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conception based on positive feedback whereby steps in a particular direction induce 
further steps in the same direction. In cases of the former, groups can adapt to or reject 
unpopular policies, reducing the ability of interests to become entrenched—an 
interpretation well-suited to the market rationality underlying classical liberal 
pluralism (Steinmo, 2001). In cases of the latter, certain institutional types might 
create certain types of political processes and relationships and shut off others, 
obstructing path ―exits‖ once the course is set. Even where exit is the ―rational‖ move, 
social adaptation to the existing path makes change extremely difficult. As Pierson 
(2000) remarks, often key institutions and processes in society have endured not 
because they serve some useful purpose but because they have become locked in.  
 
This lock-in process occurs both instrumentally and structurally. First, interest groups 
built around existing social organization do not want their investments disrupted: they 
may have developed political or economic advantages, and they may openly resist 
change (Esping-Anderson, 1985). State actors who manage institutions also have 
strong incentives to follow the path because the costs of switching are immediate 
while the benefits are not (Pierson, 2000). Structurally, Gaventa (1980) has shown that 
power asymmetries that are institutionalized at critical points may become less and 
less visible the further events progress down that ―path;‖ as they recede from actual 
decision-making points they come to appear timeless or natural. Groups might not 
know that change is possible, which keeps their interests within an already-defined 
sphere and limits their demand for institutional change (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992).   
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Thus, political institutions and processes are durable to the extent that they are 
―reinforced through socialization or interaction or legitimation while alternative scripts 
remain unimaginable‖ (Clemens & Cook, 1997). Yet unlike structures, institutions do 
change, often with significant rearrangement of the status quo—provoking the 
question, under what circumstances? Many scholars have pointed to external 
catalysts—war or macroeconomic shifts, for example, that force change to major parts 
of the political system (Sewell, 1992). Hacker & Pierson (2002), for example, have 
shown that pre-Depression elites were extremely powerful politically until the 
institutions of the New Deal changed their relationship to the state and to the 
electorate. Others suggest that seemingly minor events occurring at critical junctures 
can also have such an effect, like a routine election that brings a reformer to power. 
Clemens & Cook (1997) note that factors inherent in an institution itself can spark a 
demand or need for rearrangement; institutions are not just organizations but ―cultural 
templates‖ that provide models for perception and action. Where these models begin 
to conflict with other values, people may be provoked to demand institutional change.   
 
Institutional durability and change do not in themselves point to a particular type of 
power arrangement in society, but they can reinforce the effects of such an 
arrangement.  Essentially, the state is  
―a set of institutions that process pressures from economic interests and 
organized groups and produce binding decisions or policies. The nature of 
these institutions, or—in more colloquial terms—the ―rules of the game,‖ 
clearly shapes the potential for economic interests and organized groups to 
influence policy‖ (Huber et al., 1993: 4). 
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In other words, ―state policy is the result of power relations in society mediated by 
political institutions‖ (Huber & Stephens, 2001: 13). Such a perspective can be used to 
support different assumptions about power; social scientists inclined toward rational 
choice models have concluded that, since political institutions affect civil society‘s 
ability to influence the state, power is not based in class but in political strategy (as 
predicted by pluralism) (Kiser & Bauldry, 2005). Others, such as Bachrach & Baratz 
(1962), might dismiss this is a ―one-dimensional‖ view of power, and suggest instead 
that institutions are part of the ―second dimension‖ of power: ―political organizations, 
like all organizations, develop a ‗mobilization of bias‘…some issues are organized 
into politics while others are organized out‖ (quoted in Gaventa, 1980: 9). Norms, 
precedents, and institutional procedures constrain conflict and can prevent some 
choices from arising.   
 
Even if the above idea discredits pluralism, it need not suggest class-based power. But 
are state-centered power and class-based power incompatible? Not necessarily so: in a 
market society, the ownership class has a secure source of power, which is to create 
growth; this compels the state to enact and uphold policies that preserve an unequal 
accumulation of resources and the public to consent to, even clamor for, such policies. 
But institutions can empower or set limits on what happens within this context. So, if 
power in capitalist society operates in a predictable way, institutional variation means 
it will have different effects across time and space. The state-centered perspective may 
in fact complement class-dominance. The usefulness of these ideas will be tested in 
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the next section, which uses recent policmaking experience in Alabama as a case study 
of who has power and how they keep it (or not).  
 
Research Strategy 
 
Studying power is a way to understand the adoption of an imbalanced economic 
development strategy, which the previous chapter has introduced. Alabama‘s capital-
subsidy approach favors groups with existing resources but has less apparent benefits 
for those who need help accessing opportunities and building assets. The theoretical 
perspectives outlined above share some basic similarities that make them potential 
explanations for policy outcomes. In political sociology, pluralist, class-based, and 
state-centered theorists might all ask who governs, who makes decisions, and who 
benefits (Domhoff, 1979). One of the more common methods of identifying power is 
through network analysis, in which influential groups and individuals are identified 
and the structural connections (financial or otherwise) between them are mapped. For 
example, membership network analysis can show where financial or attitudinal 
interests overlap. Shared financial interests between otherwise unconnected actors 
may explain alliances; campaign donations to decision-makers in government can 
provide direct evidence of influence and power, and so on.   
 
However, as interviews for this study were conducted, it became clear that Alabama‘s 
institutional organization makes network analysis somewhat inaccessible. Mapping the 
organizational network of powerful groups and individuals in Alabama would have 
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been most effective with a financial rather than interpersonal focus, since ―old boy‖ 
networks and the relatively small number of power centers mean that many elites are 
personally connected in some way. But, Alabama‘s lobbying and disclosure rules are 
extremely lax, making it extremely difficult to trace financial connections between 
groups. In Alabama, political action committees, which collect money from donors 
and pass it along to candidates, can also ―pass money between themselves, several 
times over, making it nearly impossible to say where the money first originated‖—a 
process that some have called ―legal money laundering‖ (Huntsville Times, 2010). 
Thus, it would be impossible to discover through network analysis the financial or 
structural connections between influential groups and policymakers.   
 
Instead, this chapter used the reputational method for identifying power, where 
evidence is based on a reputation for being powerful (as discovered through 
interviewing). As explained by Domhoff (2010), reputational data ―can be obtained 
from a cross-section of observers who are thought to be knowledgeable about the 
powerful on the basis of their occupational roles;‖ powerful actors will be repeatedly 
mentioned so it is not necessary to seek data from the entire population of 
knowledgeable observers. This method is useful because the researcher can get a much 
broader sense of the prevailing power structure by questioning the observers about 
their own connections, policy involvements, and opinions on the major issues (ibid.).   
 
Power structure research can be difficult because one set of data may be interpreted in 
different ways based on the theoretical perspective. The first theory that will be tested 
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using power structure research is pluralism. Evidence supporting pluralism is fairly 
easy to find because interests and power are assumed to operate in a transparent, one-
dimensional manner where stated preferences and observable actions can be taken at 
face value. Political outcomes have been the favored dependent variable among 
pluralists because they show who benefits in specific cases (McFarland, 2007), 
benefits being understood as relatively clearly connected to demands. Factors such as 
changing voter turnouts, increasing political responsiveness, cross-class coalitions and 
social movements, and diversification in the lobbying process have been suggested as 
evidence that power is widely spread and not necessarily tied to economic interests 
(Dahl, 1961; Gerber & Phillips, 2003; Clemens, 1997). If this is true, approval of a 
policy framework that maintains inequality can indicate pluralism, since 
disadvantaged groups would be fighting for change if it was important enough to 
them.   
 
In a stepwise manner, this section will assess the basic characteristics of Alabama‘s 
political structure to determine whether the conditions for pluralism exist, and then 
will assess recent development policy outcomes for evidence of pluralism in action. 
To pass the first test, participation in direct democracy opportunities (like referenda) 
must cut across classes, and cross-class interest groups must exist and be significant 
political power centers. To pass the second test, direct democracy participation during 
1990-2010 must show that disadvantaged groups voted with advantaged groups to 
support capital subsidy strategies and/or reject balanced development attempts. To 
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account for coercion or misinformation, there must be evidence that the former‘s 
motivations were self-interested. Table 6 (below) lays out these tests. 
 
Table 6: Expected Features of Pluralist Organization of Power 
Test 1: Political-
structural factors 
Access to and participation in direct democracy 
Existence of cross-class interest groups and social movements 
Lobbying influence of cross-class groups 
Test 2: Empirical 
outcomes 
Quiescence/support for status quo among powerless 
Self-interested motivations for political behavior  
 
 
Confirming that state conditions and policy outcomes associated with pluralism exist 
in Alabama does not rule out class-based power, so the second theory that will be 
tested is class-dominance.  The same stepwise approach will be used to test for 1) 
political-structural factors that would make class-based power possible, and 2) recent 
outcomes that point to class-based power in action. These factors will be identified 
with help from Gaventa‘s classic 1980 study Power and Powerlessness. Gaventa 
agreed with Lukes (1974) that support for the status quo could not be taken at face 
value because of the manipulation of consent expected to take place in a class-based 
power structure. Gaventa‘s predecessors had a hard time showing exactly how 
economic power gets translated into political power, even if they agreed with the 
theory. His study was probably the first to identify the actual mechanisms of this 
process, and to show they could be empirically observed. 
 
As Gaventa showed, identifying power in this ―third dimension‖ involves showing 
how the political conceptions of the powerless are shaped by the powerful. One key 
 106 
factor is the ―historical development of an apparent ‗consensus‘‖ (1980: 27)7; the first 
test will look for evidence that inequality exists and has been maintained through the 
choices of people in the state (e.g., through policy decisions). It will also look for 
evidence of coercion and consent in the shaping of collective values (ibid.: 91). 
Coercion may be partly identified through industry-dominated lobbying and political 
donation (however, unless there is clear corporate unity, industry lobbying cannot be 
taken alone as evidence for class-based power). According to Gaventa, evidence of 
consent might be the public‘s ―psychological adaptations to the state of being without 
power‖ (ibid.: 16): for example, an altered/lowered level of political demands, a lack 
of awareness about inequality, or a malleable set of beliefs
8
. Hall (1986) and Lakoff 
(2006) have also suggested that ideologies that legitimate the status quo would be 
prevalent in a situation of class-based consent. Evidence that elites are involved in 
perpetuating these ideologies is necessary to indicate a ―third dimension‖ of power at 
work in Alabama. Gaventa also believes that counterfactuals—evidence of past 
rebellion by powerless groups—is needed to show that conflicting interests exist even 
where conflict normally fails to arise (1980: 29). Table 6 (below) shows all the 
elements of each stepwise test that must be satisfied.  
 
A stepwise test will be used to assess the state-centered theory of power as well. 
Determining if the state is the main source of power in society also requires more 
                                               
7 ―The background study may help to identify certain key symbols, cues, or routines that affect the 
maintenance of quiescence in a given situation but which may not be identifiable as part of the 
‗language of power‘ without knowledge of their antecedents‖ (27). 
8 ―Through the invocation of myths or symbols, the use of threat or rumors, or other mechanisms of 
power, the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while 
apparently contradictory grievances may be expressed in others‖ (Gaventa, 1980: 19). 
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Table 7: Expected Features of Class-Based Organization of Power 
Test 1: Political-structural 
factors 
Persistent inequality (ascribed, generational, perpetuated 
through policy) 
Historical establishment of consensus 
Test 2: Empirical 
mechanisms/ outcomes 
More lobbying and political donation by owners than 
worker/consumer groups 
Psychological adaptations to powerlessness 
Counterfactual: Past rebellion against injustice by 
powerless 
 
 
complex evidence than demanded by pluralism because the state‘s agenda might tend 
to favor growth and capital, or it might tend to favor social stability and redistribution. 
To determine whether the conditions for state power exist (Test 1), government unity 
is assessed; if these interests are fragmented or conflicting, it must be concluded that 
the state is not a coherent power source. Also assessed are the barriers between state 
and capital (such as the ‗revolving door‖ between corporate lobbying and lawmaking): 
are they rigid or porous? (National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2010). Since 
the state‘s character is shaped by institutions and policies, a closer look at these 
components is also warranted, to see if they tend to constrain or enable the state‘s 
capacity and its autonomy from civil society demands. If these conditions are satisfied, 
Test 2 then focuses on empirical outcomes. If policymaking tends to favor the unified 
state‘s interests over conflicting demands in civil society, the state is understood to be 
the major power center. Table 7 (below) sets out the conditions for each stepwise test.  
 
Because pluralism is the easiest to disprove, it is assigned as the null hypothesis. The 
defining assumptions of both alternative hypotheses are that evidence for the null 
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Table 8: Expected Features of State-Centered Organization of Power 
Test 1: Political-structural 
factors 
Unified set of state interests  
Rigid barriers between state and capital 
Institutions and policies enable state capacity and 
autonomy 
Test 2: Empirical outcomes Policymaking favors unified state goals 
 
 
 (although directly available) cannot be taken at face value, and evidence for either 
alternative must rely on indirect evidence. Because the alternatives are highly sensitive 
but poorly specified, Type II error, or easy acceptance of the null hypothesis, should 
be less of a problem than Type I error, or incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis. 
However, this chapter‘s analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative, so finding an 
―accurate‖ objective truth about power in Alabama is less essential than exploring the 
interaction between variables. As Becker (2001) notes, ―the point [of qualitative 
research] is not to prove, beyond a doubt, the existence of particular relationships so 
much as to describe a system of relationships, to show how things hang together in a 
web of mutual influence or support or interdependence‖ (219). Yet, as noted above, a 
clear understanding of these interactions is important because it can shed light on the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of existing political arrangements: do they result from 
considered deliberation and consensus among equal parties, or not?   
 
Data and Methods 
 
Each power theory is assessed using 2 types of evidence: political-structural factors 
and empirical outcomes. In a multi-stage approach, interviews and secondary research 
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are used to gather both types of evidence; interviews provided data themselves but 
also suggested the types of secondary data that might also be needed. This flexible 
fieldwork procedure allows researchers to ―pursue promising empirical and theoretical 
leads…[by moving] constantly from observation and analysis to conceptual refining 
and reframing and then back to seek new forms of data relevant to their emerging 
theoretical concerns and categories‖ (Emerson, 2001: 284). Emerson describes this as 
a simultaneously deductive and inductive methodology that allows for conceptual 
refinement and hypothesis modification. Here, such an approach is used for two main 
reasons: because the types of questions asked become more relevant as more is learned 
about the case under study, and because the alternative hypotheses require more than 
one dimension of evidence.   
 
The interviews were conducted with political observers and representatives of groups 
that participate in the political process as it relates to state-led development 
policymaking. There were 30 interview subjects, most of which lasted for one to one-
and-a-half hours and were prompted by open-ended questions. The interviews focused 
broadly on the evolution of current development policy and practice in Alabama, a 
focus which gradually revealed the ways that different interests tended to be organized 
into groups and networks. As these groupings and the relationships between them 
became clearer, the interviews asked more about their historical shaping and 
contemporary maintenance. The evidentiary significance of some interview data 
quickly became clear; other evidence was more hazy and speculative, requiring 
follow-up with secondary data.    
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Subjects were selected through theoretical sampling, a method through which new 
data are collected ―in order to elaborate, qualify, and test [emergent] analytic 
categories;‖ sampling decisions ―are guided not by concern with statistical 
representativeness but by concerns of theoretical relevance‖ (Emerson, 2001: 292). 
New interview subjects were often referred by older ones, but such leads were often 
abandoned where it became apparent that the information acquired would be 
repetitive, and instead pursued information from a different angle. This sampling 
strategy made sense because these interviews were generally regarded as objective 
sources of information rather than subjective narratives. Interviewees were asked to 
provide their own analyses of certain events and relationships, and triangulated from 
different sources increased the accuracy of such analyses, interview subjects were 
regarded as ―teachers‖ or knowledge imparters rather than as discursive figures. 
Almost all interviewees had lived in, observed, and participated in Alabama public life 
for decades; the epistemological approach was not to question their information but to 
build on it with other data sources.   
 
At the same time, reading between the lines of what was said and merely implied was 
important, especially because many interview subjects were group representatives; 
completely frank discussions were somewhat out of reach because these individuals 
spoke for more than just themselves. This semi-interpretive strategy was helpful in the 
interview process, but it colored the data collection process with subjective 
interpretations of what interviewees were saying. The benefits outweigh the costs here 
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because the primary goal was collecting information about political structure and 
empirical outcomes rather than about meaning; had the interviews focused more 
ethnographically on asking voters to explain their political behavior, these pre-
interpretations would have held more significance. Even so, more quantitative data 
from secondary sources was needed to complement and back up aspects of the general 
picture created from interviews. Secondary data was primarily collected over the 
Internet from federal, state, and NGO repositories of statistical, election, and 
demographic information; no blogs or partisan sources were used. Such sources have 
already been vetted for reliability and rigor. 
 
Results 
   
A Pluralist Understanding of Political Behavior in Alabama 
 
Through analysis of interview and secondary data, this chapter found that many 
aspects of political behavior by Alabama voters can be interpreted through a pluralist 
framework: the data pass both stepwise tests for the null hypothesis of pluralism. The 
first test of political-structural conditions required evidence of equal access to and 
participation in direct democracy across classes. The findings do show that direct 
democracy is frequently used to vet policy proposals in Alabama: state government is 
required to send all legislation that would require a constitutional amendment to the 
voters for approval; by 2006, a total of 1,088 amendment proposals had come before 
the voters since 1901—by far the most of any state (Initiative and Referendum 
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Institute, 2009). Secondary data from the US Census Bureau on the state-level 
demographic breakdown of voter turnout was only available for national election years 
(which have coincided for the most part with referenda voting) and was only broken 
down by age, sex, and race. A close proxy for class in Alabama is race and generally 
there were equal rates of voting among whites and blacks between 1998 and 2008; 
prior to 1998 black voting rates were at least 10% lower (US Census Bureau, 2010). 
Overall, this is interpreted as evidence of roughly equal access to and participation in 
direct democracy during the period under study.   
 
Interview evidence and secondary analysis of PAC contributions indicates that there 
are three main political power centers in Alabama, in terms of both lobbying expenses 
and perceptions of public influence. These are business, education/labor, and the 
religious lobby; while other interest groups may have a significant lobbying presence, 
these three are also publicly influential. The economic interests generally act on the 
traditional labor/capital axis but there is a history of cross-class pursuits that suggests a 
more complex organization of power. It is essential to note as well the influence of the 
religious lobby, which can be understood as a significant cross-class interest group or 
social movement. This evidence, as discussed below, bolsters the overall support for a 
positive result for Test 1 of the pluralism framework.  
 
Although the religious community in the Southeast is frequently spatially divided 
along racial lines, where the white churches (mostly Baptist-denomination) and black 
churches (mostly Methodist-denomination) have some separate social and political 
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interests, devoutness appears to trump those differences in voting: as a state pollster 
told me, ―How often one attends church is the single most powerful faith variable 
there is. That‘s related to everything else. And it doesn‘t matter what the religion is‖ 
(personal communication, 11/17/08). The religious lobby intersects with class interests 
in often unexpected ways; while the black churches are composed to a greater extent 
by lower-income members who may share the same class interests, the white churches 
have a diverse class membership which generally coheres around conservative goals 
(personal communication, 9/10/08). The most significant example of this cross-class 
movement is the 1999 education lottery proposal, which was strongly opposed and 
defeated almost single-handedly by widespread church opposition. 
The church community in the state collectively decided this was not 
something they wanted…the church community made the absolute difference 
in this. But here there was no external orchestration of it; there were different 
church groups but there was a clear coalescing around the position that ―This 
is just not what we want.‖ (personal communication, 11/17/08)  
 
At the same time white-oriented church organizations such as the Southern Baptist 
Convention will sometimes ally with black-oriented church organizations such as 
Greater Birmingham Ministries in supporting progressive taxation, work supports, and 
other elements of a balanced development strategy. The individual white churches 
tend to avoid political activism in areas of socio-economic policy.    
 
On the other hand, some of the major business organizations, such as the Business 
Council of Alabama (BCA) and the utility giant Alabama Power, have been some of 
the strongest supporters of balanced development policies even though they would 
increase state authority, taxation, and economic redistribution. In interviews, self-
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interest was given as a motivating factor for these groups‘ support: the corporate 
backers of public goods investment understand that such an imbalanced development 
paradigm does not serve Alabama well, either internally (because of the workforce‘s 
low skill level) or externally (because of the disincentive created for mobile employers 
and skilled workers). 
If you‘re an Alabama Power, if you are a reformer for economic development, 
you look at the world realistically and you now not only have to go beyond 
the Alabama borders…but you‘ve got to go internationally. And the imagery 
of Alabama which you still find…is so negative because it‘s built upon the 
George Wallace era. They are more conscious of having to change the 
imagery, and I think part of the reform movement…is the recognition that 
unless you did that, you couldn‘t get anywhere. (personal communication, 
9/10/08) 
 
I would say that the majority of business leaders, particularly in the major 
urban centers, recognize that we don‘t invest enough in education or in 
infrastructure for our state to sustain a competitive level of growth and that 
education is too important to leave to educators alone…the business 
community being the largest consumer of the education product. (personal 
communication, 1/14/09) 
 
It‘s becoming more apparent on projects we see—you‘re sitting there saying, 
―Why are we getting eliminated? Why does the site consultant or prospect 
turn us down?‖ And you go back and you try to do exit interviews if you 
make it that far to where you can actually ask those types of questions, and 
site consultants have told us, ―Well, first of all, it‘s education—what is your 
education system like?‖ (personal communication, 5/14/09) 
 
At the same time, there is evidence that labor is complicit in maintaining significant 
elements of the status quo. The Alabama Education Association (AEA) is the biggest 
and most powerful labor organization and, like its frequent opponent ALFA, is heavily 
involved in political lobbying. 
The two largest lobbying entities in the state that influence legislation are 
ALFA and AEA. Those two organizations, to an economic developer, can be 
somewhat detrimental, in my opinion. (personal communication, 5/14/09) 
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AEA has a tremendous amount of influence not only because of its grassroots support 
at the local school level, but also because over a third of the legislature is employed by 
the state college system, which is AEA-controlled (Carl Grafton, personal 
communication, 9/10/08). Alabama Development Office officials partially attribute 
the state‘s lack of ―third wave‖ economic development strategies to labor‘s 
recalcitrance: 
The problem we have is, the Legislature that creates the statutory incentives 
has not redefined the incentives to include incubators and all that. So I don‘t 
think the Legislature, because of the union (the teachers‘ union that has so 
much of a chokehold) they won‘t let us really put in new incentives. (personal 
communication, 10/22/08) 
 
Historical accounts suggest that labor and its biggest supporter, the African American 
political establishment, has been consistently inflexible when threatened by change, 
even where policy innovation could benefit its constituents: 
―Despite their considerable number and progressive public images, blacks and 
the AEA had little positive effect on the direction of state politics, partly 
because their leaders were almost as devoid of a progressive vision as alliance 
members or George Wallace. Once they assumed power, black leaders, whose 
considerable political skills had been honed fighting an entrenched power 
structure, did little but emulate the worst tendencies of those they had 
opposed. And as the quality of public schools declined, the AEA and its black 
allies fought virtually every proposal for educational improvement except 
teacher salary increases and school building construction‖ (Grafton & 
Permaloff, 1995: 305). 
 
Approval of or acquiescence to an existing policy framework that maintains inequality 
can be an indication of pluralism, since disadvantaged groups would be expected to 
fight for change where it was important enough to them. Evidence already presented 
above indicates that, in recent major referenda votes on balanced development 
policies, disadvantaged groups (low-income, less educated, rural, and/or black voters) 
repeatedly approve maintenance of the status quo—a key element of Test 2. 
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Interviews suggest that self-interest does figure in for low-income voters, who have 
aspirations to social mobility and do not want to jeopardize their future prosperity by 
approving higher taxes:   
[One legislator] was working on property tax reform for education, and he‘ll 
tell you things like the biggest problem—he would go into the projects, and 
try to get people to vote for property tax reform and they won‘t do it. Because 
they want to own property in the future and they tell him, ―We‘re cutting our 
own throats if you make it.‖ (personal communication, 9/10/08) 
 
I think a lot of times too, people who are poor and middle income, we don‘t 
like to see ourselves there. There‘s an aspiration of, ―I want it to be great for 
the rich because that‘s where I‘m headed.‖  (personal communication, 
10/4/08) 
 
However, class-based theories of power would suggest an element of ―false 
consciousness‖ on the part of tax-averse low-income voters, since they are the primary 
consumers of public goods. It‘s less clear that such an explanation can apply to the 
middle-class; interviews suggest that self-interest may motivate middle-class voters‘ 
acquiescence to the status quo, because they perceive their contributions to public 
revenue as subsidies for less-deserving groups: 
There‘s an attitude that is still there…that you don‘t want to do things like get 
rid of the tax on groceries because the sales tax is really the only tax that the 
poor pay; ―we give them everything.‖ (personal communication, 9/10/08) 
 
As a non-profit housing developer, a lot of times I‘ve been maligned: ―you‘re 
trying to give these people something for nothing—you‘ve got all these 
amenities for poor people; you‘re subsidizing poor people‘s housing.‖ 
(personal communication, 2/10/09) 
 
Many interview subjects reluctantly attributed these middle-class attitudes to racism, 
since tax revenue supports low-income groups and Black Alabamians have always had 
less income and wealth than whites.   
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Part of the blockage besides the distrust is the idea that many of the voters 
really will tell you, they don‘t see the benefit to their family. They see that the 
money‘s going to go to the poor blacks. (personal communication, 9/10/08) 
 
The connection between property taxes and public education funding makes this 
source of aversion particularly potent.   
I think that I would like to say to you that it didn‘t go back to racism, but that 
is at the core of it. It‘s different from what it was like when I was growing up 
because people that are black and white are friends; there‘s not some of those 
walls that were there. All the whites, though, have left all the public schools. 
And you will have [white] people who are very, very poor who will be 
sending their kids to private school, and some people in the community will 
help them pay so they can go to private schools. And these are not quality 
private schools; these are just private schools. And there is—I wish I didn‘t 
think this way, but race is at the bottom of it. (personal communication, 
9/10/08) 
 
These motivations would appear to support racial threat hypotheses such as Key‘s 
(1949), which suggest that white voters are more conservative as the local presence of 
minority groups increases. However, in one of the few published analyses of the 2003 
tax reform proposal, Rushton & Roch (2006) found that at the county level, white 
support increased as segregation decreased and there was no significant effect on 
white voting from the proportion of the local population that was black. Thus white 
voters‘ rejection of a balanced development framework can not simply be explained 
through racialized self-interest. 
 
These interviews also suggested that voters preferred not to give government too many 
resources in the fear that they would be misused or squandered. From the pluralist 
perspective, the rejection of balanced development policies represents voters‘ power 
over the state. 
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The number one thing is that [our supporters] don‘t have any confidence in 
the K-12 education system, that putting more money in the system as it exists 
today will give you a better outcome. (personal communication, 1/15/09) 
 
The government has let them down over a long period of time such that they 
have no confidence that it serves their interests. They think of their taxes as a 
deadweight loss…if they don‘t trust the government and they separate that out 
and they think of this as a payment and a loss and don‘t have any confidence 
of getting anything in return, you can‘t sell them anything because they have 
no confidence that they‘ll get anything in return. (personal communication, 
9/26/08) 
 
I guess when you‘re poor and have been poor for a long time, you‘re very 
fearful, and I guess when the government has screwed you a few times, you 
just get very distrustful, and that is what has happened. (personal 
communication, 10/8/08) 
 
On the other hand, capital-subsidy strategies have an important quality recommending 
them to voters: their perceived effectiveness. Alabamians black and white believe, and 
with good reason, that the economic development strategy pursued by state leaders 
have transformed their state‘s economic prospects. The recruitment of Mercedes in 
1993 was the decisive step in the recent development of this strategy, and although it 
was perceived as a gamble at the time because of the $350 million incentive package it 
required, the move—and the ideology behind it—is widely supported today. The idea 
was to attract big corporations that would create primary and secondary jobs (i.e., 
supplier companies), and the increased economic activity would build the tax base. 
Even supporters of more balanced development strategies acknowledge that this move 
―put Alabama on the map,‖ especially because of the ―cache of the Mercedes brand‖ 
(personal communication, 5/27/09).   
The textile industries left the state, a lot of jobs gone, and what we‘ve been 
able to do is replace a lot of those jobs with higher paying jobs in the 
automotive, aerospace, biotechnology sectors…You can get to the World 
Series in two ways—you can either grow the players in the farm system, and 
bring them up, and you can go spend $50 million, $20 million to go get 
somebody like Barry Bonds and build your team with free agents. We chose, 
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in ‘93, to go out and get free agents to get us to the World Series, and that‘s 
exactly what happened. (personal communication, 10/22/08) 
 
One thing I‘m convinced of…is that fundamentally Alabama‘s thriving 
because it‘s a low-tax, no-union state. It‘s the absolute mirror opposite of 
Michigan and Ohio…Fundamentally, the decision-makers in this state are 
going to favor continuation of the low-tax, no labor union-state, because it‘s 
working. (personal communication, /10/08)  
 
More recently, this strategy has rationalized some tax relief for low-income groups 
without a corresponding need to tax high earners. In 2007, the state‘s income tax 
threshold (which had been the lowest in the nation at $8400) was raised to $12,600; 
because the state‘s overall wealth had increased over the past decade or so, these 
changes to the system were revenue-neutral (personal communication, 1/14/09). It has 
also rationalized the state‘s lack of rural development strategy since economic effects 
are expected to spill over or ―trickle down‖ into these areas (personal communication, 
5/14/09).     
 
In part this is because endogenous development from within these areas is outside the 
range of possibility. The existing workforce and leadership, especially in the most 
disadvantaged places, is understood (by public officials, by voters across the state, and 
by these rural communities themselves) to lack certain qualities that would be 
necessary for locally-led development: 
In the state where we have a very rural area, it so happens, it has a pretty 
undereducated, and in some cases under-motivated, workforce…And it‘s my 
opinion that we have several stratas of workforce—the more undereducated 
and under-skilled, the total dynamics of that person is different. Their 
motivation is different, their whole work ethic is different…If they‘re hard-
core unemployed, you couldn‘t blast them off their [seat] to get them into a 
[training] program anyway. (personal communication, 4/22/09) 
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In rural Alabama you will find a lot of that ―Somebody‘s looking out for me.‖ 
And…people think that the Alabama Development Office, which is the 
recruiting arm for the state, they think that they‘re going to bring them 
projects…And so that‘s the biggest hurdle that we go over, because we have 
the old-school thought of, ―Well, I‘ll just call the Governor, and the Governor 
will send somebody down to help me.‖ (personal communication, 5/14/09) 
 
When you look at most communities, the highest employer will be the 
schools…or some kind of medical facility, or it will be local merchants—the 
insurance agents or the police and fire, the service and retail sector. But that 
notion that that represents collectively a job set or sector of the economy—I 
think that they‘re ubiquitous in that they miss the forest for the trees 
sometimes in seeing that. (personal communication, 10/20/09) 
 
Overall, there is adequate evidence to pass both stepwise tests for pluralism as the 
defining framework of power in Alabama. Although it seems puzzling in a state with 
such low educational attainment and high persistent poverty, it suggests that voters 
approve of the policy paradigm that contributes to maintenance of these 
circumstances, and appear to have ―rational‖ self-interested motivations for doing so. 
 
A Class-based Understanding of Political Behavior in Alabama 
 
Finding evidence of class-based power is admittedly a very difficult task because of 
the assumption that power issues from the very structure of society, which appears 
timeless and normative. Nonetheless, there is a strong tradition of class-based analysis 
of social inequality in the US, particularly in persistent poverty regions like the 
Southeast, Southwest, and Appalachia.  As noted above, Gaventa‘s (1980) study is 
perhaps most well-known and provides a convincing model for understanding why 
disadvantaged groups acquiesce with the circumstances imposed on them by 
powerholders. Gaventa dismisses absence of rebellion as indicative of absence of 
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interest conflicts, and instead follows Lukes‘ third view of power by concluding that 
―power may not only limit inaction upon inequalities, it may also serve to shape 
conceptions of the powerless about the nature and extent of the inequalities 
themselves‖ (vii). In other words, power can operate in such a way as to make 
inequality appear natural, even abstractly preferable. Seen this way, the most telling 
evidence of systemic power is the consent of the systemically disadvantaged. ―One-
dimensional‖ indicators of consent (for example, voting) are clearly inadequate here, 
so Gaventa proposes a more contextual, inferential approach that links evidence of 
inequality, of the mechanisms by which it is maintained, and of the historical 
development of such apparent consensus (27). The above literature review suggests a 
number of specific forms such evidence might take. 
    
A brief review of USDA data, as well as more extensive interviews with political 
observers and representatives of groups working for or against major balanced 
development strategies both generally and in particular (such as the 1999 education 
lottery proposal and the 2003 tax reform proposal), do provide evidence that power 
has a structural basis in Alabama society. Evidence of persistent inequality is not 
difficult to find. It‘s well-known that inequality takes a racial and spatial form in 
Alabama; a shocking 22 of 67 Alabama counties is classified as a persistent poverty 
county and 11 of these are classified as black high-poverty counties, meaning that a 
majority of the county‘s poor are black or black poverty is what causes the county to 
be classified as such (Miller, 2007). All of the 22 are spatially contiguous, located in 
the mid-southern Black Belt region and most are rural (17 classified as nonmetro). 
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Clearly, there is a structured aspect to inequality in Alabama, and while racial and 
spatial inequality is frequently correlated with class inequality, is this necessarily so in 
Alabama? The most disadvantaged may be concentrated in the Black Belt, but if low 
incomes and assets are spread relatively evenly across the rest of the (white) state, 
class might be a less salient power variable.   
 
The demographic data do suggest some spatial consistency to disadvantage: the low 
educational attainment noted in the previous chapter is not confined to the Black Belt; 
rather 35 of 67 counties is classified as low-education (meaning 25 percent or more of 
residents 25-64 years old had neither a high school diploma nor GED in 2000), and the 
vast majority of the state is classified as medically-underserved. Most importantly, 
per-capita income is relatively evenly-dispersed, with 57 counties averaging between 
$20-29,000 (in 2004 dollars). However, only 4 counties (all metro, all majority white) 
averaged more than $30,000. If per capita income for the state was almost $34,000 in 
2008, even a slight disparity in figures due to inflation does not conceal the fact that 
much of Alabama‘s wealth is extremely concentrated. County employment profiles 
also suggest that spatial stratification has class dimensions: most of the Black Belt 
counties are classified as manufacturing-dependent with low levels of self-
employment—workers, not owners, live in these places.   
 
Using counties as units of analysis when exploring individual demographic 
characteristics is not ideal, but these data provide a general picture of a mostly middle-
class state sandwiched by two extremes of poverty and wealth. Passing Test 1 for 
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class-based power requires evidence that these inequalities are not accidental or 
contingent, but are codified or structured into the basic functioning of the society. 
Interview data show how this happens in Alabama: through the tax code. In US states, 
revenue is raised through sales, property, and income taxes; sales taxes are inherently 
regressive because everyone pays the same rate regardless of income and property 
taxes are inherently flat because they correspond to property values. In a fair and 
balanced tax system, income tax should be more progressive where reliance on the 
sales tax is high. Most US state tax systems are regressive on balance, especially those 
that rely on sales taxes and do not provide targeted low-income tax credits such as the 
EITC (Davis et al., 2009). But in Alabama‘s system (which is one of the 10 worst), 
sales tax is high and even applies to basic necessities like groceries and baby formula, 
whereas income tax is basically flat with families beginning to pay below the poverty 
line. Since overall tax rates are so low, state revenue is rarely high enough to cover 
basic public functioning and services, with the state frequently in budget proration. 
This regressive arrangement is the systemic mechanism that maintains the class 
inequality evidenced by Alabama‘s increasingly strong per-capita income alongside its 
persistent poverty.   
If you really just want to put it in the starkest terms, we have the lowest taxes 
per capita in the United States and have had since 1988. Arkansas and 
Mississippi were behind us up until that point and then in the early 80s we 
passed [them]. So what that means is that [state and local] governments have 
less money to work with, but our governments are trying to do the same 
things that everybody else‘s governments are trying to do. They‘re trying to 
have a Medicaid program that meets people‘s needs; they‘re trying to have 
schools that meet people‘s needs, etc. but they‘re trying to do that with two-
thirds of the national average in money. (personal communication, 9/26/08) 
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Who wins and loses in such a low-tax, small government environment? Clearly, both 
the state and civil society suffer when revenue is not sufficient to ensure basic 
provision of public goods, but low-income people are larger consumers of public 
services whereas wealthy individuals and business are the largest source of revenue. In 
terms of economic development, low-income groups‘ consumption of public services 
are unlikely to directly encourage growth as quickly as a low taxes do, but as the 
previous chapter suggests, the long-term effects of a minimal state can be deleterious 
not only for the disadvantaged.   
 
Inequality in Alabama is clearly perpetuated through policy means, but without 
evidence that they were historically established to favor class interests, one might 
conclude that simple inertia following from a chance policy development explains the 
maintenance of the status quo. However, there is strong evidence that the tax code was 
indeed created by wealthy and powerful groups with the express goal of limiting 
others‘ power. In Alabama, tax law is codified in the state constitution, the historical 
roots of which date far back in the state‘s history. The present Constitution, written in 
1901 and one of the oldest in the country, legally established the economic 
relationships that would shape policymaking in Alabama for years to come.   
 
At that time, the US South was an agricultural economy juxtaposed against the more 
dynamic Northern industrial economy—a classic core-periphery arrangement. The 
destabilizing experiences of Reconstruction and the Populist revolt of the late 1800s 
threatened Southern elites and most whites (Jackson, 2002); in Alabama, efforts to 
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preserve the state‘s ―political welfare‖ led elites to campaign for a rewrite of the 
existing state constitution, which already favored wealthy farmers. However, it still 
relied upon the Jeffersonian principle of democratic access to the political process as 
well as deference to federal guidance on this matter. To the thinking of the post-
Populist era elites, this made the old Constitution far too inclusive of blacks and the 
very poor (ibid.). The constitutional delegation that crafted the 1901 Constitution that 
is still used today was a cross-section of the conservative and powerful in the state, 
representing wealthy planters and industrialists.   
 
The elite framers were wealthy property-holders and one of their goals was to 
minimize the rates at which they could be taxed, as well as prevent changes to those 
rates. With this goal in mind they codified property and income tax rules in the 
constitution, requiring passage through the Legislature followed by a statewide vote of 
the people to approve changes to these and any other articles by constitutional 
amendment (Ely & Walthall, 2003). At the time, the limited voting access of low-
income and propertyless groups made popular demand for change unlikely, but the tax 
structure‘s durability attests to the counterintuitive effects of this requirement. The 
only tax source that can be amended without statewide referendum is the sales tax, the 
most regressive and least stable source of revenue. As a result, lawmakers since the 
document‘s writing have relied heavily on this tax, which today is the source of more 
than 50% of state revenue. While property taxes are by definition somewhat 
progressive, Alabama‘s are among the lowest in the nation, as is its income tax which 
is essentially flat (Pace Hamill, 2002). These economic foundations not only structure 
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class-based inequality but reinforce the very conditions that create it, by minimizing 
the redistribution the state can undertake.   
 
The evidence supports Test 1 for the political-structural conditions enabling a class-
based power structure. But conditions do not determine outcomes; Test 2 focuses on 
the mechanisms that are made more likely by these conditions: coercion and consent. 
Class-based theory predicts that elites will directly influence policymaking in their 
favor (i.e., Domhoff, Perruci & Wysong, Burris). Alabama‘s lobbying industry is 
known as particularly ―well-developed;‖ since the state imposes only very lax 
regulations on political donations and transparency (personal communication, 
9/10/08), lobbying is a significant and attractive means of persuasion (personal 
communication, 4/28/09). A variety of interest groups in civil society lobby legislators 
and take part in campaigns to shape public opinion, but there is strong evidence that 
market elites are the most active in this sphere, judging from interview evidence and 
political donations by sector (NIMSP, 2010). Table 4 shows that the General Business 
sector is by far the largest campaign contributor, while Labor exerts sizable but 
comparatively minor influence.   
 
As predicted by class-based theory, the great majority of political contributions during 
2000-2010 targeted Republican candidates, who would be expected to favor policies 
protecting the low-tax, small-government environment. Looking more closely at 
specific policy proposals, it was very clear from interviews that the main actors 
opposing progressive economic reforms that would undergird a balanced development 
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strategy are within the Agriculture sector—in particular, the Alabama Farmers‘ 
Federation (ALFA—which is also the state‘s largest insurance organization) and the 
Alabama Forestry Association.  Most of the state‘s largest (500+acres) farms and 
timber holdings are located in the poor Southern region of the state (Miller, 2007) 
where local tax increases are especially needed for human and community 
development, yet many of the largest landowners and contractors (for example, 
Weyerhauser or Tyson Foods) are physically and socially absentee. At the same time, 
these groups were some of the biggest  
 
Table 9: Campaign Contributions to Lawmakers and Ballot Measures, Alabama 2000-2010 
Sector Amount, 2000-2010 
General Business $52,775,412 
         Business Associations          $42,981,305 
Lawyers and Lobbyists $31,180,908 
         Lobbyists and Public Relations          $15,595,784 
         Attorneys and Law Firms          $15,585,130 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate $18,577,966 
          Insurance          $3,169,530 
          Real Estate          $6,791,027 
Ideology $15,044,825 
          Conservative Policy Organizations          $5,395,832 
          Tax Issues          $2,979,311 
Labor $12,867,020 
          Public Sector Unions          $10,918,324 
Agriculture $11,314,993 
          Forestry          $4,811,273 
          Farm Bureau          $4,037,212 
Construction $10,520,121 
          General Construction          $4,289,081 
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2010 
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contributors to the effort to defeat proposals like 2003‘s Amendment 1 through their 
financial and media presence during the campaign season. Because this proposal went 
to a statewide referendum, they also used grassroots networks such as the county 
farmers‘ federations and local insurance offices to directly influence voters.   
We had to work against the fact that ALFA and all these people were passing 
out money to defeat it, and also they would point out to people ―You see, 
when you raise the property tax, this millage increase is going to mean that 
your car tag or truck tag on your 1970 pickup truck is going to go from $15 to 
$30‖…They had TV commercials, newspaper ads, direct mail; part of what 
they do is just enough to poison the atmosphere so it‘s harder for people to 
stand up and support these changes, and that swings the momentum and the 
voting and everything strongly the other way. (personal communication, 
2/10/09) 
 
In the Black Belt counties there is even evidence of recurrent vote-buying by such 
groups (personal communication, 10/8/08), although this undocumented information 
was only offered by two interview subjects so it may not be reliable.  
You know, there‘s some people in the community that people have faith in, 
and they often help to influence 200, 300 people how to vote.  In some of 
these areas they help them vote absentee and all the rest; I‘m not saying any 
of that is fraudulent—there‘s some people who jump to the conclusion this is 
fraudulent.  So you have people who are influenced by money themselves, 
they will get $500 or something from—it might not even come from ALFA, it 
might come from some person with resources in Greene County who‘s an 
ALFA member when you check it all the way down.  They say, ―We know if 
we give this lady $500 she will convince 200 or 300 people of the way to 
vote.  And that goes on! (personal communication, 2/10/09) 
 
In part, these efforts were a display of ―one-dimensional‖ power; voters were 
persuaded to believe that specific policy proposals were against their interests. This 
chapter interpret efforts to perpetuate an overall anti-tax mentality as evidence of the 
―second dimension‖ of power, whereby elites mobilize bias for institutional 
procedures that operate systematically to their benefit. This may be accomplished, in 
part, by closing off other potential options through the deployment of symbolic threats 
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(Bachrach & Baratz 1962). The creation of consent is a critical aspect of class-based 
theory, which expects that powerful groups will engage in broad ideological work to 
legitimate the status quo, particularly by referencing values that are already resonant in 
the popular and political culture. One of these values appears to be tax aversion.  State 
tax increases are generally ―off-limits‖ among policymakers, although small sales and 
excise tax increases are sometimes attempted and pass at the local level because they 
are the only way to raise revenue during fiscal crises. Residents know their state taxes 
them very little compared to other states in the country and region.  
People, I think, in Alabama—if you say that you have a tax proposal that 
raises anybody‘s taxes, people have sort of a natural—they‘re negative toward 
that. (personal communication, 2/10/09) 
 
This is a state where, if you‘re running for a state legislative seat, you sign the 
No Tax pledge.  And everybody does it.  (personal communication, 
9/16/2008) 
 
Conservative economic interests appear able to easily deploy the tax threat to generate 
opposition to reform among voters; all that such groups need to do is tap into that 
―visceral reaction‖ to taxation.   
It was the large wealthier landowners helping to fund opposition to help 
generate the fear that was necessary to win.  Emotion and rhetoric is going to 
beat logic and fact every time in an election in this country in my opinion, 
particularly in Alabama.  And so they were able to create all of that doubt and 
uncertainty. (personal communication, 2/14/09) 
 
See, what ALFA always has been able to do is say that they‘re out there 
defending the small landowner—the average farmer, the average timberman.  
Well, they represent a fuller spectrum than that, and they also have their own 
interests because they have investments in all kinds of facilities.  So they‘re 
able to mount campaigns that get the average landowner worried that he or 
she won‘t be able to pass the family estate on to the next generation.  And 
they use those fear tactics to keep strong support, and they‘ve done that for 60 
years. (personal communication, 9/10/08) 
 
 130 
This creates a systemic and generalized aversion to tax increases in Alabama, as 
secondary data confirm: between 1988 and 2003, voters rejected 54 of 88 proposals to 
raise local school taxes, according to the Alabama Association of School Boards 
(Montgomery Advertiser, 2003). Of course, no statewide tax increases or repeal of tax 
deductions were approved by voters either, as the record of constitutional amendments 
during the period shows. Almost as a ―default‖ mode, therefore, the policy structure 
continues to favor the economic interests of the wealthy. 
We did some focus groups with people from North Alabama and made 
discoveries; first of all in terms of the messaging—because there is such a 
visceral thing about taxes being not good, all it took was the opposition to say 
―No‖ in their ads that they ran.  In a 30-second ad that was against it, that was 
enough to speak to that visceral reaction anyway. So unless [voters] had been 
exposed beforehand or had something else to counter it…it was like, ―Bad—
anything to do with taxes is bad.‖(personal communication, 4/28/09) 
 
We had fifty referendums on that alone, tax, and passed one or two of them.  
They constantly fail at the local level, which is something that you can look at 
very readily, and that‘s very costly to add to—you watch and see where 
they‘ve lost and where they‘ve won involve those same conservative groups 
in beating those local ad valorems. (personal communication, 2/14/09) 
 
The result is that, among the very group that should be expected to demand a larger 
state supporting more balanced development, there is little evidence of resistance to 
the existing tax system. For example:    
It took us five elections in Greene County, Alabama to pass an increase in the 
local millage.  This is a county that‘s 85% black, half-poor—the people who 
were going to pay that tax by and large were the outside people: timber 
companies, Colonial Pipeline, big business, big landowners.  The average 
person, it was going to have a limited effect [on their tax bill].  And this was 
going to go to local education!  (personal communication, 2/10/09)  
 
Are such groups merely apathetic to the circumstances of their powerlessness? If so, 
perhaps conflicting interests do not exist, even though from an outsider‘s perspective 
we ―think‖ they should or must. The second test for class-based power requires a 
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counterfactual: evidence of past rebellion by the powerless against injustice, as proof 
that the lack of overt conflict does not necessarily indicate consensus. The Civil Rights 
movement provides such evidence powerfully: the Black community in Alabama was 
the key site of rebellion in the Southeast. Not only were African Americans in 
Alabama the victims of perhaps the most extreme political and social inequalities, but 
they rebelled perhaps the most strongly, forming the leadership for a national social 
movement. Class-based inequality is so insidious because it is structured into society 
more deeply than Jim Crow ever was—which may explain the quiescence among 
victims that were empowered in the past.  
 
Three elements of Test 2 have been affirmed and the existence of a class-based power 
structure appears to explain the democratic maintenance of Alabama‘s development 
paradigm. The dominant anti-tax mentality meshes well with an economic 
development strategy defined by market logics like capital subsidy, low regulation, 
and freedom of accumulation. A balanced development strategy that requires a 
significant level of public investment is a poor fit for this ideological frame. Thus, 
there is compelling evidence for the class-based organization of power in this state 
case—but some significant counterfactuals complicate the narrative here. Firstly, there 
is evidence of corporate disunity: different sectors of capital appear to have very 
different policy preferences in important areas, particularly in terms of economic 
development. While agriculture, mining, and small business were the main industry 
opponents of the landmark 2003 progressive tax reform proposal, they faced off 
against most other business sectors (including leadership by the state‘s main business 
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association), who supported the proposal to raise taxes on the wealthy, give more 
power to government, and invest in education (NIMSP, 2010). When capital‘s 
interests are fragmented, the expectation is that state power, or at least pragmatism, 
will prevail. Tomaskociv-Devey & Roscigno (1994) have shown that in North 
Carolina, business had also been bifurcated into ―traditionalist‖ and ―modernist‖ 
sectors, but this disunity was an important factor in the creation of a skill-based, 
diversified economy because it broke up the inertia of the old capital-subsidy 
paradigm that was based on cheap (Black) labor. These expectations do not seem to 
apply in Alabama. Even though the pro-reform sector spent significantly more money 
on its campaign of support, the opposition‘s message was more persuasive with the 
public, suggesting a more complex basis for power. 
 
Secondly, Alabama has not outright rejected all elements of a ―third-wave‖ or 
balanced development paradigm. Certain programs and policies, such as universal pre-
kindergarten, a state-run workforce training program, and the Alabama Broadband 
Initiative have been adopted.  The income tax threshold was recently raised, reducing 
contributions to state revenue from low-income people but increasing this group‘s 
assets. Moreover, the capital subsidy approach has clearly benefited all residents, not 
just the powerful. With the establishment of the auto industry, incomes in many 
brackets as well as public revenues have increased; access to higher education and 
positions of power has grown among much of the population. Yet, one can easily 
make the argument that these development strategies still fit into a paradigm defined 
by market rationalities, efficiency principles, and the power of the private sector over 
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the public good. For example, only 6% of children access pre-K. The state‘s 
workforce training program AIDT is generally not accessible to the least skilled and 
most needy (personal communication, 2/10/09), and its director told me point-blank 
that ―AIDT is an incentive program. Pure and simple, that‘s our job to help bring those 
businesses here‖ (personal communication, 4/22/09). Some efforts to reduce taxation 
of low-income groups have succeeded, but others—such as eliminating the sales tax 
on groceries—have failed; no effort to raise taxes of higher-income groups has 
succeeded. 
 
While these counterfactuals present an obstacle for the class-based framework, it still 
has much to recommend it as the explanator for power‘s distribution and the 
maintenance of inequality in Alabama. But entrenched power alone does not explain 
Alabama‘s developmental distinction among its neighbors. Most states in the region 
have gone through similar historical experiences, have been socially organized by 
similar class relationships, and have faced similar exogenous economic pressures. 
Reconstruction‘s effect on property taxation affected the whole region; persistent 
poverty, racial segregation, and low mobility have affected rural people across the 
region and country. Conservative voters across the country oppose taxes and 
government. What then makes Alabama somewhat distinct? What intervening factor 
causes Alabamians to stand out from their neighbors in their consistent rejection of the 
policy changes necessary for balanced development?  
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A State-Centered Understanding of Political Behavior in Alabama 
 
The above analysis has suggested that social relations in Alabama are organized along 
a class-basis, making pluralism and rational choice a less compelling explanation than 
elite hegemony for inequality‘s persistence. But the Alabama case reveals some 
weaknesses in a class-based explanation alone, particularly in the relationship between 
state and capital. Class-based theory predicts a highly constrained role for the state, 
which ostensibly has one set of interests that are defined by capital; these growth-
related needs and imperatives limit the state‘s autonomy and capacity. In Alabama‘s 
case, however, examples from the last 2 decades‘ economic development 
policymaking experience suggest that the state—or more precisely, sectors of it—does 
have its own interests, which it pursues in coalition with some sectors of capital and in 
opposition to others. As noted above, the pragmatic business sector has exerted a 
strong push in recent years for the adoption of balanced development policies. This 
influence helped convert the Republican administration of Governor Riley from 
skepticism to embrace of progressive reforms that would increase the economic and 
social role of the state and bring balance to its development strategy (personal 
communication, 9/10/08). Yet once converted, the administration became a major 
champion of the approach, devoting a massive amount of energy and political capital 
towards a public campaign that alienated many conservative supporters. Most 
Republicans in the Legislature and state Party were inclined to support the opposition 
campaign led by the Farmers‘ Federation. This suggests that the state can be a source 
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of change rather than a mere mediator, and is willing to pursue its own policy goals 
over the particularistic interests of civil society sectors like capital. 
 
Further complexifying matters, interviews suggested that the executive and legislative 
branches of government in Alabama are frequently at odds with each other in the 
sphere of economic development policymaking. The former has the majority of 
responsibility for agenda-setting and project pursuit, while the latter appropriates the 
funds for development officials to, for example, meet with and extend incentives to 
out-of-state and foreign firms (personal communication, 11/10/08). As in any state, the 
Legislature can also withhold resources that the executive wants.  In Alabama, it 
appears that the executive branch has been interested in pursuing a more balanced 
development approach, but the Legislature has presented an obstacle. 
What Governor Riley and [the Alabama Development Office] have tried to do 
was to redefine economic development, so it‘s not just recruiting, but it‘s 
trade, it‘s tourism, it‘s entrepreneurial incubators, it‘s existing industry, it‘s a 
much broader definition of creating jobs…If we don‘t look at knowledge-
based, white-collar, research, entrepreneur-type jobs, and help bring those in, 
we‘re going to end up back where we were when the apparel industry was big 
and we put all of our eggs in that basket.  We‘ve been going to the Legislature 
for the last three or four years trying to get them to redo the incentive 
package…Until the leadership that deal with incentives begin to look at where 
we need to be 10, 15 years from now, we have to take money out of the 
Capital Improvement Trust Fund, which is the oil and gas revenues, to put 
into these mega-projects, to win these projects—that‘s what‘s there to do it. 
(personal communication, 10/22/08) 
 
Why this fragmentation of interests? Judging from the influence of the lobbying 
industry over the Legislature, it‘s likely that this part of government is more deeply 
integrated with capital. The state‘s lax disclosure laws mean that a lobbyist can spend 
up to $91,000 a year on a single legislator without being required to report it. There is 
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also evidence of a ―revolving door‖ between industry and the Legislature; 31 lobbyists 
are former Legislators which puts Alabama in the top 15 nationally. And, the 
Legislature is not professionalized, meaning that legislators can hold other paid state 
jobs (called ―double-dipping‖) which can represent a significant conflict of interest 
where officials steer money toward their own industries. Berry, Berkman, & 
Schneiderman (2000) and others have found that legislative professionalization is a 
key factor protecting state actors from external political and economic influence. 
Based on these institutional factors, the Center for Public Integrity assigned Alabama a 
failing grade for its lobbying environment (CPI, 2003). Formally, though, the state has 
taken some steps to limit such influence—it is one of only 6 states with a two-year 
revolving door provision (most states have a one-year provision), and while there were 
4 lobbyists for every legislator in 2006, the national average is 5:1 (ibid., 2010).   
 
The Executive is still open to lobbying influence but term limits and self-imposed 
ethics rules may make it relatively autonomous compared to its counterpart. On the 
other hand, this apparent autonomy cannot be realized in practice without capacity. 
Indirectly (through the checks provided by the Legislature), this capacity is 
constrained by capital; not surprisingly direct obstacles are also presented by this 
source of class-based power. When asked why the state has been unable to create 
balanced development policies, a top ADO official pointed to the self-interest of 
certain capital sectors as a direct barrier to state goals: 
It‘s the major landowners, because you know, we are the lowest property-
taxed state in the United States…All the government was trying to do was to 
increase property taxes, especially on the corporate side.  More money for 
education, more money to make up shortfalls, and those things that we needed 
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to do.  Well, you can defeat a tax increase a whole lot better than you can pass 
one. (personal communication, 10/22/08) 
 
As interview data suggest, conservative business was able to capture public opinion 
with the help of legislators and defeat an ostensibly powerful alliance between the 
administration, pragmatic business, and expected supporters from labor. These 
processes were most visible during the attempt at major tax reform, but there is 
evidence of a recurrent pattern motivated by proposals for progressive policy change. 
Alabama‘s failure to adopt the type of balanced development strategy favored by most 
of its regional neighbors appears correlated, at least in part, with the low autonomy 
and capacity of its state government, and the enduring power of capital may be the 
chief independent variable shaping these circumstances. But this alone does not 
explain why conservative business, with its relatively small role in the economy, has 
such outsize influence over voter opinion, and as mentioned above it is not a 
satisfactory explanation for Alabama‘s policy distinctiveness.   
 
According to Block (1977) and others, the specific arrangement of the state also 
determines the extent of its autonomy and capacity; institutional and organizational 
variables affect the relative power of social groups and can mediate,  reinforce, or 
otherwise interact with existing power structures. These theoretical expectations are 
compelling because they provide some resolution to the structure/agency problem that 
separates class theory and pluralism—but do they have empirical support in the 
Alabama case?  Over and over again interviews indicated that they certainly do. Most 
subjects pointed to the policy influence of one key institution—the state constitution. 
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As Huber et al. (1993) have explained, constitutions are a key organizational feature 
of economic and social policy in their ability to accelerate power asymmetries: 
―Constitutions… lay down the nature of these institutions.  Thus, it is possible 
to use constitutional provisions to operationalize aspects of state structure that 
are relevant to welfare state formation. Of particular interest is the degree to 
which relatively small groups or special interests can block legislation, or 
conversely, the degree to which narrow parliamentary majorities can push 
through legislation‖(4).   
 
In writing the document, a group of elites codified significant restrictions to state 
power—restrictions that still reverberate today in the state‘s political organization. 
One of these features is the tax structure which, as explained above, is one of the most 
distinctive in the country. Without the ability to raise income and property tax rates 
from an already-minimal level, state government has very little revenue to work with. 
Another significant way in which state capacity is limited is through earmarking: 
almost 90% of the revenue that can be collected is designated for a particular 
destination. According to Ely & Walthall (2003) and interview data, no other state 
even comes close to this percentage. In a class-based power structure, earmarking can 
be useful for less powerful groups since lawmakers can be easily swayed by capital 
(especially in Alabama‘s rampant lobbying environment) or the political self-interest 
called ―pork-barrel spending.‖ Yet where so much revenue is earmarked, lawmakers 
lose all ability to respond to changing economic circumstances and emerging interests. 
Entrenched interests grow around revenue destinations and rubber-stamping becomes 
more likely than innovative policymaking.   
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Although the entire political system suffers, the area most directly affected by 
earmarking in Alabama is otherwise the biggest potential source of reform—
education. Because the constitution specifies that income tax revenue be reserved for 
direct education expenditures (such as teacher salaries), education interests are forced 
into a defensive position vis-à-vis the status quo: while the constitution‘s basic 
structure guarantees education‘s underfunding, it also guarantees a revenue source that 
cannot be touched by other more powerful interests. As a result the source of 
progressive energy in a class-based society, labor (which takes its strongest form in 
the state teachers‘ union, AEA) fails to provide a counterforce to institutionalized 
inequality. 
 
Public transportation is another major area that suffers from earmarking. In most 
states, gasoline taxes are a significant source of mass transit funding but in Alabama, 
they are earmarked for roads and bridges. Theoretically, lawmakers could unearmark 
these funds and devote a portion of them to developing mass transit, earning 
significant federal matching funds and an essential tool for economic development, 
but no Legislature has ever tried, which suggests an ongoing lobbying effort by 
powerful construction, auto, and fuel industry interests. Moreover, Alabamians—
especially rural citizens, who might benefit most from bus systems to connect them to 
better job opportunities—feel strongly about their roads: 
What drives rural Alabama is roads.  [Local leaders] are not ―road 
commissioners‖ but they might as well be, because that‘s what gives them the 
political support and also the exposure to the citizens that elect them. 
(personal communication, 9/16/08) 
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In their quest to limit competing sources of power, Alabama‘s constitutional framers 
also refrained from enabling local government authority, or home rule. Like the tax 
structure and earmarking, this institutional feature has reinforced the effects of a class-
based power structure over time. Without local authority, state government is highly 
centralized—a feature with strong practical and symbolic effects, as will be explained 
below. Counties have even less of an ability to pass tax laws than state government—
so if a county commission wants to raise local property tax millage rates or even levy 
a one-cent sales tax, it must be taken up by the local legislative delegation and 
proposed to the full House as a bill, go to the full House for an up-or-down vote if 
there is any objection by a member of the local delegation, and go on the ballot for a 
statewide vote if it is finally approved by legislators. Individuals cannot petition to 
have amendments put to referendum either but must go through the legislative 
gatekeeping process. One interview subject provided a recent example of how 
detrimental this byzantine process can be for local decision-making: 
Recently, Trussville wanted to get a bond [to form a new school district] so 
they had to bring it to the legislature…the legislators finally did approve it, it 
went on the ballot, and Trussville voted for it.  The rest of the state voted 
against it, so Trussville couldn‘t raise their own bond. (personal 
communication, 10/8/08) 
 
Without home rule, local governments lack jurisdiction over a variety of public 
functions, such as social services, corrections, or waste management. Making changes 
to even the most minor of local procedures requires the approval of the legislature. 
Nor do local governments have land-use authority; they cannot undertake their own 
planning and zoning. In fact, Alabama is the only state in the Southeast that doesn‘t 
have some kind of a rural land-planning program (personal communication, 11/10/08). 
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This further upsets the balance of power between state and capital, because 
communities are often powerless to stop sprawl or the siting of undesirable businesses 
(personal communication, 10/8/08). More pertinent to development policy, the 
constitution prevents local governments from undertaking ―internal improvement‖ or 
―[lending] its credit‖  to private business (Sections 93 and 94)—in effect, limiting 
local governments from engaging in almost any transaction with private business (Ely 
& Walthall, 2003). This provision was instated because local governments had run up 
massive debts with railroad companies and other speculative businesses during the 
1800s—but although it become less necessary and more detrimental over time, the 
difficult amendment process prevented its removal. Recently, county-by-county 
amendments (which, again, must be approved statewide by voters) have begun to 
remove the barriers to local development created by this provision.   
 
The procedural obstacles posed by this lack of home rule have greatly reduced the 
efficiency and effectiveness of both state and local government in Alabama. With so 
much responsibility, the non-professionalized Legislature cannot accomplish all the 
tasks set before it: 
When something needs to be done, county managers or the county 
commissioners have to go to their legislators with a bill and say, ―Please, will 
you pass this bill.‖  Maybe there‘s time, maybe there‘s not—we have a 
legislature that‘s part-time, they only work about three months a year, and 
they only work three days of each of those weeks…And so someone who 
wants to figure out what day to pick up dead animals or change the 
classification of their sheriff‘s department, or change the funding for 
commission—small issues that really don‘t have any bearing on the whole 
state may never see the light of day. (personal communication, 10/8/08) 
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With so little local responsibility and autonomy, communities have little initiative and 
rely on state lawmakers to do the business of governing, such as raising money and 
mediating any competing demands within civil society. Yet state government itself is 
institutionally constrained and can realistically only make piecemeal changes or 
amendments to the basic governing structure prescribed by the constitution. As a 
policy analyst told me, 
The counties can‘t do things for themselves so they have to go and keep 
getting permission.  Well, that sort of militates against change.  All of these 
things work against—so like, in economic development, rather than having 
common standards that you can expect to find in every community, you find 
all this variety of rules and regulations all over the place.  They sort of destroy 
the ability to have a market and to allow little areas to get ahead by taking 
initiative and all that.  So it enforces that deadening conformity to the lowest 
common denominator. (personal communication, 9/26/08) 
 
If home rule is so onerous, why haven‘t lawmakers and voters in Alabama changed it? 
Self-interest has created a set of entrenched interests, where each group has adapted to 
benefit from the existing institutional organization while the whole suffers. The state 
as a whole could save millions used in balloting, freeing up funds and potentially 
avoiding now-frequent budget crises, and could accomplish a great deal more business 
with local tasks devolved to local authorities; lawmakers as a group  would also 
benefit from more streamlined, modernized procedures. But at the local level, county 
commissions have adapted to the system because they have little responsibility and 
few unfunded mandates.   
Certainly our county governments are not granted as much authority as 
commissions in some states, but we‘re also not hamstrung with some of the 
things that make up county government in other states. (personal 
communication, 11/10/08) 
 
Many of [the county commissioners] don‘t want additional control; they will 
say to their local people who are complaining, ―Well, that‘s not my fault, it‘s 
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Montgomery—you can‘t blame me.‖  It‘s passing the buck.  They can run for 
office, they can be a county commissioner, they can show up at meetings once 
a month, they just decide if we‘re going to have a road here and how much to 
pay for that road, but they don‘t have to get involved in all the nitty-gritty, and 
they pass the buck. (personal communication, 10/8/08) 
 
And, with so much power centralized in the Legislature, self-interested lawmakers 
have little incentive to change the system either. They are, in effect, the gatekeepers 
for all public policy enacted in the state. In part, lawmakers‘ self-interest is tied to the 
interests of their powerful backers—corporations and other elite groups who (like their 
1901 predecessors) prefer a system where state power is centralized and thus, easier to 
control. 
The people with economic interests have figured out that if you deny that, and 
force everything into a big winner-takes-all majority thing, then it‘s very easy 
to stop anything from happening, and very difficult to make anything happen.  
So denying the ability locally to do anything, you wouldn‘t think that a 
conservative would want that.  But in fact, if you don‘t want anything to 
happen, what you do is prevent that, force everything to a big majority vote in 
Montgomery, and all you have to do is control five senators and you can keep 
anything from happening in the state.  So that‘s why the lobbying expenses 
are so extremely high here; that‘s why the price of a legislative seat—that‘s 
why all of that happens. (personal communication, 9/26/08) 
 
If you go to Montgomery when the Legislature is in session, the halls are full 
of lobbyists…Now part of the reason is that the lobbyists don‘t have to go to 
every county to get what they want passed—they just go to Montgomery. ..So 
in order for [constitutional change] to happen, we have to bring a bill to the 
legislators and they have to vote against their best interests.  They have to 
vote to pass that even though they know it‘s going to take power away from 
them…but they have ALFA on their back saying, ―We fund your campaigns; 
you vote for this, you lose your campaign funding.‖  And so, they‘re between 
a rock and hard place. (personal communication, 10/8/08) 
 
All of the institutional features covered above, although initially codified over a 
hundred years ago, appear to be part of a positive feedback process that virtually 
ensures their durability. Theorists of the state, such as Pierson and Skocpol, have 
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shown how institutional structures and policy develop through a mutually constitutive 
process whereby key decisions create pressures and norms that may narrow the range 
of politically-feasible ―next steps.‖ This certainly appears to be the case in Alabama, 
as major constitutional amendments made during the last century have only increased 
the disadvantage of certain groups such as rural and low-income people. For example, 
the existing low-tax structure was bolstered in 1978 with an amendment approved in 
public referendum that imposed caps on the maximum amount of tax applied to 
property; residential, farm, and forest land was given the lowest cap allowing for only 
10% of real value to be taxed (Ely & Walthall, 2003). In a state where timber acres 
today make up 70% of the landmass, this provision guarantees the underfunding of 
both state and local coffers. With less revenue, government continues to be hamstrung 
and thus ineffective, further eroding public confidence and reducing the possibility 
that voters will demand institutional change. 
 
The evidence appears to support a negative result for Test 1 of the state-centered 
power framework; the state‘s social policy interests are somewhat fragmented and 
there seems to be low capacity and autonomy from capital, especially on the part of 
the Legislature. In large part capital‘s hold over the state can be attributed to 
institutional features, namely a lack of rigid barriers separating lawmakers from 
money‘s influence and a constitution that tightly constrains the role of government. 
The second feature of this chapter‘s test of each power theory is empirical outcomes; 
Test 2 of state-centered theory seeks evidence that policymaking favors unified state 
goals. In one sense, it appears that development policymaking has not favored 
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Executive branch goals; as noted above, the two major pieces of proposed legislative 
reform of the past 15 years (the 1999 education lottery bill and the 2003 tax reform 
bill) have been failed projects of the Executive. However, despite rhetoric from many 
legislators opposing these and other progressive proposals, the Legislature less 
frequently presents direct opposition in its actions because of the referendum 
requirement. Under the premise of direct democracy, it can rubber-stamp a 
gubernatorial policy proposal and send it to the voters to decide, giving the appearance 
of unity in policymaking. So, it is difficult to find negative evidence for Test 2, which 
means this chapter has failed to fully clarify the role of state power in Alabama. The 
strongest conclusion that can be drawn is that the state‘s power is limited by 
institutional factors and its apparent disunity in matters of economic development 
policy.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Through an analysis of interview and secondary data, this chapter concludes that the 
uneven distribution of power in Alabama is not a historical contingency, but is 
structured by class and compounded by race and spatial location. It also concludes that 
institutions—notably, the state constitution—play an important role in maintaining 
this distribution of power. Through this organizational configuration, state 
government‘s capacity and autonomy are constrained. At the same time, the 
constitution gives locales and citizens perhaps even less power. By contrast, the 
constitution appears to give private business the most power in society by limiting 
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competing power centers, centralizing governing capacity into one body (the 
Legislature), and preventing the types of checks and balances on lobbying and other 
forms of institutionalized coercion that other states in the region have adopted.   
 
The recent literature on social policy formation, although generally focused on 
national level policymaking, provides theoretical support for the findings in pointing 
to at least some interaction effect between business power and political institutions. 
Although recent decades were dominated by an institutional focus in the development 
of social policy (e.g., Skocpol, 1992) Hacker & Pierson (2002) and Jenkins et al. 
(2006) in particular have suggested that the interaction model is more persuasive. The 
former‘s analysis of American welfare state formation shows how the instrumental 
and structural influence of business over policymaking can vary ―[depending] on 
particular features of the political-economic context‖ (282). Their conclusions are 
especially compelling in relation to the Alabama case because they anticipate that ―the 
ability of particular economic actors to exert influence [depends] heavily on 
institutional variables‖ (304) and that such variables are subject to policy feedback 
processes potentially reinforcing certain political processes, preferences, and 
strategies.   
 
Jenkins et al., who also focus on state-level economic development policymaking, also 
conclude that state policy is a ―joint effect of class forces and political institutions‖ 
(1124); these effects may be additive, mediating, magnifying, conditioning, or biasing, 
with path dependence playing a potentially significant role in all cases. In Alabama, 
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the third possibility—that ―political legacies (earlier policies and the class 
mobilization /institutional complexes behind them) aid class mobilization by 
magnifying their effects on subsequent policy outcomes‖ (1128)—seems likely, given 
the origins and outcomes related to the state constitution; in a related sense, the biasing 
effect—whereby ―political institutions have built-in biases that systematically favor 
the interests of specific classes‖ (1129)—seems likely too. These are two significant 
studies that provide theoretical grounding for this chapter‘s explanation of Alabama‘s 
development policy outcomes.   
 
However, this magnification of class power does not play out smoothly; the sphere of 
economic development policymaking reveals a significant bifurcation in the way 
business can leverage its economic advantages into political and social advantages. In 
struggles to reform policy areas bearing on development, the more ―moderate‖ or 
pragmatic sectors of capital has been less successful at recruiting voters to its position 
than the conservative sector, despite the public benefits of the former position and the 
past willingness of disadvantaged groups to take a clear position against inequality. 
The interaction between institutional and class effects may be conditioned by a third 
factor which has been suggested by the tax-aversion of Alabama voters: cultural 
norms or values. The actual mechanisms through which these joint class-institutional-
cultural effects shape policy outcomes will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INSTITUTIONS, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter‘s analysis provided evidence that institutional factors compound 
class power in Alabama, leading to development policy outcomes favoring the short-
term goals of capital and leaving the state with a less balanced approach to 21
st
 century 
economic realities. Although business is more powerful than any other potential 
interest group in society, its interests are fragmented, with moderate sectors favoring 
balanced policies and losing major political battles to conservative sectors. The 
conservative sector is less prominent in the economy, yet is appears more prominent in 
shaping public opinion.  The previous chapter noted an affinity between business 
influence and certain cultural elements in Alabama society—namely, the strong 
aversion to taxes
9
. Might cultural norms and values play an intervening role between 
institutional and class effects? The state‘s particularly imbalanced development 
strategy may result from voters‘ ideological recruitment to the policy preferences of 
conservative capital. To demonstrate influence in power structure research, it is 
necessary but not sufficient to show that outcomes are congruent with the preferences 
                                               
9 This study refers to the anti-tax mentality with the term ―anti-statism,‖ which is an umbrella term also 
used to describe aversion to government, planning, and redistribution.  The concept of [political] 
individualism is more about independence and self-reliance, but is also contrary to collectivism. The 
terms are logically consistent but may not have been politically connected until the Cold War and the 
rise of anti-communism (Diamond, 1995). 
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of specific actors; ―[one] must also demonstrate that these outcomes are a result of the 
actor‘s direct or indirect power‖ (Hacker & Pierson, 2002). The following chapter will 
explore how institutional and cultural factors reinforce the class power of the 
conservative sector over that of the moderate sector, focusing primarily on the 
discourses employed by both sectors during one major reform campaign.   
 
Institutionalized Ideologies and Framing 
 
What is the connection between ideologies and institutions? Political institutions, 
fundamentally, are structures through which decisions are made and power is 
distributed to groups (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). Ideologies are systems of meaning 
that combine ―assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and 
norms relevant to promoting or resisting social change‖ (Oliver & Johnston, 2000). 
Drawing on cognitive science, North & Denzau (1994) have explained that ideologies 
and institutions ―can be viewed as classes of shared mental models‖ (4), both of which 
create an ―architecture‖ consisting of categories or classifications which are used to 
interpret the data provided by the world. These categories are useful because, in a 
complex world where no one has complete information, they provide ―the capacity to 
generalize, to reason from the particular to the general and to use analogy‖ (14). For 
example, Wheldon‘s (2006) study of tolerance for ethnic and cultural minorities in EU 
countries found a strong relationship between the laws governing the acquisition and 
expression of citizenship, and individual tolerance judgments. People‘s perceptions of 
the world draw upon existing models; institutions are well-known and broadly 
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legitimated models. Others have suggested a more causal relationship between the 
two: as Clemens (1997) explains, institutions are also templates or models for social 
interaction and present ―repertoires‖ that actors may follow. They provide an enduring 
reflection of the cultural milieu in which they were created and form a structural basis 
or frame for existing social and political norms. Because of path dependence, mental 
models that have proven useful in the past or in one area of social life tend to be 
maintained. Thus where institutional and cultural factors are essentially ―conservative‖ 
in the change-resistant sense of the word, a mutually reinforcing effect can be 
expected, preserving from change processes favored by existing social arrangements.    
 
Political sociologists have noted the dearth of research on power‘s cultural dimension, 
noting a ―considerable reluctance to recognize the cultural dynamics within the 
organization of the state itself‖ (Jasper, 2005: 115), as well as the ways culturally-
reflective state institutions further shape and constrain social action. Such a focus is 
needed in political sociology because structural interpretations alone—―false 
consciousness‖—have failed to explain persistent power asymmetries in American 
society. A better theoretical compromise would account for the creation and 
maintenance of consent through the interplay of institutional and cultural factors. As 
explained in the preceding chapter, Gramsci‘s theory of hegemony began to explain 
how elites could employ common cultural tropes—―common sense‖—to promote 
ideas both favorable to their continued power and resonant among the people 
(Gramsci, 1995 [1971]). Today, we might call this process ―framing.‖ Frames are 
another term for mental models; existing ideologies provide frames (Snow & Benford, 
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2005). Institutions also provide powerful frames, as Althusser and others have shown; 
they reproduce dominant belief systems and they are durable, since major ruptures are 
often required to fundamentally change them (Sewell, 1992).   
 
Frames are important because they affect assumptions and beliefs beyond their 
original application; as Sewell (1992) has argued, people extend or transpose frames 
from one setting to another. In Clemens‘ (1997) words, ―once routine patterns of 
organization are articulated in [certain] ways, they become ‗modular‘ or transposable 
from one setting to another‖ (9). This can ensure consistency of worldview and may 
be reassuring for people—even where the transposition does not make logical sense. 
Framing may occur constantly throughout society where groups of actors seek to 
interpret events together, but its most powerful occurrence is in the public discourse. 
Here, the production of meaning has broader ramifications, yet certain social posit ions 
guarantee a louder voice. For example, in terms of policymaking Clemens & Cook 
(1999) note that ―effective politicians may enhance the [appeal] of a particular policy 
by building deep analogies to already institutionalized models or widely held norms‖ 
(457). So, institutional configurations can both directly and indirectly shape the 
political identities, interests, and strategies of actors and groups (Lowi, 1972). 
 
The US South: A Distinctive Cultural Region? 
 
There is an abundance of literature on the ideologies that may be prevalent in the 
South under the assumption that it is a distinctive cultural region. Some observers 
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have argued that it is possible to make some cultural generalizations across racial and 
economic subgroups.  Black & Black‘s (1992) study of southern presidential voting 
during the 1980s suggests that even across the diverse electorate, conservative 
symbols (particularly individualism and religious traditionalism) have far more 
cultural power than liberal symbols. White Republicans, who made up a plurality of 
voters in the late 80s (44%), were ―strongly conservative on defense, committed to 
individual achievement, opposed to racial quotas, convinced they pay too much in 
taxes, conventionally religious, and cold toward prominent symbols of liberalism‖ 
(225). White swing voters, who made up 18% of the electorate in the late 80s, were 
also culturally and racially conservative, favorable toward religion, and individualistic, 
although they also embraced more liberal symbols like environmentalists (229). White 
Democrats made up 24% of the region‘s voters; they ―were simultaneously attracted to 
some liberal and some conservative symbols‖ and preferred both liberal and 
conservative policies (231, 233). Black voters (14% of the electorate) ―were the most 
liberal of the voting groups, though on some issues they were profoundly 
conservative‖ (237), particularly in terms of religion.  
 
This and other evidence strongly suggests that religious values are an important 
cultural factor across the political spectrum. In terms of adherents and cultural 
prevalence, conservative Protestantism (CP) is the dominant religious affiliation in the 
region, particularly the Southern Baptist denomination (Association of Religion Data 
Archives, 2002). Over half of all Southern Baptists in the world live in the five 
Southern states of Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama; the states 
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with the highest proportion of Southern Baptists are Mississippi, Alabama, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, and Arkansas. Alabama itself was 40.6% conservative Protestant as of 
2000 (ibid.). Conservative Protestantism is an individualist theology in that it stresses 
the individual‘s personal relationship with God as the route to salvation. It is 
―conservative‖ in its fidelity to the literal words of the Bible rather than their 
interpretation through priests or contemporary circumstances. It has a dualistic 
perspective on salvation: unlike some faiths where one can be repeatedly ―lost‖ and 
―saved,‖ CPs believe that one is either ―good‖ or ―evil,‖ conditions which are 
permanent over the individual‘s life (Jelen, 1993). The ―dualistic‖ religious beliefs of 
conservative Protestantism may have a similar social manifestation. The consistent 
idea is that people and societies should follow known paths rather than straying into 
the unknown. Not surprisingly, Conservative Protestantism is also associated with 
traditionalism: traditional families, traditional roles for men and women (Southern 
Baptist Convention, 2010), and obedience/submission to elders (Ellison & Sherkat, 
1993). For research purposes, these ideological associations are important to note 
because they suggest a consistently conservative worldview; the CP identity is not just 
about religion but is about other social values too.   
    
Some authors, like Tomaskovic-Devey & Roscigno (1994) argue that racial bias, or 
racialization, is another cultural factor affecting political preferences in the South. The 
term describes race relations in the post-Civil Rights era, where racial divisions are 
―increasingly covert, embedded in normal operations of institutions, avoid direct racial 
terminology, and are invisible to most Whites‖ (Emerson & Smith, 2000: 9). While 
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the de jure roots of racialization—legal discrimination and racism—no longer exist, 
their de facto effects can still result in race-based inequality and bias. Most 
importantly, the disproportionately lower socio-economic status of non-Whites means 
that this group struggles more visibly. Most persistent-poverty counties across the 
Southeast have higher minority populations; unemployment, incarceration rates, and 
low educational attainment are proportionately lower than for Whites. Thus this group 
appears more socially unsuccessful despite being the more visible recipient of state 
resources. Tomaskovic-Devey & Roscigno suggest that, in the past, this has breed 
resentment on the part of majority Whites, especially where there is a history (as in the 
Southeast) of the white elite ―promoting and instigating racial antagonism and fear, 
thereby recreating the racial inequality upon which its economic position has 
depended‖ (1994: 587). Historically, one such mechanism of promoting racial 
animosity has been through ―the development and maintenance of racist ideologies 
and institutions‖ (ibid.), which persist after overt antagonism has subsided.   
 
Most investigation of institutionalized racism in the Southeast have focused on 
disparities in political access (i.e., participation, representation, and 
mobilization/countermobilization) persisting even after the Voting Rights Act (ibid.). 
Educational disparities are another key area where racial divisions persist through the 
normal operation of institutions; nationally, ―evidence suggests that poorer and 
minority students are more likely to be in classrooms and schools that have fewer 
important educational resources‖ (Roscigno, 1998; also Kozol, 2005; Ladson-Billings, 
2006). Parents want to send their children to the best schools; those who can opt out of 
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poor local systems tend to be white, and racial segregation becomes entrenched.  
Because racialization, unlike racism, ―is embedded within the normal, everyday 
operation of institutions…people need not intend their actions to contribute to racial 
division and inequality for their actions to do so‖ (Emerson & Smith, 2000: 9). But 
they do need to feel that directly confronting and dismantling racialized institutions is 
neither their responsibility nor in anyone‘s best interest. Black & Black‘s previously 
discussed finding of widespread White opposition to racial quotas and preferential 
treatment suggests that at least some racial bias still exists in the South, even if 
discrimination is not the intent. 
 
In terms of political messaging, various authors have argued that racial bias is tied to 
other conservative values, a connection that has been exploited by economic elites. 
Glaser (1998) explains how these themes might be reframed for people through 
political speech. In his study of recent Southern congressional campaigns, he found 
that racial themes still arose frequently; while ―for the most part, Southern 
Republicans have recognized that outright racist appeals are no longer socially 
acceptable,‖ they now articulate racialized messages ―in terms of individualism or 
distrust of the federal government or some other conservative principle‖ (70).  Brenner 
(2006) would go further, arguing that southern political realignment occurred because 
the Republican Right successfully reframed the region‘s existing conservative values 
into ―an anti-statist individualist ideology…identifying the liberal state as a central 
threat to the racial status quo and ‗traditional family values‘, that provided [the right] 
with the wherewithal to contend for power on a brazenly pro-business program‖ (48). 
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While political speeches opposing tax and government obviously do not provide 
sufficient proof of racial bias, they could be triangulated with other evidence like 
structured racial inequality.  
 
The preceding analysis explores the possible interaction effects between different 
conservative values as a means of understanding Black & Black‘s findings. On their 
own, cultural factors like religious traditionalism, racial bias, and anti-statism might 
exert independent effects but together they might maintain a cohesive conservative 
ideology that shapes more than personal preferences—such an ideology could shape 
political preferences too. However, many scholars directly oppose the conclusion that 
the ―old‖ Southern culture—traditional, conservative, racialized—still dominates; 
postwar partisan change has meant that Southern culture is today less monolithic than 
we may expect it to be. Botsch (1982) presents evidence that some conservative 
ideologies have persisted (economic conservatism and individualism) while others 
(religious conservatism and racialization) are no more prevalent than in the rest of the 
country. Hawley‘s (1988) analysis leads him to disagree entirely that the South is 
more conservative than the North, and he points to the quick pace of change in racial 
attitudes as evidence of continued dissipation of traditional rationalities.   
 
Sanders (2009) argues that Southern political realignment created a significant current 
of economic progressivism coexisting with social conservatism. Beginning in the 
postwar era, the need for aggressive economic development programs (such as the US 
Area Redevelopment Act of 1965) trumped the old racial politics of division. She 
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questions whether today, ―both black and white working class voters pin their hopes 
on growth and job creation, joining white elites, and in the process muting both racial 
and redistributive divisions‖ (personal communication, 2008). Shafer and Johnston‘s 
(2006) study concurs that economic development and class, not race, have become the 
more salient factors in new Southern culture: like the rest of the country, the region is 
shaped by pragmatic economic goals that tolerate and even depend upon ideological 
and cultural diversity. The analysis in Chapter 2 would seem to support this 
conclusion for the region as a whole, which has tended to adopt a pragmatic policy 
strategy of balanced, inclusionary development.   
 
This study can contribute to further understanding in this area. Brace, Arsenaux, 
Johnson, & Ulrig (2004) note the ―widespread consensus that ideology varies 
significantly across the states and that these variations relate to meaningful policy 
differences‖ (529). Perhaps Alabama‘s conservative development path (in comparison 
to regional neighbors) results from a unique cultural orientation among its voters. In 
Alabama, it is clear that economic development does trump other conservative social 
values for moderate business elites and some state actors. These actors have proposed 
major pieces of legislation for balanced development—legislation that would rely 
upon more taxation, bigger government, and redistribution. Voters, however, have 
been more amenable to the conservative economic position. The predominant socio-
economic ―mental model‖ may be different than that found in the rest of the region, 
where conservative politics take a pragmatic form (e.g., balanced, long-term 
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development goals) rather than an ideological form (e.g., the maintenance of 
traditional power structures).   
 
Evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggested that conservative business appealed to a 
strong cultural aversion to taxes, but if consent for inequality is truly structured into 
society, more evidence than the simple appeal to self-interest is necessary. The most 
compelling part of class-based theory is the concept of power‘s ―third dimension,‖ 
which points to culturally embedded norms that systematically cultivate preference 
among non-elites for policies that maintain inequality. The background articulation of 
certain principles and values—for example, ―freedom‖ from institutions that would 
encroach on individual liberty—makes these themes appear, in Lukes‘ words, 
universalistic, natural, meritocratic. As such, elites need not undertake planned, 
strategic, or even collaborative action to encourage these values among the public. 
Yet, they may (to quote Clemens & Cook again) ―enhance the [appeal] of a particular 
policy by building deep analogies to already institutionalized models or widely held 
norms.‖ Bawn (1999) claims that ―ideological preferences are often decisive in 
democratic decision-making, as votes cast on the basis of ideology can easily 
overwhelm those cast on the basis of direct self-interest.‖   
 
What types of analogies, if any, did elites in Alabama build between socio-economic 
policies and cultural values? In public debate, how did conservatives and modernizers 
differently frame development, job creation, and the proper role of government so as 
to appeal to voters? If the previous chapter confirmed that ―third dimensional‖ or 
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hidden power describes Alabama policymaking better than pluralism, this chapter 
looks for the observable mechanisms of this hidden power. Specifically, this means 
looking at how consent is organized. 
This may include the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how 
they are shaped or manipulated in power processes.  It may involve the study 
of communication of information—both of what is communicated and how it 
is done.  It may involve a focus upon the means by which social legitimations 
are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or roles in the 
dominated (Gaventa, 1980: 15).   
 
This investigation involves two basic steps: identifying predominant ―social myths‖ 
and the symbolic forms they take, and analyzing the transmission of these themes 
during public debate over two policy proposals. 
  
Research Strategy 
 
This chapter follows up on the power structure research begun in Chapter 3. Since 
power is very difficult to locate and measure directly, researchers identify indicators of 
power—ideally, more than one and of different types so evidence can be 
triangulated
10
. Indicators of power—who benefits, who has a reputation for power, 
who shapes the debate, etc.—can be identified through power structure research, 
which is a combination of network analysis and content analysis.  How do these 
approaches fit together? According to Domhoff (2010), 
A network analysis traces out the people and organizations that make up the 
power structure, and then figures out how they connect to and influence 
                                               
10 ―Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the 
uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. The most persuasive evidence comes through a 
triangulation of measurement processes‖ (Webb, 1981, p. 35, cited in Domhoff, 2010). 
 161 
government. Content analysis is the term for the systematic study of the 
power structure's ideologies, policies, and plans, which are learned about 
through the careful study of documents such as the texts for speeches, policy 
statements by organizations, and drafts of legislation.  
 
In the previous chapter a reputational approach was used to map the power networks 
at work in Alabama‘s socio-economic policymaking sphere (and their historical 
development). In this chapter content analysis is used for a better understanding of the 
relationship, if any, between conservative cultural values and opposition to balanced 
development strategies. First, interviews with political observers and representatives 
of politically-active groups provide evidence about the values that Alabamians 
perceive as central to their state culture. This evidence is necessary to understand what 
themes a ―framing‖ of economic development policies would need to touch on to 
increase public support. With awareness and anticipation of symbolic messages, the 
discourse leading up to two separate referenda (the vote on implementing an education 
lottery and the vote on implementing tax reform) is examined to determine what types 
of language and themes were used by supporters and opponents. 
 
Domhoff (2010) describes the content analysis method as the ―analysis of the ideology 
and policy preferences of the group or class under scrutiny…done by studying the 
written ‗output‘ of strategically located people or organizations in the network, that is, 
texts of speeches, policy statements, campaign literature, and proposed legislation.‖ 
Content analysis can be done manually, by constructing categories that relate to the 
attitude or issue being studied, looking at relevant texts to see whether and how often 
the group‘s discourse fits into those categories, analyzing these frequencies, and 
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comparing them to other content categories and other groups‘ discourse (ibid.). It can 
also be done with computer programs without the use of preconstructed categories.  In 
this study, interview data are used to construct categories. During the network analysis 
phase discussed on Chapter 3, interview subjects were asked not only about 
reputational power in Alabama but also about dominant cultural and ideological 
values. Questions were loosely guided by the literature about ―Southern culture‖ but 
were open-ended to minimize leading or distorting interview subjects‘ own 
perceptions and impressions. This information is used to construct ―framing 
categories‖ used in analysis of the public discourse surrounding the lottery and tax 
reform proposals. In the current chapter, understanding dominant values and 
ideologies (their sources, antecedents, etc.) is less important than understanding how 
they are used to symbolize or frame policy. Moreover, as Snow & Benford (2005) 
have noted, ―framing, in contrast to ideology, is a more readily empirically observable 
activity…neither frames nor framing processes are purely or merely mentalistic or 
cognitive entities [but] are rooted in and constituted by group-based social interaction‖ 
(9). 
 
To systematically compare the occurrence of these frames in the discourse, the method 
described by Domhoff (2010) is employed:  
Once the categories are developed, relevant texts are studied to determine the 
frequency and intensity of elements that fit into one or more of the categories. 
Then the various frequencies are analyzed by calculating averages or 
percentages. Finally, the averages or percentages for two or more groups are 
compared. Then, too, researchers can do studies to determine if there are 
linkages -- sometimes called contingencies or correlations -- between two or 
more content categories. 
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Thematic categories also emerge during the discourse analysis process and are 
integrated with existing categories. Content analysis software can also be used for 
word frequency searches or to determine what concepts or phrases are interconnected 
in different texts (in a fashion similar to Wordle, the well-known textual analysis 
program for popular use). Although manual analysis is slower and less quantitatively 
rigorous, here it is preferred to the software for a number of reasons that are explained 
in more detail in the next section.   
 
As in Chapter 3, a multi-stage approach is used here so data can be triangulated. Here, 
the analysis is more inductive than deductive, since the goal is to understand processes 
rather than test hypotheses. In the first stage, interview data are analyzed in reference 
to the literature—i.e., for evidence that conservative values are culturally and 
politically predominant, as Black & Black‘s research suggests. Clearly, conservative 
values are not necessarily predictors of inequality, but when significant inequality 
exists and persists such values may play a role in power‘s third dimension. In the 
southern US, persistent inequality may take the form of racialization, as Tomaskovic-
Devey & Roscigno‘s research suggests; how about in Alabama specifically? Interview 
data are also analyzed for evidence of institutional ―templates‖ for these 
characteristics. For example, Chapter 3 showed that the constitutional limitations on 
government provide a template for voters‘ anti-tax mentality. What features, 
constitutional or otherwise, would provide a template for religious traditionalism or 
racialization? The first stage of data analysis makes these connections. These 
predominant cultural-institutional characteristics form the basis for content categories 
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that are used to analyze discursive data in the second stage. Do elites use these 
elements to interpret or frame policies for voters, and if so how? What types of 
analogies or symbols are used? Do powerful actors indeed manipulate cultural norms 
and values to justify the status quo? 
 
Table 10: Content Analysis in Two Stages 
Stage 1: Internal 
perceptions of state 
culture 
Perceived predominance of conservative values, such as 
religious traditionalism or anti-statism 
Perceived racialization 
Corresponding institutional frames/templates 
Stage 2: Political 
deployment 
Use of conservative values to frame socio-economic policies 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
As the data source, print media—primarily news articles from major Alabama daily 
newspapers—are used because they are readily available in electronic format, they are 
more likely to have reached a wide variety of Alabama voters than campaign literature 
or propaganda, and they show how issues were actually covered and portrayed in the 
media. As explained above, interview data comes from the same sources used in 
Chapter 3. Content analysis relied on newspaper coverage of the issues; while polls 
suggested that Alabamians got most of their information about the issues from 
television first and newspapers second, print media archives were more readily 
available and searchable. Actual access to these data came through the electronic 
database Access World News, which is a repository of U.S. news sources (excluding 
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magazines) searchable by coverage area, keywords, date range, and other factors. In 
analysis of the lottery issue, the search was limited to Alabama coverage from October 
1998 through October 1999, which provided access to 10 statewide and local papers. 
The search was further limited to articles with ―lottery‖ in the headline; these articles 
were analyzed one by one.  Duplicate articles and articles about lottery issues 
unrelated to the education lottery proposal were removed from the analysis. In analysis 
of the tax reform issue, the search was limited to Alabama coverage from March 2002 
through September 2003, which provided access to 15 statewide and local papers. The 
search terms used were ―tax‖ OR ―Riley‖ in the headline because the proposal was 
most frequently tagged as ―the tax plan‖ or ―Riley‘s plan.‖ Many irrelevant articles 
had to be pruned but these broad search terms were the most inclusive.   
 
In general, data collection erred on the side of inclusivity, incorporating editorials, 
letters to the editor, and photo captions along with the many news articles that 
provided coverage of developments in the lottery and tax reform debates. Each text 
was a snapshot of the framing process that voters heard and absorbed into their 
perception of the issue. Each text was individually read (rather than entering them all 
into content analysis software) as a means of getting inside the public discourse as 
much as possible—a fuller picture than semantic analysis alone can provide. More can 
be understood about the pacing of the debates, the types of rebuttals or reframing used 
and by who, the way voter responses are portrayed. A certain level of metanalysis of 
the coverage itself is also possible: the researcher learns about how the media itself 
framed the public discourse. Daily newspapers with wide circulation are ostensibly 
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―neutral‖ in their non-editorial reporting, but even ―neutral‖ word choices can shape 
the way people think about issues. Therefore, there is value in manually reading a 
large body of relevant texts when doing content analysis. 
 
Results 
 
Internal Perceptions of State Culture 
 
The first stage of research for this chapter was interviewing representatives of 
different interest groups to identify the dominant ―mental models‖ in Alabama culture. 
The literature suggests that traditionally conservative values may still provide 
important mental models in the southern US. But in most places, pragmatic concerns 
seem to have trumped ideology in development policymaking, as evidenced by the 
balanced development strategies adopted in most of the seven states studied in Chapter 
2. Although there is evidence that class-based power plays a major role in Alabama 
policymaking, there is not enough evidence yet to conclude that voters rejected 
balanced development policies for ideological reasons. That question is taken up with 
this chapter‘s discourse analysis. 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, the state constitution compounds class power by limiting the 
policymaking power of government and community. It also compounds class power 
by providing a traditionally conservative mental model that is consistent with other 
values in the culture. It is difficult to understand which came first—the institution or 
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the values—but in either case, the constitution seems to play a ―binding‖ role, 
logically connecting values that might otherwise have remained disconnected. And, its 
writing may have represented a turning point in Alabama society—a ―critical 
juncture‖ in the language of path dependence theory—whereby the codification and 
subsequent reinforcement of a particular worldview silenced competing views.  
 
What are some of these dominant values? Traditionalism, religious morality, and 
racial bias were all noted in interviews in various ways (both explicit and inferred). 
Job creation is also an important goal. In terms of individualism, the previous chapter 
has already the strong aversion to taxes. Also mentioned frequently in my interviews 
was the sanctity of property rights, and especially, mistrust of government. The 
aversion to taxes appears sui generis in many ways, tied up in a complex mixture of 
practical and historical factors. The sanctity of private property rights is rooted in the 
state‘s experience during post-Civil War Reconstruction when there was nothing to tax 
in the state of any value but property (personal communication, 5/27/09).   
In Alabama especially, it comes from this thing we have about property, and 
about what that means to you as a person…there‘s a thing about property in 
Alabama that‘s not true in Mississippi, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida. (personal 
communication, 9/21/08)   
 
It comes out of a real southern and to some extent…I wouldn‘t call it unique, 
but in Alabama, a feeling over a period of time that we should never tax 
somebody out of their house or off their land.  (personal communication, 
2/14/09) 
 
Tax aversion may also be tied to the state‘s historical poverty and the strong sense that 
there are too few resources to undertake any major policy reforms or restructuring. In 
interviews the refrain ―We are a poor state‖ was repeated by interview subjects with a 
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variety of different political views, so it appears to have some cultural consistency. 
That sentiment excuses Alabama from greater investment in its people when most 
others in the region have stepped up.  
People sort of had the sense that, ―Well we‘re a poor state,‖ and so they would 
kind of excuse things that didn‘t happen or whatever, because of this 
dominant feeling: ―Well, we‘re a poor state, we can‘t do this, that, or the 
other…we can‘t afford to give those deductions that it takes to get poor 
people to have a progressive income tax to offset the regressive sales tax; we 
can‘t afford it.‖ (personal communication, 9/26/08)  
 
Alabamians tend to feel that, for better or worse, their state and their values are 
distinct, idiosyncratic. As a longtime political observer noted, ―Alabama has a rather 
rigid belief system, almost cultic, and in that respect Alabama is more like Alabama 
than it is Mississippi and Georgia‖ (personal communication, 11/17/08). This is a trait 
that Alabamians appear to be proud of even while they know their state languishes at 
the bottom of most developmental indicators (a feeling summed up in the constant 
refrain, ―Thank god for Mississippi!‖).In terms of policy, convincing Alabama voters 
that ―the best way to do something is the way all other states do it‖ is an ineffective 
political strategy (personal communication, 5/27/09). This sense of being proudly 
different and having to defend that differentness from real or perceived detractors is 
powerful in Alabama, and it probably contributes to the individualist mindset. Its most 
apparent cause is historical experience, particularly during the Civil Rights era when 
the state‘s culture came to symbolize all that was ―backward‖ about the South, from a 
national and international perspective. 
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The state constitution also plays a critical role in encouraging an individualist mindset 
that equates liberty with personal sovereignty (sometimes called ―negative freedom‖). 
How does this happen? Key features of the document limit government‘s capacity and 
autonomy, making government appear a poor, inefficient, and corrupt steward of 
public finances almost by default. Taxes are low and are primarily weighted toward 
the unstable and regressive sales tax, generating little revenue for the state to work 
with. Since deficit budgets are unconstitutional, public services remain minimal and 
proration is a common occurrence (implemented about every three or four years; 
Flynt, 2002). Earmarking forces leaders to keep doling out money to entrenched 
interests and prevents them from proactively responding to changing needs, while 
minimal ethics rules contribute to pervasive backroom deal-making. Fearful that their 
taxes are already being squandered by the state, Alabama voters have little intention of 
giving their government yet more resources, even if those resources would mostly be 
contributed by wealthier groups and would benefit all.   
If they don‘t trust the government and they separate that out and they think of 
this as a payment and a loss and don‘t have any confidence of getting 
anything in return, you can‘t sell them anything because they have no 
confidence that they‘ll get anything in return…they think of their taxes as a 
deadweight loss. (personal communication, 9/26/08) 
 
The fact that in their minds they saw that their roads weren‘t repaired, and 
they were equating paying taxes with roads and stuff—―Our roads are not in 
good shape, therefore they must be wasting our money.‖  And I think to a 
certain extent, [it‘s the same for] the education system—they saw ―Well, it‘s 
not working like it should so therefore, taxes are not working.‖ (personal 
communication, 4/28/09)   
 
Rather than a guardian of collective investment in a common future, government is 
seen as a source of corruption, waste, and mismanagement. Increased state resources 
are not equated with better functioning but with more waste.  Individualist 
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endeavors—i.e., businesses—take on a cultural sanctity. Even where the mental model 
provided by the constitution seems to conflict with anti-statist ideology, these conflicts 
appear to have been reconciled within the culture. For example, one would expect 
preference for local control where the state has historically clashed with centralized 
power in the form of the federal government. But since the centralized decision-
making structure that exists is at least held accountable through earmarking; it would 
be much harder to control local governments so voters have not clamored for home 
rule. 
We don‘t want the Feds to have too much control; we think that‘s bad, but we 
are willing for there to be that much control at the state level, and actually can 
allow ourselves to be duped into thinking that somehow, this is the way to do 
it; somehow, to change it from that way is going to mean raising your taxes.  
That all they‘re wanting to do by moving that control back down is to have 
the ability to raise your taxes. (personal communication, 9/20/08) 
 
One important effect of keeping local leadership ―neutered‖ is a sense of dependence, 
especially in relation to jobs. In Alabama, job creation is of paramount importance, 
especially because of the ―poor state‖ mentality. Interestingly, jobs are not perceived 
as something that local people create but something that must be ―brought‖ by 
government, especially outside the wealthier metropolitan areas. Again, the 
constitution plays a role: in preventing communities from even the most basic tasks of 
self-government (such as making zoning laws, funding local scholarship programs, 
raising court fees, or establishing storm water authorities—all common examples I 
learned about), local capacities and resources are low. But the effect is ideological as 
well:  
In rural Alabama you will find a lot of that ―Somebody‘s looking out for 
me‖…people think that the Alabama Development Office, which is the 
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recruiting arm for the state, they think that they‘re going to bring them 
projects… we have the old-school thought of, ―Well, I‘ll just call the 
Governor, and the Governor will send somebody down to help me.‖ (personal 
communication, 5/14/09)     
 
A pulp and paper plant [closes] and it‘s…―someday something‘s going to 
come around, and I can live off unemployment for a bit,‖ and for several 
months they figure they can make that and something will come around or a 
plant will start again; that‘s their mindset. (personal communication, 4/22/09) 
 
More specifically, government brings jobs by clearing the way for private investment. 
The state‘s success in recruiting automobile manufacturers between the early 90s and 
00s certainly reinforced this mentality. Although it took a huge commitment of public 
money to get the Mercedes plant in 1993, the prevailing conclusion is that it was 
worth it to put the state on the map industrially. If Alabamians are going to gamble 
with government, this type of immediate payoff seems to be a requirement.  
[It‘s] a very different model, to say we‘re going to raise gasoline taxes by a 
penny, or we‘re going to have a sales tax dedicated to economic development, 
and we‘re going to raise it here and we‘re going to spend it here—it‘s a very 
different concept than saying, we‘re going to raise property taxes and send 
that money to Montgomery. (personal communication, 5/27/09) 
 
If you call it economic development around here, it‘ll fly.  So normally…if 
[people] think it‘s jobs-related they‘re likely to vote for it, and particularly if 
it appears to be free to them and taxes somebody else, or if it takes money 
from the oil and gas fund, people will vote for it. (personal communication, 
10/8/08) 
 
Ironically, it is government itself that reinforces these themes most visibly, repeatedly 
making the connection to the small-government frame established by the state 
constitution. Most candidates for office willingly sign a ―No Taxes‖ pledge, which 
established a norm implying that the institution is unworthy of the public trust. During 
campaigns and once in office, it appears, public officials exploit the theme out of self-
interest.   
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Governor Riley ran on a platform of opposing waste in government.  His 
opponent at the time, [Democractic] Governor Siegelman, also ran on the 
same platform.  The Republican prior to him, Fob James, also was noted for 
wonderful comments like ―What do we need to pay state employees for?  If 
you can manage a Waffle House, you can run state government.‖ (personal 
communication, 9/16/08) 
 
White legislators, black legislators…the speech is always the same.  The 
speech is, ―This legislature is awful.  These people I work with are the biggest 
pack of clowns in the world.  It‘s terrible, you can‘t trust them, blah blah 
blah‖…Then, it always pivots around: ―You‘ve got one defense against these 
morons, and that‘s ME.  I‘m your knight in shining armor.‖  And people are 
getting this all over the state, decade after decade after decade. (personal 
communication,  9/10/08) 
  
Part of what is being articulated here is the avoidance of uncertainty, change, and risk. 
This is a savvy strategy by political leaders because it taps into the strong sense of 
traditionalism present in mainstream Alabama culture. There is a sense that it is better 
to follow in an established path of behavior than to risk a novel approach just for 
novelty‘s sake. The feeling of ―sticking with what you know‖ may be tied to the 
relative lack of new in- and out-migration that Alabama has experienced for much of 
its history; rural Alabama in particular is still a place where many of the older 
generation have not left the state and are unfamiliar with novel experiences (personal 
communications, 5/14/09, 9/19/08). It may also be tied to a strong sense of shared 
identity over the generations, an imagined community where most people have had 
similar experiences and share similar moral values. Traditionalism may also contribute 
to a distinction between ―outsiders‖ and ―insiders;‖ a clannish mentality can be quite 
strong, especially but not only in the rural areas. 
I‘ve heard—you could pick any city I represent down there and people will 
say, ―I‘ve lived here, we moved here with my family 30 years ago.‖  [A man I 
spoke to] is 35 years old, and he goes, ―Man, I‘m still an outsider.‖  This guy 
owns a fairly decent-sized company that employs 45, 50 people.  He goes, 
―I‘m an outsider.‖ (personal communication, 5/14/09) 
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As a native Alabamian, where can I say I would really, really want to live that 
is really accepting of people that don‘t look at color of skin, don‘t look at 
religious beliefs, don‘t look at sexual preference—where can you go?  And 
you look at these things and you go, ―Damn…we don‘t have one of these 
[places].‖ (personal communication, 5/14/09) 
 
―Outside people…don‘t know that ‗you‘re not supposed to do that because the 
Smiths have always been the only ones who did that‘… it‘ll be 12 generations 
before they can say ―we‘re from here.‖ (personal communication, 10/20/09) 
 
Whatever the origins of this ideology, there are clear cognitive parallels to the 
constitutional structure and its constraints on change or new courses of action, with a 
significant effect on policymaking. As the following ideas frequently voiced in 
interviews suggest,  
If an Alabama voter has a choice between a future he‘s not sure about and a 
past he doesn‘t like, he‘ll opt for the past. (personal communication, 
9/16/2008)  
 
The attitude in this state is, ―Good enough.‖  The attitude is, ―If it was good 
enough for my grandpappy, it‘s good enough for me; don‘t rock the boat and 
let‘s not make any changes; I am comfortable with what I‘ve had.‖ (personal 
communication, 10/8/08) 
 
[Alabamians] are used to a way of life that—there are many people that will 
tell you, this was good enough for me, and it‘s good enough for my children.  
They resist change and they don‘t have a lot of faith that—most of the 
messages that resonate in this state are anti-government. (personal 
communication, 2/14/09) 
 
One powerful source of tradition with the state ―community‖ is religious faith. 
Alabama has a high rate of religious adherence (defined as attending services 
regularly; ARDA, 2010): 74.4% in 2000, with highest adherence rates among 
Southern Baptists (310 adherents out of every 1000 residents), Methodists (74 
adherents out of every 1000 residents), and Catholics (34 out of 1000).  Judaism and 
Islam only have about 2 adherents per 1000 residents. There is a spatial element to 
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religious adherence: of 67 counties, the 19 that are at least 50% Evangelical Protestant 
are concentrated either in a band across the northern third of the state or a cluster at the 
southeast.  Concentrations of Methodists, Catholics, Muslims, and Jews are found, not 
surprisingly, in the university counties. Some interview evidence suggested that 
denomination matters less than adherence in terms of public opinion; the strength of 
one‘s devoutness may override more particularistic beliefs. As one longtime state 
pollster said,  
―I‘m absolutely—I‘m not convinced, I can just tell you, I have quit using any 
other measure: Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, or whatever.  How often one 
attends church is the single most powerful faith variable there is.  That‘s 
related to everything else.  And it doesn‘t matter what the religion is. 
(personal communication, 11/19/08)   
 
More frequently, the Alabamians interviewed here seemed to believe that 
denomination does matter, with conservative Christianity being dominant. Its central 
role in the culture is evident in its permeation of public life; while the infamous ―Ten 
Commandments‖ monument was removed from the state judicial building in 2003, it 
remains ―a common tradition‖ to open city council or school board meetings and 
school sporting events with a prayer led by a public official or a visiting minister, 
typically evangelical Protestants (Garrison, 2010). During political campaigns, 
candidates make regular stops at church services to make their speeches from the 
pulpit and ―the business-oriented, growth-oriented conservatives, even the moderate 
Democrats, [have learned] how to talk the authentic church talk‖ in order to stay 
politically competitive (personal correspondence, 9/10/08). Not only devout 
candidates in general but conservative Protestants in particular appear to stand a better 
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chance of being appointed or elected to public office, at least in the public‘s 
perception.  
For example, when one of the fights occurred over who would be president of 
[a state university], one of the things said against him is, ―He‘s not Baptist; 
he‘s Church of Christ.‖  That got pushed out through the [church] networks.  
So it matters to these people which church the leadership belongs to. (personal 
communication, 9/10/08). 
 
The need to know leaders share one‘s moral values connects back to the low levels of 
trust in the institution of government. It‘s evident that these two ideologies are 
connected: as a government services researcher put it, ―Two things here: you‘re going 
to be Christian, and you‘re going to sign the No Tax pledge. The two are the same, as 
far as [the voters] are concerned‖ (personal communication, 9/16/08). Mistrust of 
government obviously does not originate in conservative Protestantism, although there 
is an ideological affinity perhaps linked by individualism. As Emerson & Smith 
(2000) have discussed, an individualist theology provides the same ―mental model‖ as 
an individualist socio-economic philosophy. Religion itself seems to be an 
independent source of value in Alabama culture, but in interesting ways the dominant 
religion promotes the same value system as the state constitution. 
 
Issues of race also connect in interesting ways to this value system. Though anti-
statism appears powerful among both blacks and whites, there does appear to be an 
element of ―racialization‖ in the way it is interpreted, relating particularly to 
education. A major part of what state government does is fund public education; 
education was a racial battle ground during the 20
th
 century and continues to be 
probably the main element of racialization in the state—a circumstance that is widely 
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understood yet rarely discussed openly. Alabama is the 8
th
 most segregated state for 
African Americans, with 44% of black students in extremely segregated schools 
(Orfield & Lee, 2007). More than a matter of geographical distribution, this 
resegregation has to do with white flight—not only from school districts but from 
public schools, especially those with high black student populations. A number of 
interview subjects either alluded to or openly spoke about the flight of not only upper 
class but middle- and working-class students to ―private‖ white schools.   
Where when you get into South Alabama particularly in the rural areas you 
have lots of ―academies.‖  And I can honestly say, I can‘t tell you that the 
academies are any better than the public school system, so there‘s obviously 
other reasons people might send their children there…(personal 
communication, 5/14/09) 
 
The whites have left all the public schools…And you will have [white] people 
who are very, very poor who will be sending their kids to private school, and 
some people in the community will help them pay so they can go to private 
schools.  And these are not quality private schools; these are just private 
schools.  And there is—I wish I didn‘t think this way, but race is at the bottom 
of it. (personal communication, 10/2/08) 
  
The elephant in the room is the public education system.  Most of the places 
that we work are still for all practical purposes segregated into the Christian 
white school and the minority African American and Hispanic public schools.  
And they‘re not getting equal education.  Now, I look sometimes and I 
wonder whether the private school has a better education…(personal 
communication, 10/20/09) 
 
Especially for poorer white families that have left the public schools, having to paying 
taxes for an education system in which they are no longer invested may be an 
unwelcome burden. While this chapter does not argue that the cause of school re-
segregation is racialization (although there are many who would argue that point), the 
effect of school re-segregation is decreased support for the public school system, 
continually poor education outcomes in many of the districts, and ultimately the sense 
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that predominantly-black schools are somehow a bad public investment. The 
conservative distaste for the powerful teachers‘ union may also contribute to the 
negative connotation that the public sector has for many Alabamians who would never 
consider themselves racially prejudiced. 
 
In general interviews suggest that a significant thread of traditional conservatism runs 
through the state ―mindset‖ even across partisan lines. At the same time, job creation 
is an important concern. It is still unclear to what extent these two value sources affect 
political behavior. This chapter‘s analysis also suggests that Alabama‘s state 
constitution is a key institutional component reinforcing the effects of class-based 
power, yet the actual mechanisms of this reinforcement are still unclear as well. 
Clemens & Cook (1997) have claimed that institutions are not just rules and 
organizations but ―cultural templates‖ that provide models for perception and action. 
They are durable because of path dependence, which can make power asymmetries 
more and more hidden over time. But their durability is also magnified where they 
provide ideologies consistent with other values. Class-based power theories would 
expect economic elites to make those connections for voters—in effect, ―filtering‖ 
policy proposals through the lens of a coherent ideology that serves elite interests. Is 
there evidence that elites did so during periods of public debate over socio-economic 
policy? The next section of results looks at this question. 
 
The Development Discourse 
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Using secondary data and discourse analysis, this section explores the discursive 
mechanisms used in recent public debate over development policies that would have 
brought more balance to the state‘s development profile, including greater investment 
in human capital and more progressive and stable taxation. The major recent proposals 
were for the education lottery (in 1999) and for tax reform (in 2003). Both would have 
amended the state constitution so both were put to the voters in special elections. 
Interview data suggested that particular themes or recurrent messages would appear, 
both coded and uncoded—such as ―traditional‖ or moral values. This section finds that 
elite opponents of policy reform drew upon themes of individualism and traditional 
authority, reflected in powerful value sources of conservative Protestantism and racial 
identity, to construct voter opposition. Because key conservative values correspond to 
the ideological ―model‖ provided by the state constitution, conservative political 
interests have a discursive advantage with voters when they tap into these deep-seated 
value systems. State government‘s low capacity and corporate liberalism‘s lack of 
resonance make New Economy policies unlikely to prevail against such opposition.  
 
The Education Lottery Proposal 
 
The education lottery was the centerpiece of Candidate Siegelman‘s campaign for 
governor of Alabama. If elected, he promised that he would implement a state lottery 
with proceeds going to a Georgia-like college scholarship program, prekindergarten 
programs, and new computers for public schools (Bobbitt, 2007). Polls during the 
gubernatorial campaign showed that two-thirds of voters supported the lottery idea and 
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Siegelman‘s 16% margin of victory seemed to suggest they were ready to let him put 
it into action. Before the proposal could be approved by voters, the state Legislature 
had to agree to put it on the ballot. The House passed the proposal by a large margin; 
in the Senate, opponents filibustered but eventually passed it by three votes (ibid.). 
The subsequent campaign for public opinion was marked by a vigorous speaking tour 
by Siegelman and prominent support from the Alabama Education Association and 
several well-known business leaders in the state. The opposition was at first somewhat 
inchoate but eventually become dominated by religious groups such as the Alabama 
Baptist Convention and Alabama Christian Coalition (ibid.). Throughout the 
campaign, polls repeatedly showed that at least 60% of the voters supported the 
lottery, but in the last few weeks before the vote, support dropped drastically.   
 
A list of all the political action committees registered with the Alabama Secretary of 
State in 1999 was generated. The opposition PAC that received and disbursed the most 
money that year was Citizens Against Legalized Lottery (CALL), whose state purpose 
was ―to oppose the lottery referendum vote in the State of Alabama on October 12, 
1999‖; $1,652,139 flowed through that group‘s coffers (Alabama Secretary of State, 
2010). Most of the large organizational contributors were socially and/or economically 
conservative ideological groups. Most groups were local, but a few—significantly, 
Americans for Tax Reform, which was later implicated in an anti-gambling lobbying 
scandal, as discussed above—were national. The support PAC that received and 
disbursed the most money that year was the Alabama Education Foundation, whose 
stated purpose was ―to provide information to the people of the State of Alabama of 
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the benefit to be gained from the establishment of an education lottery & to obtain 
public support for such lottery;‖ the group had $4,899,148 in contributions during 
1999 (ibid.). The business community was also a major supporter, including Alabama 
Council of College and University Presidents, the Business Council of Alabama, the 
Economic Development Association of Alabama, the Alabama Retail Association, and 
the Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce.  
 
Evaluating the types of appeals that each side used helps in deciphering what 
messages are most resonant with voters. Analysis of print media coverage from 
Siegelman‘s announcement of his plan through the vote (Jan. 1998 through Oct. 12, 
1999) shows that negative messages were mentioned more frequently than positive 
mentions by a margin of two to one. About half of the newspaper editorials during the 
period were positive (30) and half were negative (33). In editorials and news articles, 
the opposition theme mentioned most frequently was the appeal to conservative 
principles and morals. Opponents equated the lottery with gambling (―the gambling 
bill‖ rather than the ―lottery bill‖) and based their appeals on opposition to gambling 
in general. Most frequently, they argued that gambling leads to addiction and is 
morally wrong. Some who were worried about gambling‘s regressive effect argued 
that it preys on the poor and/or that more investment in education was needed, but 
progressive plans like tax reform should be the way to do it—an appeal that resonated 
with more liberal voters.   
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More often, concerns for the poor were more related to sin. A typical quote from a 
Baptist pastor was ―[The Ten Commandments] says ‗Thou shalt not covet.‘ When 
people become compulsive gamblers, gambling becomes their god. That's against the 
first commandment‖ (Garrison, 1999).  The moral message from church leaders was 
directed both at government, which would enable and encourage the sin of gambling, 
and at those who would try to ―get rich quick‖: ―It destroys lives; it destroys the work 
ethic. What the government is teaching is you can get something for nothing. The 
Bible teaches we're to be givers, not takers. The lottery changes us from givers to 
takers. It's fueled by greed‖ (ibid.).   
 
Interestingly, a frequently-used strategy (11.4%) was to rhetorically connect 
opposition with the good reputation of opponents (particularly churches and the 
Alabama Farmers‘ Federation). In a situation where voters might be unsure about the 
specifics of the proposal, they could thus rely on the (non)endorsement of groups they 
trusted. This ―trust the authorities‖ frame was presented to voters in an ALFA 
newsletter: ―Our state senators and representatives are elected to make tough decisions 
based on the facts presented and on what's best for our state...It isn't likely that the 
general public will have all the facts on an issue as complicated as this‖ (The 
Cultivator, 1999). 
 
The other most frequently used message appealed directly to risk aversion and anti-
statism; opponents suggested that it represented a power grab and that the money 
would not be used in the way the administration promised. In a state with such a 
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strong cultural predisposition toward religious morality and mistrust of government, 
these messages must have resonated strongly. Another strategy was to discredit the 
plan itself, not the principles behind it. Some opponents argued that the plan wouldn‘t 
actually generate enough money to fund the planned scholarships or that the 
scholarships wouldn‘t end up going to the most needy students. Whatever the intent, 
those who framed the proposal in such ways drew upon the idea that no change was 
preferable to risky change. There were a small number of appeals to self-interest as 
well—for example, some argued that retail- and service-oriented businesses would 
suffer as people spent their discretionary cash on lottery tickets instead. Overall, voters 
were exposed to negative assessments of this development proposal more often than 
positive assessments.   
 
Among supporting themes, most frequently used were appeals to pragmatism. 
Supporters emphasized the problems with the state‘s underfunded education system 
and said a lottery would be the only way to raise the needed revenue without raising 
taxes. With this type of appeal supporters tried to show that it was impossible not to 
act and that this plan was the only palatable one that would be presented to them. 
Proponents also noted that Alabamians were already playing the lottery in Georgia and 
Tennessee, thereby spending millions to educate those states‘ students: ―[Supporters] 
know that Alabamians have spent hundreds of millions of dollars playing the lottery in 
other states. They want to keep that money here in Alabama to give our kids college 
scholarships, prekindergarten and classroom technology‖ (Demonia, 1999). The 
second-most frequently mentioned themes appealed to populism, but not in the anti-
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statist sense deployed by opponents. One major rationale, used during the 
Legislature‘s deliberation on whether to put the item on a ballot, was simply to let the 
people vote. This rationale did not engage with the substance of the proposal, but 
successfully removed procedural obstacles, giving supporters more time to make their 
pitch.   
 
Supporters reframed another message that their opponents had co-opted—the appeal 
to principles and morals. While opponents had suggested the lottery would cause 
broken families through gambling and addiction, supporters tried to argue precisely 
the opposite: that it would prevent broken families by creating jobs. This typical quote 
from Siegelman illustrates the way the moral appeal was framed: ―My message to the 
opponents of the education lottery is simple. You ought to be ashamed of yourselves;‖ 
the same article noted that his pro-lottery campaign charged a mayoral opponent with 
―neglecting his poorest constituents‖ (Orndorff, 1999). Perhaps surprisingly, the 
appeal to morals was used much less frequently by lottery supporters than by 
opponents. Another seemingly obvious pitch was for economic development, but the 
connection between better education and better jobs was rarely made by proponents 
(or more precisely, this type of pitch was rarely mentioned in print media). Siegelman 
framed the issue this way on several occasions (for example, ―We're talking about 
changing education in this state forever, giving our kids the chance to learn the skills 
for the 21st century so they can build rockets, too;‖ Faulk, 1999), but given the 
cultural resonance of job creation, it is surprising this frame was not used more often.   
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Ultimately the majority (54%) rejected the lottery (White, 1999). Siegelman had 
campaigned on the lottery platform in 1998 and majorities in 56 of the state‘s 67 
counties elected him. But counties that he had easily carried in 1998 soundly rejected 
the lottery or only narrowly approved it (DeMonia & Gordon, 1999.) 
 
Table 11: Campaign Rhetorics Deployed For and Against 1999 Education Lottery Proposal 
Opposition Themes Freq % Support Themes Freq % 
Total Mentions 280 64.2% Total Mentions 156 35.8% 
Appeal to Conservative Principles   Populism   
Morally wrong/sin 27 9.6% Let the people vote 27 17.3% 
Gambling/addiction 62 22.1% Opponents allied w/out-of-state interests 7 4.5% 
Free money/get-rich-quick scheme 7 2.5% Subtotal 34 21.8% 
Opposed by churches, ALFA 32 11.4% Appeal to Progressive Principles   
Subtotal 128 45.7% Children/families 17 10.9% 
Appeal to Progressive Principles   Subtotal 17 10.9% 
Regressive/preys on poor 51 18.2% Pragmatism   
Supplants equitable tax system 7 2.5% Only way to fix education (w/o raising 
taxes) 
19 12.2% 
Subtotal 58 20.7% $ going out-of-state 27 17.3% 
Deficient /Risky Plan   Other states' successes 22 14.1% 
Specifics unknown 15 5.3% Subtotal 68 43.6% 
Won't generate enough $ 16 5.7% Progress/Development   
Other plans better 3 1.1% Economic development 10 6.4% 
Could suck $ from budgets 4 1.4% Subtotal 10 6.4% 
Uncertainty about merit 
scholarships 
8 2.9% Classic Campaigning   
Subtotal 46 16.4% Strong voter support 21 7.5% 
Anti-statism   Hypocrisy/scare tactics 6 2.1% 
Big government/tax increases 4 1.4% Subtotal 27 17.3% 
Corruption/power grab 30 10.7%    
Will go to other projects 3 1.1%    
Subtotal 37 13.2%    
Appeal to Self-Interest      
No dog track provisions 2 <1%    
Retail stores not compensated 4 1.4%    
Bad for business 1 <1%    
Subtotal 7 2.5%    
Paternalism      
Don't let people vote on bad policy 1 <1%    
Lottery winners unhappy 3 1.1%    
Subtotal 4 1.4%    
 185 
The Tax Reform Proposal 
 
The tax reform proposal of 2003 also received an enormous amount of media coverage 
due in part to the advocacy of the Governor at the time. Republican Governor Bob 
Riley was a conservative Protestant—a Baptist—who had been influenced by an 
influential thesis written by a law professor completing divinity school in 
Birmingham. The thesis concluded that Alabama‘s regressive tax policy 
fundamentally conflicted with Judeo-Christian moral principles, and suggested that 
political leaders unwilling to seek reform were violating their own ethical principles 
(in effect, a charge of hypocrisy):  
―From [the] biblical texts two broad moral principles of Judeo-Christian 
ethics emerge, which provide a theological foundation for the ethical 
evaluation of the tax structure and funding of the public schools in Alabama. 
These ethical principles forbid the economic oppression of low-income 
Alabamians and require, not only that their basic needs be met, but also that 
they enjoy at least a minimum opportunity to improve their economic 
circumstances and, consequently, their lives‖ (Pace Hamill, 2002). 
 
This charge affected Riley, as did his realization that his Democratic predecessor had 
not been lying about the state‘s dire budgetary straits—government had cut all the 
spending it could and there was still not enough revenue to make ends meet (personal 
communication, 1/14/09). At the same time, a number of influential business leaders 
in the state who had recognized the need, from an economic development standpoint, 
for a more educated workforce saw that their chance to press the issue with the voters 
would be much better under the leadership of a Republican governor (ibid.). Riley and 
his team formulated a proposal for significant and progressive policy reform: by 
reducing the rate of income, sales, and property tax paid by low-income brackets and 
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increasing rates paid by wealthy individuals and corporations, they would raise $1.2 
billion, about half of which would have gone to closing the state‘s deficit and the rest 
to various education initiatives (most significantly, a college scholarship program 
similar to those in neighboring states). The plan called for leaving the new tax dollars 
un-earmarked (Gurwitt, 2003). 
 
The campaign for public opinion followed a similar path as that of Siegelman‘s 
development proposal. In this case, corporate leaders were much more prominently in 
favor of the policy, even sending the president of the Business Council of Alabama to 
head the major support campaign. Allied with the business community‘s customary 
opponents—the Alabama Education Association, the loose coalition of low-income 
advocacy groups led by Alabama Arise—and most Democrats, the pro-reform 
campaign seemed to have the advantage. The opposition was composed of anti-tax 
groups like the Alabama Farmer‘s Federation and the Small Business Association, and 
parts of the conservative Christian community—while the Alabama Christian 
Coalition was a major and prominent opponent, the Baptist umbrella organization 
formally endorsed the reform proposal. How did voters feel prior to their exposure to 
these groups‘ framing of the plan? Data from the May 2003 Capital Survey Research 
Poll (N=593, SME=+/-4%) show that between 50 to 70% of voters supported the plan 
as it had been submitted to the Legislature. Before any specifics were given, 52% 
responded that they would definitely or probably vote for the plan. After specifics 
were given, support for the plan dropped to 49%. Yet by the end of the poll, 70% 
responded that they would definitely or probably vote for the Governor‘s plan to 
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―reform the state, solve the state‘s financial problems, and prevent cuts in education, 
health care, public safety, and other state programs and services‖ (Capital Survey 
Research Poll, May 20-28, 2003). To an open-ended question on why they would vote 
for the plan, 24% said education, 19% said change was needed, 15% said they liked 
the plan, and 12% said money was needed. On why they wouldn‘t vote for it, 27% 
didn‘t like the plan, 19% said they didn‘t understand the plan, and 14% said taxes 
(ibid.) 
 
Analysis of print media coverage from Riley‘s announcement of his plan through the 
vote (Jan. 2002 – Oct. 2003) shows that, in this case, positive messages were 
mentioned more frequently than negative mentions by a margin of 3 to 2. Editorials 
and opinion pieces specifically were far more positive, by a margin of 4 to 3 (75.8% 
positive to 24.2% negative). As with the education lottery proposal, the types of 
messages that the opposition deployed most often appealed to principle rather than 
substance. In particular, the reform plan was presented as a violation of conservative 
economic principles: a typical framing of the issue, here by the former state 
Republican Party chairman, claimed that ―the Republican Party has a few 
cornerstones. One of them is lower taxes, less government. We are taking the wrong 
road. I do not see any difference between the Democrat and Republican party‖ (White, 
2003). The implication that essential principles were at stake was seen in headlines 
like ―Tied in Knots: Fiscal crisis has turned into battle for Alabama's soul‖ (Russakoff, 
2003) and in quotes like this from a Republican lawmaker: ―The party can only be 
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strong if it has a consistent ideology…if this tax plan passes, it will greatly obfuscate 
our ideology, and the party will be weaker‖ (Barrow, 2003). 
 
Opponents also pointed to specific dangers in violating these principles—in particular, 
they claimed that the people were already taxed enough and this type of development 
plan would open the door to increased taxation. They also claimed that such an 
increase in taxation would take money out to the economy and weaken it: a typical 
quote from the Alabama Farmers‘ Federation was ―We want Alabama to move 
forward. We think this tax plan is going to be so heavy and be such a large tax 
increase that it's going to hurt the economy and hold the state back‖ (White, 
2003), and they concluded that voters wouldn‘t approve a tax increase plan. They also 
argued that taxation—even the progressive kind—hurts everyone, because when you 
tax wealthy businesses or people, they will simply pass those increases onto 
consumers. This reifies market processes and implies that people should never try to 
control them. Some allusions to socialism, class warfare, and economic individualism 
were also made.   
 
Anti-statist themes also figured heavily in opponents‘ discourse, especially arguments 
that budget deficits were a result of wasteful spending in Montgomery rather than 
structural flaws in the tax code. Government was also accused of providing misleading 
figures to scare voters: the ―chicken little‖ explanation. The theme of risk and 
uncertainty was also used to point out the flaws in collecting unearmarked revenue: 
the State Republican Chairman said he was ―not a Neanderthal against progress, but 
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he does not trust the Democratic ‗gorilla‘ in the Legislature to properly manage the 
funds that would be generated by Gov. Bob Riley's tax and accountability package. ‗I 
don't trust the Legislature and the teachers‘ union that controls the Legislature…with 
$1.3 billion in unearmarked dollars,‘ he said‖ (Gordon, 2003).   
 
Ostensibly neutral parties, such as churches and religious groups, heavily leaned on 
the theme of risk to excuse themselves from taking a position: as one Baptist pastor 
explained, ―I don't see this as clearly a moral issue that we need to campaign on. I 
agree that there needs to be tax reform.  I don't think there's any question about that. 
The question is whether this proposal here is the best way to do it‖ (Garrison, 2003). 
Part of what is being maintained in such a statement is also the separation between 
church and state; another pastor was quoted in the same article as saying, ―I do not 
foresee preaching a sermon on it. You could preach either for it or against it from the 
Bible, but you have to be careful not to wrap any flag around the cross, because that's 
not where it belongs.‖ Some religious groups (most visibly, the Alabama Christian 
Coalition) did come out clearly against the plan, but tended to frame the issue in 
economically conservative ways.   
 
The direct appeal to self-interest also played a significant and strategic role in the 
opposition‘s rhetoric. Along with the Farmers‘ Federation and Forestry Association, 
the state Small Business Association was a major actor in this framing of the issue, 
and had vocal support from several types of small business owners that themselves 
would have been affected by the tax reform (like landlords and auto-repair shops). 
 190 
Particularly during the last few weeks before the vote, these opponents emphasized the 
harm the plan would visit on small businesses, farmers, homeowners, and consumers; 
for example, ―Officials at Alfa Insurance Companies predicted Wednesday that Gov. 
Bob Riley's tax plan would cause insurance rates to rise, mostly because of a new tax 
on car repairs‖ (Chandler, 2003). The self-interest argument emphasized the plan‘s 
effects on renters and car owners, perhaps in appeal to low-income voters. 
 
Supporters of the plan used many of the same themes to frame tax reform in the 
opposite way—as the Christian choice and a needed investment in the state‘s future. 
The theme of progress and development was deployed most frequently by proponents 
seeking to shape voter preference.  Alabama‘s below-average education system is 
well-known to voters, and reform advocates framed Riley‘s proposal as a major 
overhaul and historic change to this system. They argued that only a change on the 
scale proposed would move Alabama up from its perpetual last-place position in 
student achievement. To wit: ―Riley's plan aims over the next several years to drag 
Alabama from the depths of national rankings by investing in education, such as fully 
funding the acclaimed Alabama Reading Initiative and a similar math, science and 
technology initiative, and creating a college scholarship program for students who 
qualify‖ (Birmingham News Editorial Board, 2003). The state‘s last-place distinction 
in taxation was also highlighted as a barrier to progress; a frequent pro-reform theme 
was Alabama‘s 48th-place ranking in state and local taxes in 2000. Supporters pointed 
to evidence like ―a federal study that showed average farm and timber property taxes 
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in Alabama were $1.25 per acre in 2001, compared to a Southeastern regional average 
of $5.50 and national average of $7 that year‖ (White, 2003). 
 
The economic development theme was mentioned somewhat infrequently given its 
role in convincing major business leaders to call for tax reform. In talks around the 
state, the leadership of Alabama Power (in many ways the most powerful corporation 
in the state) explained that the plan was good for jobs: ―[CEO] Charles McCrary said 
revenue generated by the tax package could help turn around the state's economy 
through economic-development initiatives…‗I tell you that with all of the problems 
we have with the sluggish economy, economic opportunities coupled with the 
competition and problems in education, the old status quo won't work anymore‘‖ 
(Williams, 2003). Support for this argument also came from the much-respected head 
of the Alabama Development Office, who had been instrumental in bringing auto 
manufacturing jobs to the state: ―Alabama's top industry hunter said Monday that his 
office will be ‗neutered‘ if Gov. Bob Riley's tax package fails to pass a Sept. 9 
referendum,‖ (Tomberlin, 2003). But either supporters failed to deploy this theme 
often or newspapers failed to cover it often, because it only showed up in 6.1% of all 
coverage of the pro-reform argument. 
 
Almost as frequently mentioned as ―progress‖ was ―pragmatism.‖ State officials in 
various agencies noted that they would have to make drastic cuts in employment and 
services if the plan failed to pass. The often-repeated figure quoted was a $675 million 
budget shortfall without significant revenue increases. Supporters attempted to 
 192 
illustrate the severity of the state‘s problems by suggesting, for example, that inmates 
might have to be released from prison. They framed the issue as a crisis and a 
structural problem, not just a matter of temporary shortfall; according to a state aide, 
―The message that the governor has been giving to people from Day One, that we have 
a deep, profound, severe financial crisis, is very true‖ (White, 2003). Analogies to 
running a business were sometimes used to show how logical the proposal was; 
according to a Riley spokesperson, ―It is what any businessman would do when taking 
over a company: go in and cut what you can cut, and then identify where we need to 
make the investments to be competitive‖ (Spencer, 2003). 
 
The pragmatism case was often made with the argument that there was no better 
option—that there was no such thing as a ―free lunch.‖ Related to the crisis message 
was an appeal to self-interest. Numerous statistics were quoted to show that most 
taxpayers, especially low-and middle-income taxpayers, would end up paying less 
through reform—but again, this seemingly bulletproof argument was mentioned only 
6.7% of the time. Populist messages appealed to a sense of justice: the state had 
allowed special interests like businesses and corrupt legislators to go on exploiting 
loopholes and avoiding accountability. Problems could be fixed if everyone started to 
pay their fair share. Those who opposed the plan were big businesses that stood to lose 
most in being forced to step up.     
 
But the centerpiece of the pro-reform argument was the appeal to morality—
particularly Christian morality. The tax reform plan received national news coverage 
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in large part because of the incongruity of a conservative, Republican, Baptist 
governor not only calling for a significant tax increase on wealthy individuals and 
corporations but because he said it was the Christian thing to do. A typical claim, 
especially early on in his campaign, was that ―According to our Christian ethics, we're 
supposed to love God, love each other and help take care of the poor. It is immoral to 
charge somebody making $5,000 an income tax‖ (USA Today, 2003). This argument 
tended to be made by Riley or by other ―formally‖ religious laypeople like Susan Pace 
Hamill, a local law professor and divinity student whose M.Div. thesis first called 
attention to the hypocrisy of the state‘s regressive tax system. In a widely-reproduced 
editorial, she reasoned that ―The most compelling reason to vote yes on Sept. 9 is that 
we have no other moral alternative, given that most of us claim the teachings of Jesus 
Christ as the moral compass guiding our lives‖ (Pace Hamill, 2003). More often, 
though, supporters pointed to the regressive nature of the state‘s tax system, with its 
low income threshold and its reliance on sales tax, than to this hypocrisy—a more 
neutral and less emotionally charged argument.    
 
 After exposure to months of positive and negative rhetoric, voter support for the plan 
had dropped considerably. A Birmingham News poll in late July shows that, among 
those with household incomes under $30,000, 58% were against and 27% were for the 
plan. By September 2003, 25.1% of a voter sample surveyed in the Capital Survey 
Research Poll indicated that they would vote to approve the plan and 50.2% said they 
would vote against it; 19% remained undecided. While 55% of voters still believed 
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Table 12: Campaign Rhetorics Deployed For and Against 2003 Tax Reform Proposal 
Opposition Themes Freq % Support Themes Freq % 
Total Mentions 365 40.4% Total Mentions 539 59.6% 
Anti-statism 
  
Appeal to Progressive Principles 
  Wasteful spending in 
Montgomery 63 17.3% Regressive/reduce unfairness 91 16.9% 
Big business/tax break to 
Alabama Power 5 1.4% Un-Christian/immoral 30 5.6% 
Figures are wrong/scare 
tactics/deception 23 6.3% Democracy requires trust in lawmakers 2 0.4% 
Special interests 8 2.2% Child welfare needs 1 <1% 
Subtotal 99 27.1% Subtotal 124 23.0% 
Appeal to Conservative Principles  
 
Reputation 
  Shouldn't punish those who are 
successful 3 <1% Governor is trustworthy/courageous  2.0% 
Tax increase/taxed enough/will 
lead to more 55 15.1% Subtotal 11 2.0% 
Taking $ out of state economy/ 
will weaken 23 6.3% Pragmatism   
Big government/socialist 4 1.1% Fiscal crisis/basic svces underfunded 116 21.5% 
Poor are not gov't responsibility 6 1.6% No "free lunch"/no better choice 13 2.4% 
Violates Rep/conservative 
principles 10 2.7% 
Tax code not able to keep up with 
change over time 2 <1% 
Class warfare 2 <1% Sales taxes too volatile 7 1.3% 
Property rights 3 <1% Will reduce earmarking 10 1.9% 
Economic growth provides school 
$ 2 <1% Counties need home rule 4 <1% 
Supporters not good Christians 3 <1% Subtotal 152 28.2% 
Not involve churches in politics 3 <1% Progress/Development 
  Voters will reject this type of 
policy 25 6.9% Education funding needs 69 12.8% 
Subtotal 129 35.3% 
Progress/AL in last place (in ed., 
taxation, etc.) 52 9.7% 
Appeal to Self-Interest 
  
Economic development/jobs/investing 33 6.1% 
Businesses already too taxed 5 1.4% Antiquated 8 1.5% 
Would hurt small farmers, 
businesses 26 7.1% Subtotal 162 30.1% 
Cuts revenue to counties 2 <1% Appeal to Self-Interest 
  Will hurt homeowners/consumers 9 2.5% Hidden taxes 1 <1% 
Labor/repair taxes 8 2.2% Most taxpayers will be better off 36 6.7% 
Will hurt poor 11 3.0% Quality of life 1 0.2% 
Would cause loss of farmland 2 <1% Subtotal 38 7.1% 
Subtotal 63 17.3% Populism 
  
Uncertainty/Risk 
  
Special interests don't want to pay fair 
share: 14 14 2.6% 
Too complex/indirect costs and 
effects 7 1.9% Business tax loopholes: 11 11 2.0% 
Too much $; too fast 24 6.6% Let the people vote: 13 13 2.4% 
Education hasn't improved with 2 <1% Spending reform/increase 25 4.6% 
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past tax hikes accountability: 25 
Unearmarked/destination 
uncertain 29 8.0% Subtotal 63 11.7% 
Conflicts w/other taxes/budgeting 5 1.4% 
   Subtotal 67 18.4% 
   Classic Campaigning 
     Improper campaign tactics 7 1.9% 
   Subtotal 7 1.9% 
    
 
that Alabama was on the wrong track, 47.1% believed that the reform plan would hurt 
the state and only 7.2% believed it would help; a full 35% believed that failure of the 
plan would make no difference on the state. Even more—59.9%--believed that its 
failure would make no difference on them personally (Capital Survey Research Poll, 
2003).   
 
Of the two-thirds of voters that ultimately rejected the plan in referendum, detailed 
exit polls show that the strongest opposition was reported for the provision to increase 
the state sales tax rate on cars (68%) and the increased assessment of property to 100% 
of its market value (63%). Of the self-reported influences on their voting, 61% agreed 
that were strongly influenced by the argument that the governor had requested more 
than the minimum necessary and 56% were strongly influenced by the argument that 
the Legislature would have too much control over the new revenue. Demographically, 
75% of voters with no more than a high school education voted No, as did 71% of 
rural voters, 72% of those with incomes under $20,000, and 73% of voters who 
described themselves as conservatives. The highest level of support of any 
demographic group (58%) came from the highly educated (graduate or professional 
degree). Most African-Americans supported the plan, but it was not a large majority 
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(55%) (Seroka, 2003). The only published scholarly analysis of the referendum 
results, by Roch & Rushton (2007), found a significantly positive relationship between 
intra-county racial segregation and white opposition and no significant relationship 
between white opposition and county percent black. 
 
Discussion 
 
In both the education lottery and tax reform campaigns, the discourses used by 
opponents and proponents called on some similar ideological themes, but framed them 
in different ways. Despite strong pre-campaign support for both progressive policy 
proposals, opponents were very successful at framing the proposals in a way that 
reduced this initial support; proponents‘ ―frames‖ were ultimately less compelling to 
voters and failed to maintain or increase initial support. In this discussion the 
similarities and differences between these two experiences will be compared with the 
goal of understanding the underlying pattern of cause and effect.  
 
Overall, the findings point to two key similarities: the power of tradition and risk-
aversion, and the symbolic role of ―conservative principles.‖ Although the 
conventional wisdom about the defeats points to voters‘ self-interest—most interview 
subjects as well as post-referenda media analyses concluded that in each case there too 
many different groups that found ways the plans would harm them—it is difficult to 
conclude that Alabamians value their own well-being more than that of the broader 
community. Both plans would have clearly benefited the majority of Alabamians‘ 
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material interests, a point that opponents did not directly dispute so much as skillfully 
dissemble. Conservatives better understood the ways in which voters define ―well-
being‖ and ―community.‖ They were repeatedly able to argue for their ideas in ways 
that both corresponded to and strengthened existing ideologies. At the same time, they 
provided voters with logical excuses for their seemingly illogical choices. Moderates 
missed the mark by failing to gather up and point dominant values in a different 
direction. The defeats are interesting because in both cases, the moderate position was 
expected to be an easy sell; voters have continually voiced strong support for the ideas 
and plans involved but when faced with actual proposals, they choose to stick with 
what they know.   
 
In both policy cases, the proposals were established as risky because they would 
violate principles that were known to be trustworthy guides—principles that had stood 
the test of time.  There is a clear parallel to the state constitution, which modernizers 
since the World War II era have tried to overhaul, to no avail. One of these principles 
is the need to strictly limit government. Given more free rein, government would 
inevitably turn to corruption, waste, and mismanagement. This is axiomatic in 
Alabama, so it seems not to matter what the actual circumstances are. The moderate 
business community had wrongly assumed that if people heard from a conservative 
Republican governor (Riley) that the state had a revenue crisis, they would see the 
need for an exception to the anti-statist principle. Belief in the principle proved 
stronger—after all, voters had decades more collective experience with corruption 
than with Riley.   
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Another time-tested principle is to maintain a friendly climate for business. The state‘s 
economy relies so much, practically and in the popular imagination, on out-of-state 
businesses that there is strong resistance to raising taxes and ―scaring them away.‖ Of 
course, one of the major reasons the tax reform plan had the support it did have was 
precisely because the business community realized the state‘s low taxes were creating 
a disadvantage in the regional competition for investment. Maintaining a business-
friendly climate is not just a practical goal though; it is a principle—a powerful 
ideology that can be referenced through symbol alone. For example, the Alabama 
Farmers‘ Federation‘s monthly newsletter Neighbors featured a picture of the hammer 
and sickle above anti-reform editorials during the tax reform campaign period. Such a 
powerful symbol suggests to Alabama voters that important principles are at stake and 
probably made the substance of the anti-reform argument more compelling. The 
critical role of symbols in politics has been well-documented by social scientists 
(Edelman, 1994). 
 
Another established principle in Alabama is to keep social and political change slow 
and incremental. It‘s one of the reasons an extremely inefficient system of 
policymaking—the constitutional amendment procedure that requires a statewide vote 
for the passage of most legislation, no matter how mundane or local—remains in 
place. And, it helps explain why even the most obvious updates to that document—
like removing segregation-era wording requiring separate schools for ―white and 
colored children‖—are so difficult to make; a recent attempt in 2004 failed in 
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statewide referendum (Roig-Franzia, 2004). Opponents of the tax reform plan were 
calling on this principle when they argued that it would be ―too much, too fast;‖ this 
message, which was deployed especially toward the run-up to the vote, reminded 
voters of the risk associated with major change. It would be tempting to point to the 
state‘s past experience with major socio-political change—the Civil Rights Era, but 
this is a simplistic explanation; Alabamians‘ risk aversion is probably related to 
ongoing cultural work by politicians more than it is associated with any particular 
experience from history.  
 
The same principles are embedded in the state constitution, through earmarking 
provisions, the regressive tax code, and the constitutional amendment procedure. 
Violating these principles was skillfully equated with ―letting the camel‘s nose under 
the tent‖ (Rabb, 1999) and potentially opening up a Pandora‘s box of unknowns.  
Once the proposals had been framed as risky, opponents needed very little empirical 
evidence of who exactly would be harmed and how much. But the evidence they did 
provide gave voters ―logical‖ reasons to object—the sales tax on repairs to their cars 
would be an undue burden, the lottery would sanction gambling, the scholarships 
provided wouldn‘t be available to Pell grant recipients. Moreover, constant statewide 
voting for local amendments may put voters in the habit of voting no by default. The 
risk of making major changes to bedrock, time-tested principles appeared to outweigh 
the objective facts of individual and state benefit that would come from the lottery and 
the tax reform.  
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However, some counterfactuals suggest this explanation of voter motivation is not 
complete. For example, Alabamians are very supportive of the capital subsidy 
economic model which has involved considerable risk-taking over the past 2 decades. 
Attracting Mercedes to the state in 1993 required a $253 million incentive package for 
1,900 jobs and no guarantees from the company about its long-term commitment to 
the state. Attracting Honda in 1999 required a $158 million package for 1,500 jobs, 
despite calculations that it would take 20 years before the state breaks even on its 
investment (Site Selection, 1999). Steel manufacturer ThyssenKrupp got an $811 
million deal (directly approved by voters in a 2007 referendum over the use of 
bonding to pay for it) and a 30-year tax holiday. If risk-aversion guides Alabamians‘ 
choices about socio-economic policy, why were these much riskier proposals 
supported?   
 
Another important counterfactual is that many states in the region share a pro-business 
orientation yet, as shown in Chapter 2, many have also found a balanced approach to 
growth and development that doesn‘t pit the needs of business against the needs of 
people. Shafer & Johnston (2006) and others have a strong basis on which to conclude 
that pragmatic economic needs now tend to trump other traditional rationalities in the 
South. This makes sense because, as theorists from Block to Molotch to Domhoff have 
explained, the logic of growth is fundamentally pragmatic. When capital accumulation 
becomes unbalanced, it begins to threaten growth; economic elites concede to 
redistribution out of their own self-interest. In Alabama, pragmatic elites recognized 
this—so much so that they were the core of support for these redistributive policy 
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proposals. Yet most voters (along with conservative elites and their political sponsors) 
were swayed by principle, not pragmatism. The previous chapter has suggested and 
this chapter will emphasize that pro-business culture in Alabama is distinct in the 
region, because it is fundamentally ideological rather than pragmatic.   
 
One might expect as Susan Pace Hamill and Bob Riley did that, like economic 
pragmatism, religious values would persuade voters to support balanced development 
policies. Instead, as content analysis shows, religion—particularly conservative 
Protestantism—can be manipulated to serve a broader conservative ideology. 
Religious arguments were deployed to deflect the education lottery and then 
abandoned in order to withhold support for tax reform. Opponents called the lottery 
―regressive,‖ ―immoral,‖ and a ―sin‖ and voters agreed; a few short years later, 
supporters of tax reform tried to appeal to the same morality by claiming it was ―un-
Christian‖ not to do anything about the state‘s abysmal education system and lack of 
opportunities for working and low-income people. Here, voters turned their back on 
the morality appeal and most religious leaders demurred, claiming that policy was not 
a matter for them to comment or counsel on. 
 
This is an interesting and possibly rare look at the cracks that form in the decades-old 
alliance between conservative religious and economic principles in the South when its 
fundamental hypocrisy is brought to light. ―Christian‖ values, as Hamill and Riley 
pointed out, share more with a progressive socio-economic policy than with 
Alabama‘s regressive approach to development. Yet, the dominant religious culture in 
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the state (conservative Protestantism) not only rejects progressive policy proposals but 
twists its ―moral‖ rationale in an opportunistic way to avoid them.  In this way, 
religious values are used to serve economic principles. Perhaps this explains why 
evangelical Protestantism was strongly linked to opposition—because its theology 
rationalizes anti-statism. As one pastor explained during the tax reform debate, 
―Baptist belief holds every individual believer accountable for his or her own actions.  
There is no priest/pastor intermediary, nor ecclesiastical body to order, authorize or 
mandate action.  Every Baptist and every Baptist congregation is autonomous‖ 
(Brymer, 2003). 
 
From this perspective, supporters made many miscalculations in their campaign for 
public support. They took Alabama voters at face value, appealing to the pragmatism 
of a pro-business culture and the morality of a religious culture. They did not 
understand that an ideological opposition to taxes, special treatment for low-income 
groups, and regulation of market processes was likely to overcome pragmatic and 
moral considerations for most voters. They did not understand that their natural base 
of support, economically progressive voters (especially African Americans), were 
probably still swayed by suggestions of risk at the hands of government. As an 
influential Democratic state senator explained during the tax reform debate, ―Black 
people in particular and poor people in general have always been very suspicious 
when somebody in Montgomery says, ‗I‘m going to help you,‘ because usually in the 
end we get ripped off‖ (Russakoff, 2003).   
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Supporters made strategic mistakes in framing the issues; their early call to ―let the 
people vote‖ during the Legislature‘s deliberations may have wasted opportunities to 
frame the proposals substantively. Supporters of Riley‘s plan, eager to show how they 
were going to resolve the state‘s fiscal crisis, emphasized the proposed tax increases 
more than reduction for most payers or tax reform in general. Indeed, the majority of 
local news articles and editorials referred to the two sides as ―pro-tax‖ and ―anti-tax‖ 
rather than pro-reform and anti-reform. This was probably unintentional among 
supporters but likely had a huge effect. Where they did emphasize reductions, they 
overstated the benefits for low-income groups vis-à-vis the middle class. This 
rhetorical focus on regressivity pits low-income groups against everyone else—an 
unpersuasive appeal since most Americans believe they are middle-class (Alesina & 
La Ferrara, 2004). Supporters should have pitched the plan as a fight for the middle-
class against wealthy and out-of-state landholders and corporations, but as one 
interview subject noted, the leaders of the pro-reform campaign—the business 
community—were unwilling to do so.        
       
That said, one could still make the argument that both of these plans were overly 
flawed from the perspective of the self-interested voter. For example, low-income 
voters may prefer their tax contributions be paid through sales tax for various reasons; 
according to one community leader in the Black Belt, ―poor people tend to like the 
sales tax, because they pay it in small increments. And so they may reject change as an 
effort to make them pay more‖ (Murray, 2003). And without a better case made for the 
economic development benefits of these plans, why should middle-class voters have 
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cared that the poor would be helped through lower taxes or better educational 
opportunities? It makes sense as well that people in rural counties (where 
landownership may be more concentrated) would have rejected the tax reform plan 
because of its proposed increase on property taxes.    
 
Understanding the ways that powerful actors frame policy issues is more useful if it‘s 
clear how and why these frames resonate with their audience. The next chapter aims to 
resolve this question of voters‘ responses. Although elites portrayed the policy 
proposals in pragmatic vs. ideological terms, did voters see things the same way? And, 
what happened to the role of racial bias in voters‘ opposition to redistributive 
development plans? Analysis of the public discourse does not reveal much reference 
to race; were coded messages being used or did interview subjects make too much of 
racialization in Alabama? If ―the end of Southern exceptionalism‖ applies to Alabama 
as well as its neighbors, both Blacks and Whites will respond to development policy 
proposals not ideologically, but pragmatically and on the basis of self-interest.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS OF VOTING 
 
Introduction 
 
The goal in this chapter is to test whether elements of a conservative ―mental model‖ 
that appears to have institutional form in the state constitution and that elite opponents 
deploy in public discourse are associated with voter opposition to the proposals. As 
explored in the previous chapters, a constellation of related values—anti-statism, 
religious morality, racial bias, individualism, risk aversion, traditionalism—all appear 
to shape local culture. It is difficult to separate these into discrete variables with 
separate effects because they interact, resulting in an overall ideological mix or mental 
model that tends to guide behavior in a patterned way. This study has proposed that 
Alabama is different from many of its neighbors because the dominant mental model 
is ―ideologically conservative‖ rather than ―pragmatically conservative.‖ Balanced 
development policies may be rejected not on their merits but because they violate 
some type of principle or tradition. This study suggests that class actors manipulate 
voters‘ interests by framing such policies in certain ways guaranteed to get an 
ideological reaction, with the goal of serving class goals like limited government.   
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Understanding the ways that powerful actors frame policy issues is more useful if it‘s 
clear how and why these frames resonate with their audience. Respected non-partisan 
groups had agreed that both of the development policies used as cases in this study 
would have been better for the state‘s overall economic health; from a pragmatic 
perspective, there was little reason to reject them. Not only had the state‘s (ostensibly) 
brightest policy minds crafted, consulted on, and tweaked the two major policies 
before putting them to a vote; as of 1999, 37 other states had education lotteries
11
 
(Bobbitt, 2005) and as of 2001, Alabama had the lowest tax revenue in the U.S.—68% 
of the national average, on a per capita basis, with every state in the southeast boasting 
a large tax revenue advantage over Alabama
12
 (PARCA, 2001, 2009). It was certainly 
made clear to voters that these legislative changes would not be novel or untested. 
Accordingly, elites would have had to convince voters that supporting the policy(ies) 
would be worse for them personally and concretely, or would be a violation of abstract 
principles.   
 
Voting preferences based in self-interest would provide evidence for a pluralist 
understanding of power in Alabama‘s development policymaking process. Voting 
preferences based in ideology would provide more evidence for class dominance. 
Chapter 4 has shown that elites framed the policies in both ways but emphasized 
ideology and principles. Statistical analysis will show which frame actually did 
persuade voters by establishing relationships between opposition and certain 
demographic characteristics like religious adherence, risk aversion, and race. If 
                                               
11 By 2009, the figure climbed to 42. 
12 These figures were the same in 2008. 
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opposition was more likely to come from voters who had self-interested reasons to 
oppose the policies, such as people in wealthy counties who would be taxed 
proportionately more or people in older counties with fewer school-aged children to 
benefit from increased state support of education, it will be taken as evidence that a 
class-dominance model of power is not the best fit for these data. If opposition was 
more likely to come from voters in counties with ostensibly less material interest in 
doing so, such as counties with more low-income voters or African American voters, it 
will be taken as potentially supporting evidence for class dominance and the 
manipulation of interests. Testing for disproportionate opposition from groups that 
might have ideological reasons to oppose the policies (based on the ways they were 
framed by opponents) will be taken as stronger evidence for class dominance. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
A secondary analysis was conducted using data from a multiple sources. The two 
dependent variables were collected from the Alabama Secretary of State and captured 
county-level voter opposition on the two statewide referenda. While vote outcome 
percentages at the voting-district level were also available, no other relevant 
independent variables at that level were available so the analysis focused on counties 
and the characteristics of their populations. Thus, any conclusions drawn about voter 
preferences are actually being drawn about the types of people that are more likely to 
live in certain counties. A county with a greater population of a certain subgroup may 
create the context for a particular voting preference to form, but does not necessarily 
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mean the members of that subgroup express those preferences. The well-known 
example would be primarily African American counties and Democratic voting: the 
two characteristics are positively correlated but without individual-level data, it cannot 
be inferred that African American residents are more likely to vote Democratic than 
other residents in the county. Nonetheless, as King (1997) notes, researchers in many 
fields of academic inquiry as well as policymakers, marketers, epidemiologists, and so 
on ―routinely try to make inferences about the attributes of individual behavior from 
aggregate data‖ (5). For the most part, this chapter will do the same, although 
estimation of subgroup voting preferences will be constructed for race. The problems 
presented by ecological inference will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
 The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)‘s ―County 
Characteristics 2000-2007‖ dataset was the main source of independent variables used. 
It contains aggregate county-level data on resident characteristics such as race, age, 
income, education, and other demographic variables that were in some cases recoded 
from 2000 Census data. Further details of the methodology are available online at 
www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb. Most of the variables were from 2000, the year for 
which most county-level data were available. Socio-economic data that were expected 
to change somewhat more rapidly (population growth, unemployment rate and median 
household income) were manually added for the vote years from both the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and from the Census. Data on religious adherence were collected 
from the Association of Religion Data Archives‘ ―Religious Congregations and 
Membership Study, 2000‖ (Counties File); details of the methodology are available 
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online at www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCMSCY.asp. The Odum 
Institute for Research in Social Science‘s ―Southern Focus Poll‖ was explored as a 
potential source of attitudinal variables, but the N for Alabama was too small for 
results to be significant.   
 
County-level voter opposition on the two statewide referenda were the two separate 
outcomes analyzed here. The raw data, available as the number of ―no‖ votes cast in 
each county, was recalculated into weighted percentages based on the proportion each 
county contributed to total statewide opposition levels. For Models 1C and 2C, a more 
sophisticated method was used to convert the raw vote data into percentage opposition 
by racial group.  
 
To examine the distributional properties of variables, univariate analysis was used. To 
examine the relationships between predictors and outcomes, bivariate analyses were 
conducted and then used to inform full modeling via multivariate analysis. Bivariate 
analyses tested, via OLS regression, all the theoretically relevant independent 
variables; those with p-values less than .200 were included in full models. This 
somewhat high p-value is used as a criterion for inclusion because it has greater 
sensitivity to possible interactions (Frongillo, 2004). Bivariate correlations revealed 
whether any of the significant predictors were multicollinear variables (Pearson‘s 
correlation > .800) and these were removed where appropriate. Spatial analysis was 
also incorporated for Models 1A and 2A to assess and address spatial error in 
multivariate modeling. 
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Measures 
 
Based on the ways that opponents framed the proposals in their public dialogue, one 
would expect voter opposition to vary based on voters‘ receptivity to these frames. 
Opponents tied both proposals mostly to self-interest (i.e., ―vote no because your 
vehicle taxes will be raised‖) or to a handful of connected conservative principles like 
anti-statism, religious morality, and risk aversion (i.e., ―vote no so we don‘t give 
government more power,‖ ―vote no so we don‘t let the camel‘s nose under the tent,‖ 
etc.). Opponents did not mention racial motives for voting a certain way, but interview 
data had suggested that race matters in Alabama (i.e., ―vote no so government doesn‘t 
redistribute ―our‖ money, ―vote no so people don‘t start to think they can get 
something for nothing‖). Voters who would be more likely to have one of these values 
based on some demographic characteristic of their county of residence were identified. 
Regressing ―no‖ votes on these characteristics would reveal their predictive strength 
and confirm whether the previous chapters accurately identified what is important to 
Alabamians.   
 
Voters who might be more receptive to the self-interest frame might be wealthier in 
the case of the tax reform proposal, because their higher tax brackets would mean 
proportionately more property taxation (which was an important part of the policy 
plan). Counties with higher median incomes would therefore be more likely to oppose 
the tax reform—but not the lottery, because as a form of sumptuary tax, contributions 
would be ―voluntary.‖ Opposition to the tax reform plan for reasons of self-interest 
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might also be seen among older voters, i.e. those without school-aged children, but 
again no self-interested opposition would be expected for the lottery. If opposition was 
strongest among these types of counties, it would be evidence that these balanced 
development policies failed on their merits—a pluralist explanation for voting 
behavior. Geographically, the wealthier counties in both 1999 and 2003 were located 
in the northern and western halves of the state (Figure 4 illustrates the 1999 data), with 
the wealthiest also the most urban (e.g., Huntsville-Madison County in the north, 
Birmingham-Jefferson County in the middle, Mobile-Mobile County in the south). 
The ―older‖ counties are in the southeast ―Wiregrass‖ region and the northwest, with 
the greatest concentration of school-aged children in a cluster in the middle west of the 
state (Figure 5). This cluster coincides with the Black Belt somewhat, but not entirely.  
 
Voters who would be expected to support the proposals because of self-interest might 
be middle- or lower-income, might have school-aged children, or might live in rural or 
depressed areas. If counties with lower median household incomes, higher proportions 
of school-aged children, lower population densities, or higher unemployment levels 
are more likely to oppose the policies it could be evidence that people were voting 
against their own interests. It wouldn‘t necessarily be evidence of ideological voting 
but would be evidence that self-interest voting was probably not happening, calling 
into question the pluralism explanation.  
 
Voters who responded to the ideological framings of these policies might reside in 
places with any of the above characteristics, but they would have some other 
 213 
Figure 4: Median Income, 1999                                  Figure 5: Percent Age 0-14 
                   
 
characteristics too. Moral and religious themes were frequently used to drum up 
opposition for the lottery proposal, mostly by those who perceived gambling as a sin 
but also by those who argued that a lottery would prey on the poor and would supplant 
a morally responsible tax system. Often church opposition alone was cited as a 
rationale for voters to say ―no,‖ apparently because religious organizations are such a 
trusted source of authority. Morality and religion were tools used to encourage both 
opposition and support for the tax reform plan. Some religious leaders, such as the 
Alabama Christian Coalition and some churches, argued against the plan but didn‘t 
provide specifically religious reasons for opposing it. Often these groups claimed the 
plan would be yet another instance of over-taxation, power grabbing, and wasteful 
Legend: 
$16,646-27,177 
$27,177-35,962 
$35,962-55,440 
Legend: 
19-20% 
20-22% 
22-25% 
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spending by government. In Chapter 4, such connections between conservative 
religious and economic ideologies were anticipated.   
 
On the other hand, supporters like Governor Riley strongly argued for the plan on 
―Christian‖ grounds. Because religion was appropriated for such a variety of 
arguments, it‘s unclear how strong the relationship between opposition and county-
level religious adherence was. Interview data suggested, not surprisingly, that religious 
opposition was key to the lottery‘s defeat but its effect on the tax reform‘s defeat 
remain to be seen. Empirically, some non-Evangelical religious groups such as Greater 
Birmingham Ministries (an interfaith coalition for social justice begun by the United 
Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church and the United Presbyterian Church in the 
Birmingham area) were strong supporters of the tax reform plan, and support other 
ongoing progressive policy goals such as constitutional reform, affordable housing, 
and public transportation (Greater Birmingham Ministries, 2010). However, this 
particular religious group seems to be an outlier and its policy preferences should not 
be understood as representative of all non-Evangelical religious groups. As for 
Evangelical Protestants have generally not been among the leadership advancing such 
goals, and tend to focus their advocacy efforts on charity and mission work (Southern 
Baptist Convention, 2012)
13
. Counties with more Evangelical Protestants are 
theoretically expected to express greater opposition to the lottery because of their 
more conservative understanding of ―sin‖ and ―morality,‖ but not necessarily to the 
                                               
13 The Association of Religion Data Archives follows precedent by categorizing conservative 
Protestants, including Baptists, into an ―Evangelical Protestant‖ category (see Manza & Brooks, 1997: 
47 for further discussion).  
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tax reform because of supporters‘ markedly ―Christian‖ arguments for that policy. In 
terms of geographic distribution, the most and least ―religious‖ counties are evenly 
distributed throughout the state; a pattern is hard to discern from Figure 6. County-
level concentrations of Evangelical Protestants in 2000 are displayed in Figure 7 
below; the southeast Wiregrass region and the northwest were most Evangelical while 
the middle region including the Black Belt was least Evangelical.  
 
No attitudinal variables were available to directly measure economic conservatism or 
the tax-averse, anti-statist mentality through which it is often manifested in Alabama, 
but voting in presidential elections is often used to approximate ideology. Here, living 
in a county that votes more Democratic is expected to be negatively associated with 
opposition to the two policy proposals. Not surprisingly, voting Democratic in the US 
is positively correlated with having a liberal or progressive ideology, but as a recent 
Gallup Poll report notes, the two political preferences should not be conflated:  
While Americans' party identification and political ideology are related, they 
are by no means one and the same. For instance, while residents of Alabama 
and Mississippi are the most likely to be conservative ideologically, they are 
not the most Republican in their party affiliation (Saad, 2009). 
 
The explanation for this divergence between party and ideology has a historical basis 
in Alabama. Prior to the Civil War, the Democratic Party was generally made up of 
small farmers, merchants, and laborers who were concerned with maintaining 
individual rights and opposing strong centralized government. Reconstruction brought 
freed blacks into the anti-slavery Republican Party, leading the state‘s traditional 
Democrats to appeal to white voters on the basis of racial unity. These efforts led to 
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Figure 6: Percent Religious Adherents                  Figure 7: Percent Evangelical Protestants 
                  
 
nearly a hundred years of Democratic control over Alabama, despite a major challenge 
during the Populist era. Democrats in Alabama, as in the rest of the Southeast, 
consolidated their power through the development of one-party politics, which helped 
contain and control political divisions within the state and region and maintain power 
vis-à-vis the federal government (Cotter, 2008).  
 
Although the Democratic Party in Alabama was long associated with white 
supremacy, the turn among national Democrats to liberalism and civil rights and the 
national Republican Party‘s nomination of Barry Goldwater in the 60s began to turn 
conservative Alabamians toward the Republican Party. Today, the state's African 
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79-95% 
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American voters are almost entirely Democratic, while among white Alabamians, 
women, less-educated, and lower-income voters are more likely than others to be 
Democrats (ibid.). While Democrats in Alabama are still more ―conservative‖ than 
Democrats in many other parts of the country, they are more liberal on social and 
economic issues than their Republican counterparts (and thus more likely to favor 
progressive development policies). Figures 8 and 9 show that the counties that 
supported the Democrats most in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were 
located, not surprisingly, in the Black Belt. Despite the historical tendency for the 
northern and southeastern counties to skew more progressive, neither of these regions 
was particularly supportive of the Democrats in recent years.  
 
Personal receipts from government might be similarly associated, since people in 
counties relying on a lot of help from government (for Medicare, or veterans‘ benefits, 
or unemployment insurance, etc.) might be more apt to see government as an ally and 
a resource, which is the perspective that lottery and tax reform supporters were 
appealing to. Another possible proxy variable for ideology would be farm 
employment. Because the Alabama Farmers‘ Federation is one of the most politically 
active conservative groups, counties with more farm employment would be positively 
associated with opposition if ideology was a main motivator. Farm employment is 
measured by the absolute number rather than the percentage of total employment, 
because the latter can be skewed by poorer and less developed counties. 
Geographically, clustering of high farm-employment counties is found in the far north 
and coastal counties.   
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Figure 8: Percent Voting Democratic, 2000         Figure 9: Percent Voting Democratic, 2004 
              
 
Finally, although the previous chapter‘s analysis did not directly indicate that racial 
bias played a role in creating opposition, interviews with key informants had 
suggested that race had important ideological effects in Alabama, in that the dominant 
culture tended to equate government with redistribution of resources from the 
―deserving‖ to the ―undeserving.‖ Since Whites are the majority in Alabama and 
Blacks tend to struggle much more economically, race is bound up in feelings about 
the role of government and taxation. Thus, in an ideological voting situation, counties 
with more White voters would be expected to opposed the balanced development 
policies at increased rates. A negative relationship would be expected for counties 
Legend: 
21-34% 
37-57% 
57-88% 
Legend: 
18-34% 
34-50% 
50-83% 
 219 
with more Black voters, but since Percent White = 1 – Percent Black, only the former 
is used in regression analyses.  
Figure 10: Farm Employment 
 
 
Control variables are included because they likely have some effect on opposition, 
although the precise nature of each effect is not specified. Variables like the county 
proportion of male residents, personal receipt of government transfers, population 
growth (measured over the five years during which the vote took place), proportion of 
Hispanic residents, and educational attainment are theoretically correlated with 
economic dynamism, feelings about government redistribution and/or the importance 
of education, and openness to change and risk-taking, policies that aim to increase the 
redistributive role of the state. 
Legend: 
216-732 persons 
732-1335 persons 
1335-3001 persons 
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Figure 11: Percent White 
 
Table 13: Expected Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables 
Type of Evidence Independent Variable 
(County-Level) 
Relationship to 
Lottery Opposition 
Relationship to Tax 
Reform Opposition 
For Self-Interest 
Explanation 
High Median Household 
Income 
n.s. + 
% Aged 65+ n.s. + 
Against Self-Interest 
Explanation 
Low Median Household 
Income 
- - 
% Aged 0-14 + + 
Population Density - - 
Unemployment Rate + + 
For Ideological 
Explanation 
% Religious Adherents + +/- 
% Evangelical Protestant 
Adherents 
+ +/- 
Farm Employment + + 
Personal Receipts from 
Government 
- - 
% Voting Democratic - - 
For Racial 
Explanation 
% Population Black - - 
% Population White + + 
Control Variables 
% Population Male n.s. n.s. 
Population Growth n.s. n.s. 
% Hispanic n.s. n.s. 
% Bachelor‘s Degree n.s. n.s. 
Legend: 
18-34% 
34-50% 
50-83% 
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Results 
 
Overall, the evidence does suggest, and strongly so, that race plays an important role 
in shaping voter preference for the capital subsidy model of economic development. 
The evidence also suggests that ideology plays a greater role than self-interest. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables and the thirteen hypothesized 
predictor variables are presented in Table 2. Histograms showed that both dependent 
variables were slightly skewed to the right (toward greater opposition). With 67 cases, 
54% of voters in the average county opposed the education lottery proposal; the 
average county opposed the tax reform proposal by almost two-to-one. As for the 
independent variables, the table shows that religious adherence is high in Alabama, 
with the (unweighted) county mean about 72%. Adherence is defined as regularly 
attending services or otherwise participating in a congregation (ARDA, 2002). These 
congregations were grouped into six main categories: Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, 
Mainline Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Orthodox. Total religious adherents are the 
sum of all congregations reporting adherents out of the county‘s total population less 
children 13 and under. Evangelical Protestant adherence is high as well (about 41% of 
all residents). The rate of Bachelor‘s Degree or greater educational attainment is low, 
about 14%. The mean rate of population growth increased between the two votes, 
from about 5% to about 7%. On average there are slightly fewer men than women 
across the 67 counties. The mean proportion of Whites was about 70% and the mean 
proportion of Hispanics was 2%. The mean unemployment rate was 5.99% in 1999 
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and 6.41% in 2003; median household income was $30,152 in 1999 and $31,606 in 
2003. The average amount per county of people employed in farming either part-time 
and full-time was 871 per county. Less than half of voters chose the Democratic 
candidate in 2000, and even fewer did so in 2004.  
 
Table 14: Variable Descriptive Statistics (2000) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
Education Lottery, % Voting No 54.18 7.31 
Tax Reform, % Voting No (2003) 66.87 10.99 
Education Lottery, % White Voting No 61.20 12.32 
Tax Reform, % White Voting No (2003) 54.46 14.14 
Independent Variables 
% Religious Adherents 72.25 12.40 
% Evangelical Protestant Adherents 41.65 13.06 
Farm Employment (FT+PT) 871.31 561.17 
Population Density per sq. mile 83.46 96.19 
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t (x.01) 2347.20 3634.00 
Median Household Income (x.01) (1999) 301.52 63.80 
Median Household Income (x.01) (2003) 316.06 68.70 
Unemployment Rate (1999) 5.99 2.73 
Unemployment Rate (2003) 6.41 1.74 
% Hispanic 1.59 1.30 
% Population Growth (‗95-‗00) 4.85  6.99 
% Population Growth (‘00-‘05) .81 5.41 
% Bachelor‘s Degree or Higher 13.49 6.32 
% Aged 65+ 13.86 1.98 
% Aged 0-14 21.09  1.62 
% Population Male 48.52 1.98 
% Population White 69.33 21.53 
% Voting Democratic (2000) 43.99 13.31 
% Voting Democratic (2004) 38.75 12.52 
 
Maps of county-level voting (broken up into 3 ―levels‖ of opposition strength) suggest 
a significant spatial autocorrelation effect—that is, counties are clustered 
geographically in their opposition, meaning a violation of the assumption of 
independent errors in OLS regression. Figures 12 and 13 below visually display 
county-level opposition to each policy proposal. Although the levels of opposition 
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differ, the maps show that the northern part of the state, particularly the northwest, 
tended to be more opposed to both policies while the band of Black Belt counties in 
the lower-middle part of the state tended to be less opposed to both. The southern part 
of the state clustered in stronger opposition to the lottery than to tax reform, vis-à-vis 
the rest of the state.  
 
What geographical features might explain these clustering effects? As noted above, 
the northern counties and the Wiregrass region in the southern tier of the state were 
historically more progressive (Cotter, 2008) than the middle band encompassing the 
Black Belt and the cities of Birmingham and Montgomery, but these preferences don‘t 
seem to hold up today. Visual inspection of the county-level concentrations of racial 
subgroups (Figure 11) suggests that racial clustering appears more strongly correlated 
to policy preferences today: the Black Belt‘s greater concentration of African 
Americans, and North Alabama‘s lower concentration of African Americans, has 
probably contributed to regional difference in opposition to these progressive policies. 
Lower opposition in the eastern part of Alabama might be due to proximity to 
Georgia, which is somewhat more progressive in its development policies than 
Mississippi to the west (as has been discussed in Chapter 2). Georgia also has a 
successful education lottery which many eastern Alabamians play.  
 
Bivariate analyses of the relationships between the lottery vote and the individual 
predictors (displayed in Table 15) show that the Racial explanation is strongest by a 
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wide margin. The single variable associated with the Racial explanation (Percent 
White) was the strongest predictor (β=.747). Since Whites did not have any greater 
 
Figure 12: Education Lottery, % Voting No             Figure 13: Tax Reform, % Voting No 
                   
 
self-interested reason to oppose the lottery than Blacks (unless they tended to be 
wealthier or older, which can be assessed through multivariate analysis), the strength 
of this predictor suggests that race does have important ideological effects in Alabama. 
Moreover, the greater the concentration of Whites, the more opposition there was to 
the balanced development proposal. The Ideological explanation also appears to have 
some merit; as expected Percent Evangelical Protestants (β=.752) and Farm 
Employment (β=.304) were both positively associated with opposition, and Personal 
Legend: 
24-41% 
41-56% 
56-72% 
Legend: 
29-50% 
50-73% 
73-87% 
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Receipts from Government and Percent Voting Democratic were negatively 
associated. The results also suggest that counties with more linkage into the Alabama 
Farmers‘ Federation network were somewhat more opposed to the lottery, perhaps (as 
has been suggested) because this organization is strongly conservative. Its leaders 
opposed the lottery on anti-statist grounds, suggesting that the state of Alabama would 
squander or misuse any revenue generated by the lottery. However, Percent Religious 
Adherents was negatively associated with opposition (β=-.246), which is the opposite 
of what was expected. This suggests that religious values in general did not defeat the 
lottery proposal—it was specifically Evangelical values, which are more conservative 
and as Chapter 4 suggested, associated with economically conservative ideology as 
well.   
 
Surprisingly, although ideological voting implies potential conflicts with self-interest, 
the regression results indicate that people were also voting in accordance with their 
self-interest. Counties with lower income, more school-aged children, and more 
unemployment were less opposed to the measure. It‘s likely that these counties made 
up the support base for the lottery plan—after all, about 46% of Alabamians did 
support it. Still, the relative strength of these relationships compared to that of Percent 
White, Percent Voting Democratic, and Percent Evangelical Protestants suggests that 
even in lower income counties and so on, a higher percentage of Democrats, Whites, 
and/or of Evangelicals would decrease county levels of support. These identities trump 
self-interest, although self-interest still matters. 
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As for the control variables, the proportion of male residents was associated with 
greater opposition. This may be an indicator of economic dynamism, since counties 
with more men may have more jobs (and less interest in policies for long-term, 
human-capital-led development); or it may be an indicator of population age, since 
counties with more women tend to be older overall (and less interested in supporting 
public education). However, the percent of residents aged 65 and older was not 
associated with opposition, so the former explanation is probably more accurate. 
Counties with more Hispanic residents were more likely to oppose the measure; 
scatterplotting shows that the relationship is actually curvilinear perhaps because 
counties with more Hispanic residents may also be wealthier. Population growth had a 
positive effect, which was also an unexpected result, but scatterplotting also suggests 
that this relationship is curvilinear—up to a certain rate of growth, greater influx of 
newcomers increases opposition to the proposal. Voters‘ education level (Percent 
Bachelors‘ Degree and Higher) had a negative effect—more educated voters were less 
likely to oppose the lottery.  
 
All of the variables that were significant at p<.200 were tested for multicollinearity in 
bivariate correlation matrices (see Appendix B). Where Pearson‘s correlation<.800, 
multicollinearity was diagnosed and the weaker predictor variable removed from 
multivariate analysis. Both population density and personal receipts from government 
were strongly correlated with voting against the lottery and with each other; since the 
DV is weighted by population, proxies for population are bound to be highly 
correlated. To address this problem, both IVs were removed from multivariate 
 227 
Table 15: Bivariate Regression Analysis of Voting No, Education Lottery 
Variable (N=67) Expected Relationship* Beta T Sig. 
 ASIE FIE FRE    
Median Household Income - n.s. n.s. .308 3.206 .002 
% Aged 65+ n.s. n.s. n.s. .103 1.021 .310 
% Aged 0-14 + n.s. n.s. -.261 -2.672 .009 
Population Density - n.s. n.s. -.431 -4.733 .000 
Unemployment Rate + n.s. n.s. -.027 -.272 .786 
% Religious Adherents n.s. + n.s. -.246 -2.513 .014 
% Evangelical Adherents n.s. + n.s. .567 6.814 .000 
% Voting Democratic n.s. - n.s. -.731 -10.617 .000 
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t n.s. - n.s. -.407 -4.408 .000 
Farm Employment n.s. + n.s. .278 2.865 .005 
% Population White n.s. n.s. + .747 11.115 .000 
% Population Male n.s. n.s. n.s. .387 4.157 .000 
% Population Growth (95-00) n.s. n.s. n.s. .443 4.896 .000 
% Hispanic n.s. n.s. n.s. .227 2.307 .023 
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ n.s. n.s. n.s. -.264 -2.710 .008 
 
analysis. The strongest predictor in bivariate analysis, Percent White, was 
multicollinear with Democratic voting, so the latter variable was removed. Percent 
White and Percent Evangelical were also highly correlated (Pearson‘s 
correlation=.756) but both were retained because the effects of each are of significant 
theoretical interest in this case. Evangelical Protestants are overwhelmingly white, so 
without individual-level voting data it‘s difficult to say which status has a greater 
―individual‖ effect on voting No (their combined effects are the subject of a more 
detailed exploration, explained below).   
 
A full model was built using multivariate regression. Multivariate regression reveals 
how well each independent variable predicts the dependent variable, controlling for 
each of the other independent variables. Model 1A (displayed in Table 16) includes all 
the predictors that were significant at p<.200 in bivariate analyses, minus any 
multicollinear variables; the full model is significant at p=.000, its adjusted R-
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square=.637, and a check of the residuals shows that they are normally distributed. In 
Model 1A, Percent White, Percent Religious Adherents, Percent Population Growth, 
Percent Aged 0-14, and Percent Hispanic remain significant at p<.05; the effects of the 
other variables are diluted by each other. Although Percent Religious Adherents was 
negatively associated with opposition in bivariate analysis, controlling for other 
factors (perhaps such as income or Evangelical Protestants) bumped it into the positive 
category. Given the framing of the lottery by opponents, it is not surprising that there 
was greater opposition in counties with more religious adherents. Counties with higher 
rates of population growth may have stronger economies and the need for income 
from a lottery may be less apparent. The positive correlation with Percent Age 0-14 
was not expected, because it was hypothesized that such areas would welcome more 
funding for public education. It is difficult to interpret the negative effect of Percent 
Hispanic residents; since Hispanics make up such a small proportion of the Alabama 
population, it‘s unlikely that Hispanic voters themselves are responsible for the effect 
and more likely that some other characteristic of such counties is responsible. 
Although the correlation between opposition and race was expected, the strength of 
the effect of Percent White is somewhat surprising—this variable explains nearly all 
the variance between counties in this model.  
 
This model does not account for spatial autocorrelation. Given the geographic 
clustering in opposition ―levels‖ apparent in Figures 1 and 2, and the possible 
explanation in uneven distribution of racial groups across Alabama counties, it‘s likely 
that spatial autocorrelation is violating one of the key assumptions of regression 
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Table 16: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Voting No, Education Lottery, Model 1A 
 Beta T Sig. R-sq. Adj. R-sq. 
Model   .000 .670 .637 
Median Household Income -.183 -.952 .343   
% Aged 0-14 .253 2.673 .009   
% Religious Adherents .414 4.246 .000   
Farm Employment -.082 -1.039 .302   
% Population Male .128 1.515 .133   
% Population Growth (95-00) .284 2.649 .010   
% Hispanic -.145 -2.017 .047   
% Population White .991 6.264 .000   
% Bachelor‘s Degree + -.015 -.081 .936   
 
analysis (i.e., the independence of observations). Spatial autocorrelation can take one 
of two forms: spatial lag and spatial error. Theoretically, the former would be 
appropriate when the values for opposition in County X are believed to be directly 
influenced by the values for opposition in neighboring counties. The latter would be 
appropriate if there is not a direct influence but rather some spatially clustered feature 
that influences opposition for County X and its neighbors (Ward & Gleditsch, 2008). 
 
The spatial analysis program GeoDa was used to diagnose and account for spatial 
autocorrelation in the full regression model. Using Queen‘s first-order spatial 
weighting, which defines a county‘s neighbors as those with either a shared border 
or vertex (as in chess), a classic OLS regression was run on the group of predictor 
variables significant in bivariate regressions at p<.200. Results show that the model is 
a good fit at R-sq=.726, but a positive and significant Moran‘s I value of .398 
confirmed the presence of spatial autocorrelation, and Lagrange Multiplier diagnostics 
indicated that the problem was one of spatial error, not spatial lag. Spatial error 
regression in GeoDa with the same predictor variables appears to be a better fit, with 
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an R-square value of .859. However the lag coefficient (Lambda) is significant and 
strongly positive (λ=.783), which shows that a very high amount of the variance is 
being attributed to spatial error. The only predictor variables that remain significant in 
the full model (besides Lambda) are Percent Religious Adherents (β=.206), Percent 
White (β=.306), and Percent Population Growth (β=.207). For this reason the OLS 
model as presented above in Table 16 is a somewhat unsatisfactory explanation for the 
variance in opposition between counties. Spatial error modeling does not specify the 
indirect influence acting between counties, but only suggests that this influence does 
exist. However, other data suggest that race (and its subsequent effect on ideology 
and/or self-interest and thus, voting behavior) may be one very important spatially 
clustered feature of Alabama counties.  
 
For the tax reform vote, bivariate analyses of relationships with the individual 
predictors (displayed in Table 17) show that the Racial and Ideological explanations 
are strongest by a wide margin. Almost all of the variables theorized as part of these 
explanations were associated with opposition in the linear direction hypothetically 
expected. For the Ideological explanation, the direction of the relationship with the 
religious variables was not specified because there were reasons it could have gone 
either way—in the public sphere, religious arguments were made for both opposition 
and support of the balanced development policy. A strong predictor of opposition was 
Percent Evangelical Protestants, which was positively related to opposition (β=.600). 
Percent Religious Adherents was not significantly associated with opposition at all. As 
in the lottery case, counties with more Evangelical Protestants had qualitatively 
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different preferences about the tax reform proposal than counties with more religious 
adherents in general. Counties with many religious adherents were no more likely to 
oppose the measure than counties with few religious adherents. It‘s possible that the 
religious argument put forth by supporters like Gov. Riley (―vote yes because it‘s un-
Christian to rely on tax revenue from the poor‖) was more persuasive to religious 
voters in general, while the argument put forth by religious opponents like the 
Christian Coalition (―vote no because small businesses and farmers are taxed enough 
already‖) was more persuasive to Evangelical voters. 
 
Other indicators of ideological preference also suggest that the ideological explanation 
for the tax reform‘s defeat has some merit. Not surprisingly, the relationship between 
county opposition and county Percent Voting Democratic in the 2004 presidential 
election was strongly negative. The results suggest that the relationship between 
opposition and farm employment established in the lottery analysis continues more 
strongly for the tax reform. Counties with more linkage into the Alabama Farmers‘ 
Federation network were significantly more opposed to the tax reform proposal. As 
with the lottery, it may be because this organization is strongly conservative. Its 
leaders opposed the tax reform on anti-statist grounds, suggesting that the people of 
Alabama were already taxed enough and that the state would waste the revenue 
generated by tax reform as well as use it as an opening to continue with tax increases.    
 
Unlike the lottery, though, the relationship may also be associated with perceived self-
interest; a major part of the tax reform plan was to begin taxing property at its market 
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value, rather than its ―current use‖ value [the state constitution sets property tax rates 
for agricultural land at only 10% of its ―current use‖ value, meaning that an acre of 
land might contribute only $1.15 per acre per year to Alabama‘s coffers (Archibald & 
Hansen, 2002). However, the self-interest explanation only goes so far--the increases 
would have been offset for small landholders by lowering the overall state tax rate, 
raising the homestead exemption, and creating a new ―farmstead‖ exemption to 
provide a tax break for small farm owners. Large landholders—many of whom are 
absentee—would have been the main targets of the increase, not voters. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, self-interest arguments made up only about 17% of all opposition pleas 
while 62% focused on the violation of conservative principles and anti-statism. 
 
Clearly ideological opposition played a critical role. Yet the single variable associated 
with the Racial explanation (Percent White) was the strongest predictor (β=.661). 
Moreover, the greater the concentration of Whites, the more opposition there was to 
the balanced development proposal. Since Whites as a group are wealthier than Blacks 
in Alabama, this may also be explained in the aggregate by self-interest. Without 
individual-level data, it‘s difficult to tell whether Whites‘ racial identity or economic 
status was more important in their decision to oppose the tax reform. Disaggregating 
county-level voting into voting by racial subgroup helps control for the effect of 
income, and will be explored below. 
 
It is critical to note the evidence suggesting that self-interest may not have played an 
important role in stimulating opposition. The ―For Self-Interest‖ explanation 
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hypothesized that counties with higher incomes and more elderly residents would be 
associated with increased opposition to the redistributive plan (because it was largely 
aimed at increasing school funding). Results show that these relationships were not 
present. On the other hand, people did not appear to be voting against their self-
interest either; there was no increase in opposition from counties with lower incomes, 
more school-aged children, higher unemployment, greater rurality).  
 
As for the control variables, the proportion of male residents was positively associated 
with opposition. Contrary to the lottery case, counties with more Hispanic residents 
were more likely to oppose the measure; scatterplotting shows that the relationship is 
actually curvilinear perhaps because counties with more Hispanic residents may also 
be wealthier. Population growth had a slightly positive effect, which was also an 
unexpected result, but scatterplotting also suggests that this relationship is 
curvilinear—up to a certain rate of growth, greater influx of newcomers increases 
opposition to the proposal. Voters‘ education level was negatively associated with 
opposition; educated voters found this balanced development proposal more palatable 
than the education lottery. 
 
Those variables that were significant at p<.200 were tested for multicollinearity in 
bivariate correlation matrices (see Appendix). Income was highly correlated with 
population growth, at Pearson‘s correlation=.815, so the weaker predictor variable 
(income) was dropped from multivariate modeling. Here again, Percent White was  
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Table 17: Bivariate Regression Analysis of Voting No, Tax Reform 
Variable (N=66) Expected Relationship Beta T Sig. 
 FSIE ASIE FIE FRE    
Median Household Income + - n.s. n.s. .169 1.699 .093 
% Aged 65+ + n.s. n.s. n.s. .170 1.711 .090 
% Aged 0-14 n.s. + n.s. n.s. -.202 -2.038 .044 
Population Density n.s. - n.s. n.s. -.042 -.413 .681 
Unemployment Rate n.s. + n.s. n.s. -.124 -1.241 .217 
% Religious Adherents n.s. n.s. +/- n.s. -.052 -.518 .605 
% Evangelical Adherents n.s. n.s. +/- n.s. .600 7.429 .000 
% Voting Democratic n.s. n.s. - n.s. -.578 -7.012 .000 
Receipts from Gov‘t n.s. n.s. - n.s. -.020 -.203 .840 
Farm Employment n.s. n.s. + n.s. .415 4.520 .000 
% Population White n.s. n.s. n.s. + .661 8.730 .000 
% Population Male n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .178 1.787 .077 
% Population Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .193 1.947 .054 
% Hispanic n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .373 3.984 .000 
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -.279 -2.875 .005 
 
 
highly correlated with Percent Voting Democratic (Pearson‘s correlation=-.904), so 
the latter variable was dropped. 
 
Two models were built using multivariate regression, one with an interaction term for 
Percent Evangelical X Percent White and one without. Model 2A includes all the 
predictors that were significant at p<.200 in bivariate analyses, minus multicollinear 
variables. The full model is significant at p=.000 with an adjusted R-square value of 
.518, and a check of the residuals shows that they are normally distributed. In Model 
2A (see Table 9), only Percent White, Percent Evangelical, and Percent 0-14 remain 
significant at p<.05; the effects of the other variables are ―diluted‖ by each other. In 
other words, only these three variables remain significant predictors of county-level 
variance when all the other predictors are held constant.  
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Table 18: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Voting No, Tax Reform, Model 2A 
Variable (N=66) Beta t Sig. R-sq. Adj. R-sq. 
Model   .000 .562 .518 
% Aged 65+ .048 .480 .633   
% Aged 0-14 .241 2.099 .039   
% Evangelical Protestant Adherents .309 2.958 .011   
Farm Employment .078 .858 .393   
% Population White .581 3.090 .003   
% Population Male -.020 -.206 .837   
% Population Growth (00-05) -.062 -.394 .694   
% Hispanic .044 .526 .600   
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ .008 .059 .953   
 
 
An interaction between Percent White and Percent Evangelical was also tested in 
multivariate regression; the adjusted R-square value of this model is not much greater 
at .535, indicating that it explains about the same amount of variance as Model 2A. 
However, the interaction term is significant here (β=-.916), suggesting that the 
relationship between being county Percent White and county opposition differs with 
different county-level proportions of Evangelical voters. The precise nature of this 
interaction relationship is difficult to assess without disaggregating White opposition 
from Black opposition at the county level; the next section attempts to address this 
issue. 
 
As with the lottery case, this model does not account for spatial autocorrelation, so 
similar efforts as above were used to assess the problem of spatially-influenced 
opposition values. The spatial analysis program GeoDa was used to diagnose spatial 
autocorrelation in the full regression model. Using Queen first-order spatial weighting, 
a classic OLS regression was run on the group of predictor variables significant in 
bivariate regressions at p<.200. Results show that the weighted model is a good fit at 
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R-sq=.624, but unlike the lottery case, a non-significant Moran‘s I value and non-
significant Lagrange Multiplier diagnostics suggest that spatial autocorrelation is not a 
problem in this regression model. A check with Rook first-order spatial weighting (a 
less-inclusive contiguity measure in which counties that share a border and not a 
vertex are weighted) had the same result. Without spatial statistics that point to spatial 
autocorrelation, the original multivariate regression model is assumed to be an 
adequate explanation of the variance between counties. 
 
White Opposition  
 
The regression models above for both vote outcomes are interesting in that they reveal 
race to be the key predictor of opposition to progressive policies for economic 
development. Yet the counties with bigger White populations (and stronger 
opposition) are also more healthy economically; perhaps Blacks and Whites in such 
counties are more opposed to redistributive development approaches. Using aggregate 
data to draw conclusions about the behavior of sub-groups raises the issue of 
ecological fallacy. As noted above, without disaggregating the data by racial subgroup 
it is difficult to know how important race really is.   
 
Roch & Rushton (2007) are the authors of the only published statistical analysis of 
recent referenda voting in Alabama (they explored the 2003 tax reform vote), and the 
way they dealt with the problem of aggregate data is instructive here. Roch & 
Rushton‘s goal was ―to examine the ways that the racial mix of counties, in terms of 
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both the proportion of the population that is Black and the degree of racial segregation, 
influence white voting‖ (15)14. They found the ecological fallacy too problematic for 
their more complex analysis, so they used King (1997)‘s methods for ecological 
inference.  They constructed county-level estimates of support for the Tax Reform 
proposal by race, using the sophisticated method developed by King, which is a two-
step process that involves first constructing estimates of voter turnout by race (using 
King‘s Ez1 software program), and then generating estimates of voter support by race.   
 
Roch & Rushton found that county-level support varied considerably among Whites 
(between 6 and 50%) and less so among Blacks (between 69 and 80%), and estimated 
that support by racial subgroup is 21% for Whites (or 79% opposition) and 75% for 
Blacks (or 25% opposition). However, they also report the same aggregate results for 
the second step when they use Goodman‘s (1959) simpler technique, here assuming 
identical levels of White and Black turnout across all counties. Goodman‘s less 
accurate technique preceded King‘s and was long the standard procedure; it assumes 
that turnout across districts is identical for subgroups and that voter turnout for 
subgroups is independent of groups‘ proportion of total population (Gill, 2001). For 
the purposes of this chapter, the two-step process is overly cumbersome so Goodman‘s 
technique is used to estimate subgroup opposition assuming equal turnout across 
counties.   
 
                                               
14 They find that racial integration is associated with increased White support for the proposal, which 
they interpret as evidence against V.O. Key‘s ―racial threat‖ hypothesis. 
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Using information from the Alabama Secretary of State on September 2003 county 
voter registration numbers by race, White voters‘ proportion of the total county-level 
vote is determined. Total county-level opposition is then regressed on the percentage 
of White voters (β=.750). Tax Reform, Whites Voting No is multiplied by .750 to 
create a new variable that focuses on white voting behavior, Tax Reform Percent 
Whites Voting No. A visual check of the output suggest that the estimates are 
accurate: for example, Cullman County and Lee County are both 75% White or more 
but Cullman is known to be one of the most conservative counties in the state (74.04% 
White opposition) while Lee, home to Auburn University, is quite liberal (56.13% 
White opposition). The same process is repeated to estimate Black voters‘ proportion 
of total county-level opposition. The regression reveals a beta coefficient of -.762; Tax 
Reform Black Percent of Vote is multiplied by (1-.762), or .238, to create Tax Reform 
Percent Blacks Voting No. While these estimates are not as rigorous as estimates 
using King‘s technique, they are close: the estimated rates of opposition for Whites 
(75%) and Blacks (24%) are close to the 79% and 25% rates Rushton & Roch 
produced with the more sophisticated procedure. 
 
The same procedure is followed to produce estimates of White and Black opposition 
to the education lottery proposal. Using information from the Alabama Secretary of 
State on June (the only month available) 1999 county voter registration numbers by 
race, White voters‘ proportion of the total county-level vote is determined. Total 
county-level opposition is then regressed on the percentage of White voters (β=.806.) 
Education Lottery White Percent of Vote is multiplied by .806 to create a new variable 
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that focuses on White voting behavior, Education Lottery Percent Whites Voting No. 
The process is repeated to generate estimates of Black voters‘ proportion of total 
county-level opposition. The regression reveals a beta coefficient of -.800; Education 
Lottery Black Percent of Vote is multiplied by (1-.800), or .200, to create Education 
Lottery Percent Blacks Voting No.   
 
The procedures used to generate Models 1A and 2A are used with the new, more 
accurate dependent variables (also weighted by county proportion of total statewide 
vote): bivariate analyses help weed out hypothesized predictors based on the p<.200 
criteria; after checking for multicollinearity, significant predictors are used to create 
full models. The variable Percent White is not used in this model, nor is the interaction 
term Percent Evangelical X Percent White. 
 
Bivariate analyses of the relationships between White opposition to the lottery 
proposal and the same group of individual predictors (displayed in Table 19) show 
that, among White voters, the Ideological explanations is still the strongest explanation 
for opposition, but the predictive power of some control variables has become 
magnified. For the Ideological explanation, the strongest predictor of opposition was 
Percent Voting Democratic (β=-.781); in counties with more Democrats, Whites were 
less likely to oppose the lottery. Percent Evangelical Adherents (β=.580) was also a 
strong predictor; in counties with more Evangelicals, Whites were more likely to 
oppose the lottery. The negative association with Percent Religious Adherents, which 
was significant for the aggregate data, is even stronger here. This shows that, when 
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looking at Whites alone, proximity to religious values in general decreased opposition, 
while proximity to Evangelical values increased opposition.   
 
The connection between county farm employment and opposition, not surprisingly, 
gets stronger among Whites alone. Although non-White farmers and farm workers 
(mainly Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians) make up about 7% of farm 
operators in Alabama (2007 Census of Agriculture), meaning that many more than 7% 
are non-white farm workers, ALFA is clearly a White farmers‘ organization. Although 
the organization does not give demographic information on its membership, a quick 
analysis of the pictorial representation of ALFA members in a sample of four regular 
newsletters (Friends and Family quarterly and Neighbors monthly) shows that a 
disproportionate amount of White faces and few if any Black or Hispanic faces are 
shown (14 out of 216 or about 6%). While farming itself tends to be a more 
ideologically conservative enterprise due to the often fierce guarding of property rights 
(cite), the Alabama Farmers‘ Federation may be even more conservative because of its 
lack of diversity. 
 
Whites were somewhat more likely to oppose the lottery in counties with higher 
median income. This cannot be interpreted as voting for self-interest, because the 
lottery was to collect sumptuary or ―vice‖ taxes. Unlike property or income taxes, vice 
taxes are not progressive and thus do not disproportionately affect wealthier people (in 
fact, vice taxes are usually very regressive). If Whites in wealthier counties weren‘t 
voting on the basis of self-interest, it‘s reasonable to conclude that they were voting 
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ideologically. However, none of the other variables associated with voting against 
self-interest were associated with White opposition to the lottery, which suggests that 
self-interest was still an important predictor of support among Whites. In particular, 
Whites in counties with more school-aged children were less likely to oppose the 
lottery (β=-.470), as were Whites in counties with higher unemployment rates (β=-
.254). This is interesting because it may reveal a key distinction between the 
motivations of White voters. Rather than a monolithic group, Whites appear to be 
divided into a group that opposed the lottery based on some association with 
Evangelicalism (either as Evangelicals themselves or living in areas with high 
concentrations of Evangelical neighbors) and/or based on income (either as wealthier 
people themselves or living in wealthier areas), and a group that supported the lottery 
based on self-interest (either as parents of school-aged children or unemployed 
themselves or living in areas with high concentrations of parents or unemployed 
neighbors). Opposition to the lottery was strongly racial, but not all Whites voted the 
same. The basis of opposition was primarily Evangelical Whites, and secondarily 
wealthier Whites. 
 
As for the control variables associated with White opposition, the relationship with 
population growth was strongly positive (β=.556). Population growth may be an 
indicator of economic dynamism, and voters in growing counties might not have felt 
the imperative to bolster public education in the state. Scatterplotting suggests that this 
relationship is curvilinear—at a certain rate of growth, a greater influx of newcomers 
ceases to be associated with greater opposition. The proportion of male residents was 
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also associated with opposition. As explained above, the proportion of males may also 
be an indicator of economic dynamism, since counties with more men may have more 
jobs (and less interest in policies for long-term, human-capital-led development); or it 
may be an indicator of population age, since counties with more women tend to be 
older overall (and less interested in supporting public education). However, the 
percent of residents aged 65 and older was not associated with opposition, so the 
former explanation is probably more accurate. Whites in counties with more Hispanic 
residents were more likely to oppose the measure than the aggregate group of voters in 
such counties; scatterplotting shows that the relationship is actually curvilinear 
perhaps because counties with more Hispanic residents may also be wealthier. In 
counties with more Personal Receipts from Government, White were less likely to  
 
Table 19: Bivariate Regression Analysis of Whites Voting No, Education Lottery 
Variable (N=67) Expected Relationship* Beta T Sig. 
 ASIE FIE    
Median Household Income - n.s. .299 3.097 .003 
% Aged 65+ n.s. n.s. .020 .199 .843 
% Aged 0-14 + n.s. -.470 -5.278 .000 
Population Density - n.s. -.337 -3.544 .001 
Unemployment Rate + n.s. -.254 -2.601 .011 
% Religious Adherents n.s. + -.448 -4.961 .000 
% Evangelical Adherents n.s. + .580 7.049 .000 
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t n.s. - -.393 -4.228 .000 
% Voting Democratic (2004) n.s. - -.781 -12.378 .000 
Farm Employment  n.s. + .480 5.417 .000 
% Population Male n.s. n.s. .387 4.157 .000 
% Population Growth (95-00) n.s. n.s. .556 6.623 .000 
% Hispanic n.s. n.s. .461 5.148 .000 
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ n.s. n.s. -.152 -1.519 .132 
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oppose the lottery, perhaps because of greater reliance on and comfort with the state as 
a figure in social policy. Voters‘ education level was not a strongly significant 
predictor of White opposition, but since it is significant at p<.200 it will be included in 
multivariate analysis.  
 
Full models were built using multivariate regression. Model 1B (see Table 20) 
 includes all the predictors that were significant at p<.200 in bivariate analyses, 
excluding population density (which was multicollinear with government receipts). 
The full model is significant at p=.000, its R-square=.930, and a check of the residuals 
shows that they are normally distributed.  Interestingly, in full modeling of White 
opposition to the lottery, more of the predictors remain significant at p<.05—i.e., even 
when controlling for all of the other variables. Percent Evangelical and Percent 
Religious Adherents exhibit almost countervailing effects, with the former strongly 
positive and the latter strongly negative. Voting Democratic remains negatively 
associated with White opposition while Farm Employment remains positively 
associated, suggesting that ideology plays an important role in determining White 
rejection of the lottery proposal. The only other variable that remains significant is the 
―self-interest‖ variable Percent Aged 0-14, suggesting that White opposition decreases 
with the proportion of school-aged children. The model suggests that, on the whole, 
White opposition to the lottery had a lot to do with Evangelical identity.  
 
Analysis of White opposition to the 2003 tax reform proposal followed the same 
methods as described above. Bivariate analyses of the relationships between White 
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Table 20: Multivariate Analysis of Whites Voting No, Education Lottery, Model 1B 
 Beta t Sig. R-sq. Adj. R-sq. 
Model   .000 .938 .930 
Median Household Income .075 1.094 .277   
% Aged 0-14 -.223 6.218 .000   
Unemployment Rate -.031 -.651 .517   
% Religious Adherents -.645 -10.630 .000   
% Evangelical Adherents .772 15.516 .000   
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t .201 4.281 .000   
% Voting Democratic (2004) -.227 -4.642 .000   
Farm Employment  .158 5.069 .000   
% Population Male -.008 -.226 .822   
% Population Growth (95-00) .037 .742 .460   
% Hispanic -.011 -.326 .745   
% Bachelor‘s Degree + .100 1.452 .150   
 
 
opposition to the proposal and the same group of individual predictors (displayed in 
Table 13) show that, among White voters, the Ideological explanation is still the 
strongest explanation for opposition. Not surprisingly, the strongest predictor of 
support was Percent Voting Democratic (β=-.848); White opposition was more likely 
in those counties with fewer Democrats. As seen with White opposition to the lottery, 
the variables Percent Evangelical Adherents and Percent Religious Adherents have 
nearly the opposite effect at the county level. Whites‘ proximity to religious values in 
general did not defeat the tax reform measure—it was specifically their proximity to 
Evangelical values. Even though anti-reform arguments made by Evangelical 
opponents did not directly reference religious values, it appears their arguments were 
more persuasive in the Evangelical community than the explicitly religious pro-reform 
arguments made by supporters. These arguments, as noted above, tended to refer to 
individual freedoms and anti-statism. As theorized in Chapter 4, (White) Evangelical 
voters may be more ideologically receptive to such arguments. 
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Here again, the association between county farm employment and opposition gets 
stronger among Whites alone. Areas where more people are employed in farming 
tended to be more averse to the reform plan. This makes sense from a self-interest 
perspective (farmers would have wanted to avoid increased property taxes) and from 
an ideological perspective (farmers and especially the Alabama Farmers‘ Federation 
tend to be considerably more economically conservative). For example, ALFA‘s 
monthly newsletter Neighbors featured a picture of the hammer and sickle above anti-
reform editorials during the tax reform campaign period, which fits into the group‘s 
message about the danger of violating conservative principles and the ―slippery slope‖ 
that could lead to socialism/communism.  
 
Based on the positive relationship between income and opposition, and the negative 
relationships between with unemployment and the proportion of school-aged children, 
self-interest was also an important predictor of support among Whites. Here again, 
Whites appear to be divided into a group that opposed the measure based on some 
association with Evangelicalism (either as Evangelicals themselves or living in areas 
with high concentrations of Evangelical neighbors) and/or based on income (either as 
wealthier people themselves or living in wealthier areas), and a group that supported 
the measure based on self-interest (either as parents of school-aged children or 
unemployed themselves or living in areas with high concentrations of parents or 
unemployed neighbors).  
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As for the control variables associated with White opposition, the relationship with 
population growth was strongly positive (β=.513). Population growth may be an 
indicator of economic dynamism, and voters in growing counties might not have felt 
the imperative to bolster public education and/or progressivity in the state. 
Scatterplotting suggests that this relationship is curvilinear—at a certain rate of 
growth, a greater influx of newcomers ceases to be associated with greater opposition.  
The proportion of male residents was also associated with opposition. As explained 
above, this may be an indicator of economic dynamism too, since counties with more 
men may have more jobs (and less interest in policies for long-term, human-capital-led 
development). Whites in counties with more Hispanic residents were more likely to 
oppose the measure than the aggregate group of voters in such counties; scatterplotting 
shows that the relationship is actually curvilinear perhaps because counties with more 
Hispanic residents may also be wealthier. Counties with greater educational attainment 
had proportionately fewer White opponents to the tax reform plan, which suggests that 
higher education or its context made voters more receptive to the progress and 
development narrative propounded by Gov. Riley and the rest of the support 
campaign.  
 
Full models were built using multivariate regression. Model 2B (see Table 22) 
includes all the predictors that were significant at p<.200 in bivariate analyses; the 
fullmodel is significant at p<.001, its R-square=.954, and a check of the residuals 
shows that they are normally distributed. In Model 2C, Percent Voting Democratic,  
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Table 21: Bivariate Regression Analysis of Whites Voting No, Tax Reform 
Variables (N=66) Expected Relationship Beta t Sig. 
 FSIE ASIE FIE    
Median Household Income + - n.s. .242 2.473 .015 
% Aged 65+ + n.s n.s. -.008 -.077 .939 
% Aged 0-14 n.s. + n.s. -.370 -3.941 .000 
Population Density (2000) n.s. - n.s. -.551 -6.541 .000 
Unemployment Rate n.s. + n.s. -.272 -2.803 .006 
% Religious Adherents n.s. n.s. +/- -.556 -6.627 .000 
% Evangelical Adherents n.s. n.s. +/- .512 5.899 .000 
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t n.s. n.s. - -.610 -7.619 .000 
% Voting Democratic (2004) n.s. n.s. - -.848 -15.863 .000 
Farm Employment n.s. n.s. + .506 5.809 .000 
% Population Male n.s. n.s. n.s. .471 5.286 .000 
% Population Growth n.s. n.s. n.s. .513 5.920 .000 
% Hispanic n.s. n.s. n.s. .407 4.415 .000 
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ n.s. n.s. n.s. -.213 -2.156 .034 
 
 
Percent Evangelical Adherents, Percent Religious Adherents, Farm Employment, 
Government Receipts, Percent Aged 0-14, and Population Growth all remain 
significant at p<.05. The model suggests that, on the whole, White opposition to the 
lottery had most to do with ideological orientation. Compared to the lottery vote, the 
variables that had a weaker effect on opposition were income, the presence of school-
aged children, and religion. As with the lottery vote, Percent Religious Adherents and 
Percent Evangelical Adherents had an opposite effect (with the former decreasing 
opposition and the latter increasing it); in the tax reform case these effects were 
slightly weaker. The variables that had a stronger effect on opposition were population 
growth, voting Democratic, the amount of personal receipts from government, and 
county farm employment.  
 
Evangelical voters—or more accurately, voters in counties with more Evangelicals— 
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Table 22: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Whites Voting No, Tax Reform, Model 2B 
 Beta t Sig. R-sq. Adj. R-sq. 
Model   .000 .957 .951 
Median Household Income .142 1.897 .061   
% Aged 0-14 -.098 -2.799 .006   
Unemployment Rate .060 1.391 .168   
% Religious Adherents -.393 -6.553 .000   
% Evangelical Adherents  .343 -6.553 .000   
Personal Receipts from Gov‘t -.185 -4.356 .000   
% Voting Democratic -.450 -8.454 .000   
Farm Employment .242 9.258 .000   
% Population Male -.016 -.530 .598   
% Population Growth (00-05) -.136 -2.034 .045   
% Hispanic -.025 -.899 .371   
% Bachelor‘s Degree + .098 1.384 .170   
 
 
were clearly a major source of opposition to both of these progressive development 
policies. Who are Evangelical voters? Can any demographic data be inferred about 
them based on the characteristics of the counties they live in? Table 23 displays the 
results of regression modeling based on all of the study variables with p<.200. 
 
Table 23: Percent Evangelical Adherence, 2000 (Multivariate Regression) 
 Beta t Sig. R-sq. Adj. R-sq. 
Model   .000 .949 .943 
Median Household Income, 1999 -.129 -1.647 .105   
% Aged 65+ -.191 -3.745 .000   
% Aged 0-14 -.132 -2.359 .002   
Unemployment Rate, 1999 .079 1.565 .123   
% Religious Adherence .621 17.670 .000   
% Population White .816 12.009 .000   
% Bachelor‘s Degree+ -.178 -3.199 .002   
 
 
The more Evangelical adherents there are in an Alabama county, the more White 
residents there are (by far), the fewer older and younger residents there are, the greater 
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the rate of religious adherence in general, and the lesser the educational attainment. 
These data hold up for the 1999 economic data and the 2003 economic data, although 
the relationship with Percent Bachelor‘s Degree+ is greater (β=-.212, p=.000) and the 
relationship with Percent Aged 0-14 disappears for the later year. In other words, 
counties with more Evangelicals are not richer or older, which were two key 
hypothesized predictors of opposition based on self-interest. If Evangelical voters—
probably a significant source of opposition, although with aggregate data it‘s hard to 
be sure—were against the policies based on self-interest, this is the opposite of what 
would be expected. Moreover, voters in counties with more Evangelicals are likely to 
be less educated; on the basis of self-interest one might expect less educated voters to 
embrace policies that would increase their families‘ access to better schools and 
college scholarships. If not on the basis of self-interest, Evangelicals may have been 
motivated by ideology.   
 
Discussion 
 
By identifying the types of people that affirmed (with their votes) arguments against 
each policy proposal, these analyses generally support the conclusions made in 
Chapters 3 and 4—that opposition to the policies was significantly motivated by 
ideology. As interview data showed, observers pointed to Alabamians‘ inherent 
ideological aversion to government as a major reason for opposition, and discourse 
analysis supported this interpretation. But each source of evidence lacks an important 
piece that the voting analysis makes clear--observers overlooked the importance of 
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conservative religion in the defeat of the tax reform, and discourse analysis did not 
give any indication of the central importance of race in the defeat of both the tax 
reform and the lottery. The voting analysis shows that these groups were indeed more 
receptive to the ways that traditional conservatives framed the issues even though they 
contradicted themselves between one case and the other—suggesting a durable 
ideology that can be adapted to very different circumstances.  
 
The regression analyses of each vote outcome, especially when looked at 
comparatively, reveal a complex interplay between race, religion, and self-interest. 
The effect of race is not surprising given that Whites as a group are much wealthier 
than Blacks—on the basis of personal self-interest alone, it‘s expected that ―Whiter‖ 
counties would be more likely to oppose redistributive socio-economic policies. 
Moreover, because Alabama‘s Black residents are geographically concentrated, race 
would be expected to explain much of the variance in county-level voting. 
Nevertheless, the effect of Percent White explains almost all the variance in opposition 
to the lottery after controlling for all the other factors (including income), and is also 
the strongest predictor when controlling for everything else in the tax reform case.  
Looking more closely at White opposition alone, self-interest is still clearly an 
important predictor; the proportion of school-aged children in a county significantly 
affects the outcome in multivariate regression for both voting cases. Whites in ―older‖ 
counties may not feel a personal need to support socio-economic policies that would 
benefit other types of families more. These effects are evidence that can support the 
pluralist understanding of political power in Alabama—e.g., neither policy proposal 
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got enough support in the ―marketplace‖ of personal preference. The fact that White 
voters‘ preferences prevailed does not necessarily imply class-based power; perhaps 
these were poorly-crafted policies and/or perhaps Black voters were ambivalent.  
 
However, the much stronger effect of religion especially among Whites provides 
strong evidence for the role of ideology over self-interest. A religious county context 
was a strong predictor of opposition to the lottery, but this was expected because the 
lottery was associated with sin, addiction, and gambling during the public discourse. 
Many individual churches as well as religious networks like the Alabama Christian 
Coalition and Southern Baptist Convention opposed it. However, the tax reform plan 
presented no violations of religious values or morality. In fact, morality and Christian 
values were cited far more often in the public debate as reasons to support the 
measure. Yet opposition to this proposal was strongest in the most conservative 
religious contexts—counties with a greater concentration of Evangelical Protestants—
although religious adherents in general did not provide a context more conducive to 
opposition. Looking at White voters specifically, the difference in opposition between 
more religious and more Evangelical counties is even more striking. For both voting 
cases, Percent Religious Adherents had about the opposite effect as did Percent 
Evangelical Protestants.  
 
Furthermore, while Percent Religious Adherents was associated with increased 
aggregate opposition to the lottery, it was associated with decreased White opposition. 
These results provide more evidence of ideological voting, revealing the paramount 
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importance of conservative religious identity in shaping White policy preferences. 
Religious identity is about more than moral values for White conservative Protestants 
in Alabama. Because voters in these types of communities were much more likely to 
oppose both redistributive plans despite ―Christian‖ grounds for opposition to only 
one plan, it appears this identity is fused with an economic ideology—a preference for 
a small state with minimal ability to interfere with private accumulation. This 
economic preference is probably not based in self-interest or pragmatism—the tax 
reform plan would have only infringed upon the personal economic interests of a very 
small group at the top of the income pyramid, a responsibility welcomed by capital‘s 
major representatives (such as the Business Council of Alabama and the Economic 
Development Alliance of Alabama) who publicly anticipated long-term benefits for 
civil society generally and for business specifically. Nor is this preference based in 
principles of self-government, as the tax reform plan would have increased the power 
of local authorities vis-à-vis the state.   
 
Rather, this study suggests, it is based in a racialized anti-statism to which Alabama‘s 
conservative Protestants appear particularly receptive. The literature has anticipated 
this interaction to a certain extent, suggesting that conservative Protestantism goes 
hand-in-hand culturally with an ethos of individualism that prevents CPs from 
acknowledging the fundamental causes of African American inequality (Emerson & 
Smith, 2000). A number of scholars have argued that religious values are related to 
economic policy preferences. Emerson & Smith argue that religion plays an important 
role in defining the ―cultural toolkit‖ of many Americans (meaning a defined set of 
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cultural resources that defines individual reality and patterns one‘s interpretation of 
experiences) (Swidler, 1986). Emerson & Smith theorize that the particular cultural 
toolkit of conservative Protestantism features individual actors rather than actors-in-
structure, compounding the already-individualist bent of mass American culture. 
Because of CPs‘ belief in ―accountable freewill individualism‖ where people are 
individually accountable for their freely-chosen actions, structures and institutions are 
not understood to have much of an effect on people‘s life outcomes (Emerson & 
Smith, 2000: 76). Personal choices are more important. And, because personal 
relationships—not only with God but with other individuals—encourage people to 
make the right choices, defective relationships are seen as the main cause of individual 
and social problems (ibid.). From this perspective, any systemic discrimination that 
does occur results from the actions of discriminatory individuals or because of 
institutions that undermine healthy individual relationships, such as government. 
 
The way that this individualist narrative shapes CPs‘ perspective on government and 
social policy has been the focus of much political-sociological observation. Felson & 
Kindell (2007) find evidence that a conservative (that is, free-market) economic 
ideology is dominant among conservative Protestants, although its effects are only 
consistent among better-educated CPs.  It‘s also likely that other key elements of 
conservative Protestantism shape adherents‘ views on such matters. For example, 
direct adherence to a guiding moral text (―originalism‖) rather than human 
interpretations of that text may create a frame that is transposable to other texts. To 
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wit: conservative Protestants tend to support a literal reading of the US Constitution as 
well; as Tuttle & Smith (2010) explain, 
―Literalism and originalism share a core commitment to the idea that their 
relevant texts have a timeless, fixed meaning that is readily ascertainable. In 
addition…both are deeply concerned about the loss of constraint that results 
from interpretation that is untethered to text; both have a strong, self-
consciously populist impulse and an equally strong and self-conscious disdain 
for elite opinion, both with respect to interpretive norms and cultural values; 
and both maintain that all other approaches to their relevant texts are 
fundamentally illegitimate because they breach a duty of fidelity‖ (1).     
 
Clearly, structural location is also a part of this causality. There is a relatively high 
degree of spatial, occupational, and religious segregation in Alabama, meaning 
Evangelical Whites are less likely to belong to the same social networks as Blacks. 
Political participation may also shape the economically conservative effect of the 
Evangelical vote: education is related to greater participation and Edgell & Tranby 
(2007) have found that among religious conservatives, the better educated are more 
likely to oppose most solutions to African American inequality. However, the fact 
remains that White conservative Protestants are found across the southeastern U.S., 
yet many of these state governments have been successful in establishing balanced 
development policies that invest in all residents.    
 
The difference in Alabama is a set of structural, cultural, and institutional 
preconditions that allows economic conservatives to trump countervailing forces like 
labor or the state. Rather than being grouped under a single-peak association which 
would represent its collective interests, business is bifurcated into modernizers and 
conservatives. The ―corporate liberalism‖ of modernizing business corresponds more 
closely with public interests but less closely with the existing cultural context. This 
context is tied to the state constitution: both indirectly and directly, it favors the 
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maintenance of the status quo. When attempts are made to challenge the status quo, it 
is not difficult for conservative business interests to marshal public support for their 
interests.  In part, this is because of the cultural template provided by the document: 
constitutional provisions like the regressive tax code, earmarking, centralized 
authority, and the arduous amendment procedure have ―primed‖ the electorate for 
suspicion of government and fierce aversion to change, especially when it might 
involve taxes. Reinforcing these effects is conservative Protestantism (especially 
Baptism): its central role in social and political life has normalized values like 
faithfulness to texts and tradition and more importantly, ―accountable freewill 
individualism.‖ This mental model is further reinforced by racialization, which hides 
structural sources of inequality by embedding racial divisions in the normal operation 
of most institutions and thus making them ―invisible‖ to most Whites (Emerson & 
Smith, 2000).   
  
These structural and cultural preconditions still do not guarantee that conservative 
business‘s way of framing socio-economic policies will be more successful with the 
public. Some institutional provisions contribute directly; perhaps most important is the 
lack of transparency in state campaign finance laws. In the cases under study here, 
powerful economic interests like out-of-state gambling cartels and corporate owners of 
vast timber tracts had merely to identify the most influential mouthpiece and pay 
handsomely without fear of disclosure. These groups‘ opponents in the modernizing 
business sector would only go so far to expose this process because after all, they 
create consent in the same ways under other circumstances.
15
  
                                               
15 As one member of the pro-tax reform campaign explained, ―The only way this was going to be 
successful was through defining, identifying, and discrediting the opposition.  That was not done for 
political reasons, and thus it became impossible‖ (personal communication, 7/12/10). 
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This period in Alabama‘s history was marked by influential Evangelical leaders like 
the Alabama Christian Coalition‘s John Giles and former state Supreme Court Judge 
Roy Moore (of ―Ten Commendments‖ fame) who were strongly opposed to any 
expansions of state power and who were not averse to taking and ―laundering‖ such 
political donations through their PACs. 
 
Using religious authorities to spread conservative economic messages is particularly 
ingenious because religious values are perhaps the strongest common bond between 
racial groups in Alabama. Racial divisiveness is minimized when policies are framed 
in a way that resonates with both Blacks and Whites (Kellstedt, 2000). Lottery 
opponents took clear advantage of this fact when they argued that lotteries meant 
gambling, sin, and a regressive tax on poor people; in opposition to tax reform many 
of the same groups claimed that implementing more progressive taxation represented 
overreaches of government authority and threats of waste and corruption. Although 
Blacks were far less persuaded by such arguments, their potential opposition was 
minimized because religious values and anti-statism resonate with them too. The 
effect of rejecting both plans was a continuation of the status quo in which Whites 
have significantly greater access to education and opportunities and only accept tax 
increases where funds are likely to circulate locally. Low- and middle-income 
Alabamians continue to pay more than twice as much of their income in state and local 
taxes as do those with the highest incomes (Institute on Taxation and Economic 
Policy, 2009).   
 
Establishing a pattern of racialized voting behavior opens up the cache of supporting 
evidence beyond the economic development realm. For example, in 2004, several 
legislators proposed an amendment to the state constitution that would have removed 
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1901-era language permitting the segregation of schools by race and 1950s-era 
language confirming that Alabama's constitution does not guarantee a right to a public 
education. While federal law supercedes states‘ ability to formally segregate schools, 
the removal of the segregation language would have been symbolically important. 
Opponents like the Alabama Christian Coalition argued that ―guaranteeing a right to a 
public education would have opened a door for ‗rogue‘ federal judges to order the 
state to raise taxes to pay for improvements in its public school system‖ (Roig-
Franzia, 2004). Even though this argument was ―ridiculed by most of the state's 
newspapers and by legions of legal experts‖ (ibid.), it was persuasive enough that 
voters rejected the proposal in statewide referendum. Regressing county-level voting 
on the variables used in this study reveals that Percent White and Percent Evangelical 
Adherents were again the strongest individual predictors (β=.761 and β=.660, 
respectively; p=.000). Furthermore, attempts to end the state‘s regressive tax on 
groceries, which hits low-income Black families the hardest, have failed repeatedly 
over the past few decades; however these attempts have never gotten past the state 
legislature into a referendum. 
 
If race really is at the core of voting by influential White groups, it is easier (in a 
manner of speaking) to understand Alabama voters‘ favor for the capital subsidy 
approach to development. The jobs that come to Alabama from big manufacturers are 
much needed, but they seem to be taken mostly by middle-class Whites. Because the 
state refused to apportion the new jobs such that some specific number would come to 
the poorest counties (the Black Belt counties), because the state does not provide 
public transportation or quality public education, and because people without a high 
school diploma are ineligible for many of the state workforce training programs, the 
capital subsidy approach almost guarantees that state money spent on corporate 
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incentives will not benefit poor Black communities. Balanced development policies, 
like the tax reform proposal and even the less-progressive lottery proposal, would have 
directly benefited the least advantaged and would have given more power to 
government for redistribution and potential mismanagement. Unfortunately, a set of 
extraordinary opportunities to change one of the most regressive socio-economic 
systems in the country was squandered.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study began by asking why inequality and poverty tend to persist at certain 
subnational sites, and the extent to which governments at this level have the capacity 
to address these issues.   How much power to make significant economic changes do 
state governments have, in the face of global economic restructuring?  What role does 
subnational civil society play in limiting or enabling this potential sphere of power?  
What determines the relative power of groups within civil society, and are these 
configurations durable or fluid?  These questions were posed using Alabama as a case 
study.  The study‘s findings suggest that institutional, structural, and cultural variables 
at the state level determine the relative power of capital, state government, and the 
public to set political agendas, achieve goals, and facilitate or ward off change.  In 
Alabama, the state theoretically has the capacity to modify the way it connects with 
the global economy (as evinced by the experiences of high-performing states in the 
region) but it does not have enough authority to do so.  Its authority is limited by both 
political institutions (the constitution), and by class-based power in the form of vested 
elite interests.  Voters can enable the state to act, but do not do so because they 
consent to the prioritization of these elite interests.  
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Thus, in Alabama, the local economy‘s incorporation into the world economy is 
directed primarily by civil society, with the state acting as a facilitator but not a 
manager of this process.  A minimal state has already been established through the 
existing political-institutional structure; the state constitution strictly limits state 
government‘s power and makes it hard to modify this arrangement.  When the 
constitution was written in 1901, constraining the state especially in the economic 
development sphere was seen as beneficial to the public—at the time, Alabama was 
not the only place in the US where unrestrained state and local governments had gone 
into serious debt trying to attract railroads and other businesses (Walthall et al. 2001).  
However, many of the positive civic goals associated during the neoliberal era with 
devolution and shrinking the state never came to pass for Alabama, since this 
constraint was never matched by a corresponding empowerment of the public (through 
home rule, for example). This left the remaining power center in civil society, private 
interests, with outsize influence over economic development ideals and activities. As 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno (1997) have explained, patterns of local 
incorporation in the world economy ―depend not only upon the investment decisions 
of international capital but also upon local class relations and the economic projects 
of local elites‖ (571, italics added).  When local elites are more empowered and more 
inclined to pursue narrow private interests—say, dismantling regulations or lobbying 
for tax abatements—with no discernible public benefit, the result can be uneven 
development with less public benefit. 
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In Alabama, local elites‘ economic projects are bifurcated— the more short-sighted 
sector favors narrow private interests; the more far-sighted sector favors balanced 
development.  Luckily for the former, existing circumstances suit their interests.  
Despite the heavily pro-business culture, the moderate sector has less power than the 
conservative sector to manipulate the interests of the public.  This is at least partly 
because the constitution sets a ―cultural template‖ for small government and slow 
incremental change to the status quo; at the same time, the prevailing values among 
Alabamians are proudly conservative to the point of risk-aversion.  In itself, this 
cultural context might not prevent change in the area of economic development, 
because many other conservative electorates have enabled their governments to bring 
about balanced development.  But here, a ―perfect storm‖ mediates against socio-
economic change.  Conservative sectors rhetorically connect moderately progressive 
policies with the violation of individual rights and the expansion of government; in 
doing so they create an ‗imagined community‖ that shares some basic unviolable 
principles; of such principles, Hall et al. have said, ―the more deeply sedimented the 
layers of culture that they appeal to, the greater will be their persuasiveness‖ (419).  
As a result, the public tends to support proposals for economic development activities 
that directly enable business (e.g., tax abatements, site preparation, subsidized 
workforce training for new employers) but not other activities that would directly 
enable workers and communities (e.g., two- and four-year college aid, access to public 
transit, increased flexibility in the state‘s use of revenue). 
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As in Gaventa‘s (1980) Tennessee case study, power asymmetries that were 
institutionalized at critical points in history (here, the writing of the state constitution 
all the way back in 1901) became less and less visible as time passed and as these 
asymmetries receded from actual decision-making points they have come to appear 
natural or even preferable.  This keeps the public‘s interests within an already-defined 
sphere and limits their demand for institutional change (Thelen and Steinmo 1992).  
Acculturation to a system based on inequality becomes an inertial force that does not 
even rely on the actions of a unified class to keep it going; the public sees this system 
as natural and cannot imagine possibilities ―outside‖ of it.  Furthermore, potentially 
countervailing interest groups have been built around existing social organization and 
do not want their investments disrupted, since they may have developed political or 
economic advantages.  Here, even the powerful teachers‘ union does not challenge 
basic institutional features that limit change and maintain cultural expectations, such 
as earmarking, because they have their own payout from these features.  State actors 
who manage institutions also have strong incentives to follow the path because the 
costs of switching are immediate while the benefits are not, as Pierson‘s (2000) 
theories have anticipated.  
 
At the same time, ongoing cultural work maintains the binding effects of collective 
ideologies; and this study has shown how that cultural work was performed during 
public debates over proposed policy changes.  But, as Gaventa‘s work has also shown, 
the exercise of hidden power occurs not only during times of conflict or in response to 
grievances, but constantly and invisibly—preventing grievances from arising in the 
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first place.  Some bedrock cultural values directly favor the economic conditions that 
maintain inequality.  Other values or norms indirectly favor these conditions or share 
an ideological ―affinity‖ with them.  For example, racialization creates a dichotomous 
way of thinking about the community: ―us,‖ the deserving, versus ―them,‖ the 
undeserving.  But is the explanation for Alabama‘s resistance to change during the last 
few decades really so simple as race?  It seems hard to believe especially given Shafer 
and Johnston‘s (2006) evidence for the ―end of Southern exceptionalism.‖  Their 
voting data show that while conservatism remains strong in the South, its political 
base is now wealthy rather than White—an expression of new material interests rather 
than ―old‖ ideological interests.  And, as Chapter 2 has shown, much of the South does 
appear to have pursued a balanced, inclusive approach to development that seems to 
transcend the old exclusionary ideologies.   
 
In Alabama, some evidence (specifically, the qualitative interview-based analyses 
included in this study) suggests a continued role for racialized political behavior in 
Alabama.  However, quantitative voting analysis is less conclusive.  The fact that 
wealthier and Whiter counties were more likely to vote conservatively on Alabama 
economic development issues makes it hard to untangle the independent effects of 
these two identities.  The role of race becomes somewhat clearer through 
consideration of another bedrock value‘s effects on voting—religion.  When looking 
at conservative voting among Whites alone, income still exerts somewhat strong 
effects but the strongest effects come from conservative Protestantism (labeled 
Evangelicalism in the voting analysis section, a category that includes Baptists, 
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fundamentalists, and other conservative Protestant groups).  Evangelical adherence 
was the strongest predictor of White opposition across both the lottery and tax reform 
cases, even controlling for income, education, and other variables.  In other words, 
Evangelicalism trumped income as the basis for opposition not only for the lottery but 
also and especially in the case of the tax reform—unexpectedly, because the tax 
reform plan presented an economic threat to higher income groups but no violations of 
religious values or morality.  In fact, morality and Christian values were cited far more 
often in the public debate as reasons to support the measure.  The resonance of this 
argument for religious voters was expected to be so strong that Governor Riley 
himself staked his entire political career on it.  Why then would voters from this 
devout group be most opposed to the tax reform plan, and what does race have to do 
with it?   
 
This study suggests that religious identity is about more than moral values for White 
conservative Protestants in Alabama—it represents a broader worldview 
encompassing economic and community preferences.  Conservative Protestant voters 
were much more likely to oppose both plans despite ―Christian‖ grounds for 
opposition to only one plan—evidence that this identity is fused with an economic 
ideology: a preference for a small state with minimal ability to interfere with private 
accumulation.  This economic ideology is not about self-interest; as Table 15 (p. 197) 
shows, CPs in Alabama tend to be less wealthy and less educated.  Instead, it appears 
to be about race: CPs are overwhelmingly White.  The CP worldview, which 
emphasizes individualism and personal responsibility in both social and economic life, 
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offers an accessible and familiar way to make decisions about whether or not to 
expand government.  Like the state constitution, it provides a template or mental 
model to help people make sense of complex issues.  Guided by such a template, 
economic choices that would seem pragmatic—such as investing in public goods for 
the sake of progress and development—may be subject to moral evaluations about 
merit and community belonging.  In this way religious cleavages become a more 
important factor for understanding economic voting than class cleavages (Manza & 
Brooks, 1997), the latter of which entail a more racially and culturally diverse type of 
collectivity.  Saying no to government becomes a way to say no to a host of other 
issues that conservative Protestants may be uncomfortable with.  This explains why 
the moral message deployed during the lottery campaign was effective, but was 
dismissed during the tax reform campaign.  Here, supporters failed to recognize the 
equally important economic dimension of the religious ideology—an economics based 
not on self-interest or personal pragmatism, but on principles.   
 
This ideological connection is important because conservative Protestantism is the 
dominant identity group in Alabama not only in terms of adherent numbers but in 
terms of cultural and political influence.  Does that mean that religion is a structural 
factor in its service to class interests?  This study will not conclude that religion (in 
this case, conservative Protestantism), or culture more generally, is used by class 
actors as a means of engineering consent for conservative socio-economic policies; 
that causal relationship is beyond the scope of the research presented here.  The 
assumptions of a class-based power structure do raise questions about the 
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―coincidence‖ of a dominant religious ideology that promotes a conservative 
worldview in a state where maintenance of the status quo is in capital‘s short-term 
interest.  There is clearly an affinity between this particular religious denomination and 
a conservative economic ideology. However, without a more thorough examination of 
conservative Protestantism‘s roots in Alabama culture, determining causality is out of 
reach.  Religion (i.e., culture), then, will be interpreted as an independent variable that, 
in conjunction with other variables, happens to increase the likelihood that the 
regressive status quo will be maintained.  In Alabama, CPs happen to be the dominant 
political bloc in the state, both culturally and in terms of numbers—which means that 
their preferences are decisive.  It is the specific configuration of cultural, structural, 
and institutional factors that work together to maintain the conservative status quo in 
Alabama.  This explains how conservative Protestants can form a significant voting 
bloc in Georgia, North Carolina, and other southeastern states without having been 
organized as effectively by conservative economic elites. 
 
This study‘s findings are important because they build on a few key areas of inquiry 
regarding ideology, political power, and economic development.  As predicted by 
Huber & Stephens (2001), Hacker and Pierson (2002), and Jenkins et al. (2006), ―the 
ability of particular economic actors to exert influence [depends] heavily on 
institutional variables‖ (304); however, their research on these interactions does not 
specifically account for the influence of a third factor, that of cultural norms or values.  
Studies that have considered the political role of culture, particularly religion, have 
received a good deal of scholarly attention during the last decade or so with the rise of 
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the Christian Right.  Yet few studies have examined the effect of local context, 
especially subnational institutional context, in determining the political power of 
religious beliefs; most work assumes a fairly even effect over space.  This study shows 
that culture‘s effect on power varies can be considerably strengthened by context and 
in variable ways; in Alabama, institutional context does not so much directly enable 
religious blocs (as perhaps it does in Mormon Utah, for example) as it enables a way 
of thinking that is aligned with a certain set of religious beliefs, those of conservative 
Protestants.  This conclusion contributes to the relatively small body of research on 
power‘s cultural dimension and ―the cultural dynamics within the organization of the 
state itself‖ (Jasper 2005: 115), as well as the ways culturally-reflective state 
institutions further shape and constrain social action.   
 
The conditional causality suggested by this study complicates the one-size-fits-all 
―end of Southern exceptionalism‖ theory, and helps explain why social inequality and 
uneven development continue to threaten places where job creation has indeed seemed 
to be voters‘ chief consideration.  In Alabama during the past two decades, voters 
faced with the choice to make major decisions about job creation have turned to 
principles over pragmatism.  This finding more closely echoes Black and Black‘s 
(2007) recent study of conservative politics in the South, which acknowledges the role 
economic considerations have played but also emphasizes the ways in which racial, 
religious, and cultural values continue to shape dominant political preferences.  In 
terms of development more specifically, these Alabama findings also fit within the 
more place-specific, path-dependent understanding of economic development 
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promoted by Lobao (2005)—one ―[stressing] the importance of analyzing regional and 
local variations in macro-level processes‖ (5).  If recent Southern political 
development is seen as a macro-level process, Lobao‘s call allows this study‘s 
particular findings about Alabama to fit into a broader conceptual project.   
 
The study also has practical implications for issues of development, power, and 
policymaking in Alabama and nationally.  Looking at Alabama, many questions 
remain: given these durable local circumstances, what sort of predictions can be made 
regarding development in the state over the next decade or so?  The past two decades 
have been a key period for states to respond to emerging 21
st
 century economic 
imperatives.  In rejecting a development approach that did not have the advantage of 
mapping onto familiar power structures and ideologies, Alabama made a choice that 
has left the state ill-prepared for a global economy that demands knowledge, 
flexibility, and innovation capacity.  What is unclear today is whether the new crises 
provoked by national recession, as well as the piecemeal third-wave development 
strategies that have popped up sporadically on the local level, will lead the state to 
embrace a more innovative paradigm based on different types of public investment 
than the state has typically valued.  If not—if the state is structured into a particular 
type of policy approach—how can it leverage local assets and advantages to further 
exploit this approach in the new economic circumstances?   
  
Assuming that the conditions maintaining preference for the capital-subsidy approach 
have not changed, it stands to reason that Alabama will have to leverage its existing 
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strengths (especially ―business friendliness,‖ manufacturing strength, and global 
connections) without an increase in public investment similar to that adopted by many 
other states.  This may be possible, although the current approach will certainly have 
to change.  To begin with, evidence suggests that big-ticket capital subsidy itself is no 
longer tenable: there is simply no money left in the incentive-enabling Capital 
Improvement Trust Fund today (a fact which receives little to no attention in the 
media, perhaps because political leaders are not ready to acknowledge it).  Sources 
indicate that ―the day of the big-box—chasing the big ribbon-cutting—is coming to an 
end‖ (Sid McAnnally, personal communication, 5/27/09).  Even if funds were 
available, Alabama‘s willingness to put it all on the line economically no longer seems 
as effective, as other considerations become more important for investors—a 
conclusion supported by the recently resolved Boeing/EADS competition (European 
aerospace company EADS and proposed construction site Alabama failed to win a 
major federal contract over Washington-based Boeing when the US government was 
apparently persuaded to support the domestic company). 
 
Even so, Alabama has considerable economic strengths that it could take advantage of 
without major ideological confrontations.  Concentrating on a state‘s existing strengths 
can be a boon, if these are innovative and are fostered from the bottom up.  
Diversification, innovation, and internally-driven growth are repeatedly emphasized 
by scholars of state economic development policy (Drabenstott 2006).  For example, 
Lobao (2004) has suggested that states foster ―territorial production complexes‖ based 
on firms that are generally locally-owned, small to moderate in size, and serve national 
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and international markets (21); she gives the example of artisan furniture production 
and associated tourism in the Ohio River Valley, and the revitalized small-scale dairy 
economy in the Northeast is another well-known case study.  Alabama does have 
manufacturing strength and well-developed connections with national and 
international markets, although it currently lacks an infrastructure of small locally-
owned production especially across lagging areas such as the rural Black Belt.  Still, 
this type of local small-scale manufacturing would not require major upgrades in 
human capital but could promise a more sustainable set of middle-class jobs than that 
brought by externally-owned corporations.   
 
Successful ―third wave‖ development initiatives need to draw on the right kind of 
organizational resources too.  Radin et al. (1996) identify a handful of organization 
features that are key to building local capacities and facilitating endogenous 
development—the ability for local governments to cooperate with each other, to share 
locally generated tax revenues, to engage in local land-use planning, and to effectively 
train civic leaders.  Alabama has been handicapped in this organizational realm; the 
local dependence fostered by its governance structure and capital-subsidy paradigm 
has prevented local governments and citizens from seeing development as a process as 
well as a product.  The idea of building community capacities that are not connected to 
immediate economic benefits are less familiar and possibly seen as inefficient, not 
only by state and market elites but also by the people themselves.  However, Alabama 
has begun the important organizational process of dismantling the barriers to inter-
county cooperation, as evidenced by a law passed in the early 2000s allowing up to 
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five counties to come together and create a regional authority with the ability to tax 
itself and fund economic development projects at the local level (Neil Wade, personal 
communication, 10/22/08).  This is a major first step for a state with an entrenched 
culture of local rivalry and competition as well as a top-down, product-oriented 
understanding of development.  And for better or worse, it does not require a 
fundamental realignment of the role of the state government which would seem to 
alienate most Alabamians from the pragmatic goals of development. 
 
Flora, Sharp, Flora, & Newton (1997) have also shown that leadership training and 
other forms of community-based interaction are associated with successful local 
economic development.  Currently, locales in Alabama benefit from community 
leadership training offered by the Economic Development Partnership of Alabama in 
partnership with Alabama Power and a few other major corporate interests in the state 
(Wiley Blankenship, personal communication, 5/14/09).  In a low-tax environment, 
industry may wear many of the hats that would be normally be worn by government or 
nonprofits, and this is certainly true in Alabama; the state could continue to take 
advantage of the quasi-government role played by industry which could be a boon for 
cash-strapped local communities (although it may continue come with strings 
attached).  Particularly important for bottom-up development and capacity-building is 
targeted support for entrepreneurialism in distressed areas, which Alabama has 
approached somewhat half-heartedly (John Zippert, personal communication, 2/10/09) 
perhaps due to the prevailing ―pick a winner‖ mentality.  However, such support could 
be provided through market mechanisms rather than through state aid; for example, 
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business incubators can divert funds and assistance to distressed areas in the spirit of 
microcredit and microentrepreneurialism (Claxton 2005).  As these types of programs 
have shown, relatively small inputs even from profit-minded local sources can help 
raise people out of poverty in areas where external investment does not usually 
penetrate, ensuring that development does not just continue to happen to growth poles 
but becomes more widely spread.    
 
Many of the steps Alabama could (and has begun to) take in the interest of third-wave 
development need not be expensive nor directed by the state, so civil society‘s historic 
aversion to taxes and planning would not necessarily pose a barrier.  But, they would 
require some institutional reorganization as well as a general openness to change.  It 
remains to be seen whether Alabama‘s powerholders will be willing to cede enough of 
their economic and political control to allow those changes to be made.  It seems clear 
that voters will look to them to frame such changes in reassuring and familiar ways.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Bivariate Correlations Among Study Variables 
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